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Abstract 
 
“This thesis seeks to conceptualise a model of inclusion for people with disabilities in 
deliberative democracy, which on one hand addresses a gap in deliberative democratic 
theory and on the other hand provides practical insights for its practitioners. Despite its 
critical and emancipatory roots, in practice deliberative democracy has traditionally left 
people with disabilities outside deliberative decision making processes. The thesis identifies 
the root causes of this exclusion as deliberative democracy’s convergence with liberalism 
which leads to the construction of the deliberative citizen as a liberal citizen, its neglect of 
the embodiedness of deliberation and normalisation of able-bodiedness, and finally its 
neglect of the spatiality of deliberative sites in both micro and macro levels. The proposed 
model of inclusion seeks to reclaim the emancipatory quality of deliberative democracy by 
replacing the dominant liberal conceptualisation of deliberative citizenship with a caring 
citizenship. It highlights the embodiedness of deliberation and suggests instrumentalising 
the embodied appearance of the disabled in deliberative sites as a claim for recognition and 
voice. It proposes a way to translate the presence of the disabled in deliberative sites into 
preference. Finally, it highlights the role of the spatial arrangements in a deliberative site as 
a factor that contributes to inclusion or exclusion.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Setting the Stage: The   Underlying Problem 
Deliberative democracy calls for a qualified participation from citizens that would be demanding 
even in the most mature democracies. Its demands for rational reasoning and preference for the 
force of the better argument are almost impossible to meet for those who lack the communicative 
competencies, and as a result render them disqualified for meaningful participation in the 
deliberative sphere. The exclusion of citizens with communicative disabilities does not only raise 
questions regarding deliberative democracy’s own emancipatory credentials and vision, but also 
constitutes a conspicuous democratic deficiency that has not been adequately addressed in the 
literature so far. The significance of this deficiency becomes even more striking when we consider 
that nearly twenty percent of any society live with a disability. Having a disability makes individuals 
a member of the world’s largest minority group.1   
 
Deliberative theory’s problems especially regarding exclusion are well known and have been 
discussed widely over the last few decades. In fact, its trajectory reflects a pattern of an ongoing 
dialogue between its theory and practice. In this on-going dialogue first a variety of issues relating 
to the theory are raised by its critics as well as practitioners, which in turn lead to modifications of 
blind spots in the theory, and so on. As a result, deliberative theory shed its earlier, more formal 
and procedural characteristics in favour of a more inclusive approach over the years. However, 
while discussions regarding inclusion and what counts as deliberation abound, they are limited to 
the participation of the average citizen. That “no one with the competency to speak and act may 
                                                     
1 In the UK there were over 11 million people who live with a long term illness, ailment of disability in 
2014 (Department for Work and Pensions 2014). In 2012 the US Census Bureau reported that nearly 
1 in 5 people in the US have a disability (US Census Bureau 2012). 
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be excluded from discourse” is one of the most repeated maxims of deliberative democrats 
(Steiner et al. 2005; Cohen 2002; Benhabib 1996; Chambers 1995). Yet societies are made up of 
more than average citizens and deliberative democrats have not yet adequately addressed what 
then we ought to do with those who do not speak, act or reason with the competencies of an 
average citizen. 
Although what is meant by this average citizen is not necessarily clarified and for the most part 
only self-explanatory depending on the context and arguments of the authors, it becomes 
obvious that the average citizen is at least an able-bodied citizen. In comparisons that 
problematize citizen competence the subjects are usually elites vs. ordinary citizens, the more 
vocal vs. the less vocal, the more politically active vs. the less politically active etc. Neither the 
critics nor the exponents of deliberative democratic theory acknowledge the existence of those 
whose physical or cognitive disabilities prevent them from voicing their preferences in a way that 
is expected from interlocutors in a deliberative setting. As a result, those who are probably most 
in need of being heard end up remaining voiceless, almost as non-existent citizens. 
The place of the disabled in deliberative democracy is a question of how deliberative democrats 
see a significant portion of any given society’s citizens. Citizenship in the west has always 
expressed a right to deliberate with others and participate in determining the fate of the polity 
to which one belongs (Isin and Wood 1999, 156). While different traditions define and limit the 
extent of this participation in different ways stemming from various justifications and concerns, 
the vision and the self-proclaimed difference of deliberative theory is enhanced participation 
through deliberation.2 In light of the current exclusion, do deliberative democrats see people 
with communication disabilities as citizens? Are the disabled to be content with their 
                                                     
2 For different democratic traditions and their approaches see Held 1987.  
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citizenship as merely legal status, at the mercy of the decisions of the abled as a deliberative 
version of civitas sine suffragio? What is at stake here is the very democratic credentials of 
deliberative democratic theory, because as Dryzek points out, “without inclusiveness there 
may be deliberation but not deliberative democracy” (Dryzek 2010, 137). 
The Significance of the Problem 
This work, then, intends to explore and open new avenues in which the disabled can constitute 
themselves as political agents under new terms, and take their position in deliberative sites that 
have so far been unavailable to them. While contributing to deliberative democratic literature by 
addressing a significant gap in theory and its practice, it also brings together the aspirations of two 
projects that are inherently emancipatory: disability studies and deliberative democratic theory. 
It follows the “emancipatory disability research” paradigm, which rejects the traditional 
assumption that people with disabilities “suffer” from their physical or cognitive impairments and 
instead suggests that it is physical, cultural and social environments that exclude, disadvantage or 
oppress certain categories of people who are labelled disabled (Barnes, C. 2001). Similarly, 
deliberative democracy has always harboured an emancipatory potential, a vision of giving the 
otherwise disadvantaged groups voice and influence in democratic spaces (Knops 2006). Indeed, 
it is this emancipatory potential that gives deliberative democracy its self-proclaimed superiority 
over other, representative and liberal constitutionalist accounts of democracy. 
 
The two emancipatory projects also provide us with two different yet complementary 
perspectives through which we can appreciate why the exclusion of people with disabilities from 
deliberative decision making processes must be problematized. From a disability studies 
perspective, this exclusion is part of the wider oppression that people with disabilities face in 
  
4 
 
their daily lives.3 Adapting Young’s multi-dimensional typology of oppression, it becomes visible 
in the economic exploitation, social marginalisation, political powerlessness, cultural imperialism 
and violence that people with disabilities are forced to live with (Young 2002). Therefore, 
alleviating this exclusion is a step to mitigate their oppression. From a deliberative democratic 
perspective, deliberative democracy’s values of equal access and equal voice are the most 
obvious reasons why their exclusion is problematic. From a policymaking perspective, 
participation has an economic value when people whose lives are affected by certain decisions 
are involved in the decision making process, mitigating the possibility of ill-considered policy and 
investments. I unpack these considerations in the following paragraphs, showing how the claims 
and concerns of the emancipatory disability research agenda converge with deliberative 
democratic ideals in the quest for inclusion of people with disabilities in deliberative democracy. 
 
The oppression that people with disabilities face imposes on them a particular set of economic 
disadvantages and cost. Described by Gleeson as “costs of disability”, these relate to – but are not 
limited to – the additional medical, social and transport needs that people with disabilities usually 
have. While there is usually no recompense from governments, people with disabilities face a 
double disadvantage in terms of their net income. Life costs of the disabled are £550 a month 
more on average, however they are usually employed in low paying jobs and more than twice as 
likely to be unemployed as non-disabled people (Scope UK 2016; Office for National Statistics 
2016).  Moreover, people with mental health problems may face up to a 42% pay gap when in 
employment (Campbell 2016). Largely as a consequence of the disadvantages they face in 
professional training and in the labour market, people with disabilities tend to be poorer than 
other socially disadvantaged groups. Their social marginalisation also becomes visible in their living 
                                                     
3 For many disability studies theorists this oppression is part of a wider social oppression that is 
connected to other forms of subjugation, which includes the oppression of deviant bodies identified 
on sex, gender and race lines. See for example Gleeson 1998, 130; Abberley 1987; Morris 1991; Oliver 
1990. 
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environment – usually in the physical or socio-economic margins of cities – as well as in the 
inaccessibility of public urban spaces. They are further marginalised from mainstreams of power, 
including formal political spheres due to legal or administrative barriers, lack of awareness of 
political rights, inaccessibility of voting, the internet, audio-visual media etc. (European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights 2016). As a result, the able-bodied maintain their advantage in 
power relationships in the political sphere. Power is also maintained through violent means – 
while asylums and institutions are history at least in western contexts, the dominant cultural 
practices that privilege able-bodiedness still construct the disabled as the other, the deviant. 
In light of this multi-dimensional oppression, participation of people with disabilities in 
deliberative sites is primarily an equality issue.4 The idea of a democratic people assumes that all 
legally affected individuals should be included and given rights of political participation. Hence, 
in a democratic order, the preferences and goals of the marginalised should count just the same 
as the preferences of all other citizens. They should have the opportunity to influence the 
decisions of a government, the regulation of the key institutions of society as well as the 
determination of the conditions of their individual and associational lives. They should be able to 
do this ideally in proportion to their stake in the outcome (Warren 2009, 17; Della Porta 2013, 
40). 
Participation of people with disabilities is also desirable in order to introduce new and important 
issues that relate to their lives into the political debate (Della Porta 2013, 42). While all issues are 
not equally important, all issues ought to be given the opportunity to access to, and be heard in 
the public sphere. When there is a track record of leaving certain groups of citizens and their 
                                                     
4 Following the participatory theory as formulated by Pateman, by participation I refer to equal 
participation in the making of decisions, and by political equality I refer to equality of power in 
determining the outcome of decisions. See Pateman 1970, 43. 
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views outside, or attempting to assimilate them to a single dominant culture, the recognition of 
the disadvantaged and the oppressed, and their opportunity to have a voice become especially 
important (Young 2002, 121; Andersen and Siim 2004, 17; Gastil et al. 2012, 21). Failing to do so 
by depriving the disabled of the right to take a place at the decision making table sends the 
message that they are not like other people and they are not wanted as part of the broader polity 
(Appelbaum 2000, 850). On the other hand an inclusive decision making process is a means to 
give them the opportunity of the fullest self-expression (Pateman 1970, 36). In this sense an 
inclusive deliberative site becomes instrumental not only in recognising, but also in reducing 
inequalities, as it provides the means and mechanisms for the existence, acknowledgement and 
the representation of the perspectives of those who are marginalised and oppressed. Beyond 
recognition and representation, participation can be an instrument for redistributing the 
resources to the advantage of the weakest and the most silent. 
 
Participation is not only just but also educational and integrative. Because there is an 
interrelationship between the authority structures of institutions and the psychological 
qualities and attitudes of individuals, being taken into account as an equal and listened to – 
maybe for the first time in the case of people with disabilities – boosts self-esteem and 
communicates that the person with a disability is part of the polity (Goodley 2014, 9). The 
opportunity to partake in the polity can be a significant, therapeutic and normalising 
experience for people with disabilities (Appelbaum 2000). Therefore for the disabled individual 
the experience of participation in a deliberative site can be as important as decision making 
itself (Pateman 1970, 27). Besides, the inclusion of the disabled in deliberative sites is 
educational not only for those with disabilities, but for all who are present. Sharing deliberative 
spaces with disabled citizens may change the dispositions of the able-bodied towards the 
disabled, open their minds to new issues and experiences different than their own, and take 
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them into account in their thinking. The deliberative site, therefore, can become a school of 
democracy in a very immediate sense (Della Porta 2013, 41). 
Finally, an inclusive deliberative site is also preferable from a public administration point of view, 
for it improves efficiency and cost – benefit payoff. Political or policy decisions which are a direct 
outcome of or informed by inclusive deliberation should be expected to decrease the possibility 
of error. Decisions and costly investments concerning people with disabilities will have a better 
chance of hitting the desired targets if they originate from or are informed by the preferences 
and deliberations of the very people which they are intended for. In this sense, the famous and 
now well established statement of the disability rights movement, “nothing about us without us” 
should be heeded not only as a political slogan, but also for the sake of administrative efficiency 
and cost-benefit payoff. 
 
Thesis and Chapter Outline 
 
With these concerns in mind, my distinct contribution to the field will be developing a model of 
inclusion for the disabled that brings together the insights of a number of disciplines which on one 
hand reclaim deliberative democratic theory’s emancipatory credentials and on the other hand 
provide practitioners with applicable, realistic steps. This model is informed by the insights of 
disability studies scholarship, which locate disability in the social and physical barriers around the 
individual rather than the individual herself. Deliberative democracy harbours a number of such 
barriers in its construction of the deliberative citizen and her competencies, and its 
conceptualization of deliberation and the deliberative site. The first barrier is deliberative 
democracy’s marriage with liberalism and the consequent construction of the deliberative 
citizen as a liberal citizen in the more dominant, liberal readings of deliberative democracy. 
I contend that this construction is one of the root causes of the exclusion of people with 
disabilities from deliberative democratic theory and deliberative sites. The second barrier 
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is deliberative democracy’s neglect of the embodiedness of deliberation, which can also be 
linked to the first root cause. The third barrier is deliberative democracy’s neglect of the 
spatiality of deliberative sites, both at the micro and macro levels. I identify and analyse 
each of these barriers in order to arrive at a conceptualisation of deliberative democracy 
that is conducive to the inclusion of people with disabilities in deliberative sites as equal 
citizens.  
 
The main body of the work consists of two introductory and three analytical chapters. My 
main concern in the first two chapters, on deliberative democracy and disability studies 
respectively, is to lay the theoretical groundwork for the discussion that follows. In these 
two chapters I also put deliberative democracy and disability studies literatures in 
communication with each other. In Chapter 1 I give an account of deliberative democratic 
theory and highlight the different ways its practice excludes people with disabilities. After 
tracing the development of deliberative democracy through its normative, empirical and 
systemic phases, I problematize its demands from citizens regarding their competence as 
well as its conceptualisation of the deliberative citizen as a liberal citizen. I refer to 
deliberative democracy’s Rawlsian roots in this context, and suggest that replacing 
deliberative democracy’s liberal orientation with a caring orientation makes deliberative 
citizens more responsive to each other, while making deliberative democracy more 
inclusive of difference.  
 
In Chapter 2 my goal is to bring disability and disability studies into the context of deliberative 
democratic theory, especially as they pertain to the inclusion of people with disabilities in 
public life. I trace the development of disability studies and explore the claims of disability 
scholars regarding attitudes towards disability in public life. In this discussion the social and 
critical models of disability provide us with the vocabulary which is then used to assess and 
  
9 
 
criticise deliberative democracy’s assumptions regarding citizens. I contend that deliberative 
democracy follows society’s prevalent attitudes against disability in its assumptions 
regarding the normal citizen, and in the many ways it ignores or excludes people who do not 
fit in this construction of normal citizenship.  
One of the building blocks of the model that I develop comes from the critical model’s 
insight that disability is an embodied experience. Meanwhile deliberative democracy’s 
construction of normality implies disembodied citizenship as well as disembodied 
deliberation. The significance of the body has been ignored by deliberative democracy’s 
Habermasian and Rawlsian genealogies, and gone unacknowledged by deliberative 
democrats ever since. In Chapter 3 I emphasize the embodiedness of both disability and 
deliberation, and suggest that the inclusion of the disabled in deliberative democracy starts 
with their taking their place, their embodied presence in deliberative sites. I then explore 
what this embodied presence can mean and achieve in the deliberative site. 
In Chapter 4 I establish a link between the embodied presence of the disabled in deliberative 
sites and inclusion of the disability perspective from an epistemic point of view, arguing that 
deliberative sites that are already cognitively diverse become epistemically superior with the 
arrival of the disability perspective. Having suggested in the previous chapter that the 
embodied presence of disabled person is the first step to inclusion, I highlight here the need 
for the translation of this embodied presence into preference, because presence alone 
cannot communicate preference. In this discussion I turn once again to the caring orientation I 
had introduced earlier, and suggest that the care relationships between the disabled and their 
carers can facilitate this translation, whereby the disabled co-deliberate with their carers in 
deliberative sites. I then provide examples of how this co-deliberation can work in practice. 
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In Chapter 5 I introduce the theme of spatiality – another notion largely ignored by deliberative 
democrats so far – and argue that the spatial arrangements of deliberative sites are significant at 
both micro and macro levels in discussion of inclusion and exclusion, because space denotes 
power relationships that are not immediately visible. Here I discuss how spatial arrangements 
can include or exclude people with disabilities further, and consequently how an awareness of 
spatiality can be conducive to more inclusive deliberative sites. 
In conclusion, and weaving the above themes together, the inclusive model I propose constructs 
the deliberative citizen as a citizen with a caring orientation. It acknowledges the embodiedness 
of disability as well as deliberation, and employs the embodied presence of the disabled citizen 
in the deliberative site as a claim for recognition and inclusion. It claims that the inclusion of the 
disability perspective makes decisions reached in deliberative sites epistemically superior, which 
in final analysis is worth the cost of the possible disruption that including the disabled may cause. 
Finally, this model acknowledges the role of the spatiality of deliberative sites in the inclusion or 
exclusion of certain segments of society. 
At the cost of causing this introductory chapter to be unusually long, a number of concepts and 
topics need to be introduced before we can proceed to the main body of the work. In the 
following sections I first introduce and discuss my methodological approach, and then define 
what I mean by “people with disabilities”. The chapter ends with a description of Learning 
Disability Partnership Board (LDPB) meetings, which I attended regularly while I was 
developing this inclusion model. Most of the ideas explored in this work have been 
developed as a result of my observations on LDPB meetings and my interaction with LDPB 
participants. As a result, I regularly refer to my experience in LDPB meetings throughout this 
work. 
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Underlying Philosophy and Methodological Approach 
 
Having set the stage by introducing deliberative democracy’s problem of inclusion regarding 
people with disabilities and having reflected on the significance of this problem, the 
contribution and normative concern of this work is to recover and even further the 
emancipatory credentials and vision of deliberative democracy by exploring and proposing 
ways through which people with disabilities are included in deliberative sites. This 
exploration will be situated between the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, 
maintaining an awareness of the dialogue – tension if you will – between its theory and 
practice as I seek an attainable and workable approximation of deliberative theory that can 
accommodate the needs and adjustments that disability requires. In this, I follow 
Mansbridge’s practice-thought-practice approach: 
 
As sometimes happens with the most original forms of theory, this new theory derives 
from acute observation of practice. People who were actually engaged in trying to 
make democracy work tried first one form of practice and then another until they 
evolved a set of institutions that came closer to meeting their needs (Mansbridge 
2003). 
 
I employ a qualitative methodology which reflects the dialogue between theory and practice. 
I start with the theory and highlights its aspects that I deem to be especially relevant for my 
concerns. I then analyse deliberative sites at the micro-spatial level, in the context of a single 
deliberative site which is situated in a network of deliberative sites.5 I then feed the insights 
I have gained from these meetings back into deliberative democratic theory. 
                                                     
5 To be more specific, Learning Disability Partnership Board Meetings in Gloucestershire (see below). 
My focus is strictly on face-to-face, physical deliberative spaces and I leave broader sites of 
deliberation (e.g. web forums and internet based innovations) outside the scope of this work. The 
focus on micro deliberative sites also acknowledges the importance of face-to-faceness of deliberative 
democratic practice. As Parkinson 2012, 7 observes, physical public space matters to democracy and 
  
12 
 
By doing this, I make visible which norms or claims of deliberative democratic practice hinder 
the inclusion of people with communication disabilities. Having identified the exclusionary 
aspects of deliberative practice, I then adjust the theory’s norms or claims, or suggest new 
ways through which people with communication disabilities can be included in deliberative 
practice. By using this ongoing pattern, my purpose is to help refine deliberative democratic 
theory, making it more sensitive to real-world constraints and opportunities (Dryzek 2007, 
40). For this interaction between theory and practice, I make use of a unique setting, 
Gloucestershire Learning Disability Partnership Board (LDPB) meetings, where people with 
learning disabilities come together with local council staff and various other stakeholders in 
a deliberative setting.6  
In my analysis of the LDPB meetings I use an interpretive approach which also has 
phenomenological and autoethnographic underpinnings. An interpretive methodology is 
best suited to my purposes for several reasons. First, I intend to capture the experiences, 
voices and complexities of public deliberation as it takes place in LDPB meetings (Hendriks 
2007). By studying this specific context in depth, I seek to understand meaning - what really 
happens when the disabled and the non-disabled deliberate together, and why.  
Second, I seek to understand a specific deliberative site in its local, social and institutional 
context. Here I am not interested in exploring a mechanistic causality that can be generalised 
anywhere and everywhere, but rather I want to understand how the actors experience this 
context and how their experience might inform deliberative democratic theory (Schwartz-
Shea and Yannow 2012, 52).  
                                                     
neglecting the physical element can have detrimental consequences especially for people with 
disabilities, who are already physically as well as socially isolated from public spaces 
6 A detailed account of LDPB is provided below. 
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Therefore, and third, I do not claim that my analysis and the following suggestions will solve 
the problem of exclusion once and for all. I do not seek a final settlement. Instead I seek to 
stimulate debate on an issue overlooked by deliberative democratic theory, and suggest one 
creative way of thinking that might help people with disabilities become visible and their voice 
heard. Finally, LDPB meeting participants come from very different backgrounds and 
experiences, not to mention varying levels of cognitive abilities. The interpretive approach is 
able to accommodate this multiplicity of roles, experiences and abilities, as well as actors' own 
interpretations that are found in this context. 
My focus so far on the meaning that is embedded in words, actions and artefacts has 
emphasized the more hermeneutical stream of interpretive research (Yanow 2006; Dryzek 
1982; Ercan et al. forthcoming). However a more phenomenological stream is also very 
relevant for my purposes. Phenomenology seeks to understand social and psychological 
phenomena from the perspectives of the people who experience that phenomena (Welman 
and Kruger 2002). It relies on a relatively simple principle: "providing a deep understanding 
of a phenomenon as experienced by several individuals" (Creswell 2012, 62). I try to 
understand the LDPB meetings as experienced by people with disabilities. The focal point is 
not the meetings themselves, but the shared experience of these meetings by people with 
disabilities as well as non-disabled interlocutors. .  While I look for the meanings underlying 
words, actions, gestures, assumptions, interactions, procedures, rules, artefacts and spaces, 
the meanings that I arrive at are not inevitable. Rather, they are shaped by my experience as 
a former charity manager, and positionality as an academic researcher who has read relevant 
texts extensively – an opportunity most my observees did not have. Yet, these meanings are 
still not constructed arbitrarily or in isolation, because they emerged out of constant 
interaction between my observees and me. 
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Another aspect of phenomenology which is extremely relevant for my analysis is its emphasis 
on the significance of the body and the corporeal experience. Merleau-Ponty offers a 
phenomenological account of 'being in the world' as a means to correct the distorted 
accounts of experience found in rationalism. In his account the body is not a place but the 
starting place in an investigation of one's existence. There is no separation between the 
experiencing "I" and the body through which that experience takes place, as the body is the 
intermediary of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 138) . The primacy which Merleau-
Ponty attributes in his phenomenological perspective to lived experience and the 
significance of the body is a useful tool to understand the corporeal dimensions of inequality. 
Indeed, in The Second Sex we see Simone de Beauvoir employ his phenomenological 
understanding of the body as "the instrument of our grasp upon the world" (Beauvoir 1997 
[1949]). Similarly, in Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young explores how corporeal 
modes of communication can maintain inequality in the gestures, tone of voice, movement 
and reaction of others (Young 2011 [1990]). Because of the embodiedness of the disability 
experience, my interpretive approach maintains a strong phenomenological outlook as well 
as a hermeneutical one. As I will explore in great detail in the following chapters, the 
presence of people with disabilities is a different type of presence. As a result, a 
phenomenological awareness is not only useful, but also necessary to understand what really 
happens in the deliberative site when people with disabilities are present. 
Finally, inherent in my interpretive approach is also an autoethnographic element. 
Autoethnography seeks to describe and analyse personal experience in order to understand 
cultural experience (Ellis, Adams, and Bochner 2010). It starts with a personal story, which 
usually includes an epiphany that forces the person to analyse lived experience (Wall 2008; 
Bochner and Ellis 1992; Couser 1997). My personal story regarding disability started almost 
a decade ago when I first walked into a mental asylum in Ankara, Turkey, as the new manager 
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of an organisation that worked with people with physical and cognitive disabilities in state 
institutions. While I do not share my own personal narrative expressly in this work, the 
experiences and insights gained during this time shapes my analysis of the problem as well as the 
solutions I propose. In this approach, I follow – although silently – many disability scholars who 
wrote their own experiences into their own work to challenge mainstream views on disability 
and lay bare the oppressive attitudes of an able-bodied society (Holt 2008). Indeed, disability 
studies have been one of the areas autoethnography has been used widely, especially by disabled 
disability scholars (Denshire 2014).7 
The autoethnographic element provides a layered account, in that my experience stands next to 
abstract analysis and interaction with relevant literature (Charmaz 2001). This approach is a 
response to the critique directed at autoethnography regarding its reliability, generalisability and 
validity. Autoethnographists are often criticised on the grounds that they are not rigorous 
enough, they do not do adequate fieldwork, they do not hypothesise, analyse and theorize (Ellis, 
Adams, and Bochner 2010). Duncan for example calls for “hard evidence” to support “soft 
impressions” (Duncan 2008). Similarly, Starkes warns against relying on stories alone, because 
although there may be good stories, stories do not constitute good scholarship on their own. 
They must be supported by theoretical abstraction or conceptual elaboration (Sparkes 1996, 24). 
In response, the stories I tell do not stand on their own. Rather, they provide the link in the 
interaction between the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in the manner that 
Mansbridge describes, as I cited above. Moreover, to highlight their relevance and reinforce their 
validity, when I tell a story, I support it with a second account found in the literature to show that 
                                                     
7 The use of autoethnography as a research method by disability scholars is again rooted in the oft-
repeated “nothing about us without us” slogan (Charlton 1998). The expert on disability is not the 
clinician or the researcher, but the person who experiences disability or illness herself. 
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my experience of, and reflections on a singular event converge with other scholars’ experience 
of and reflections on similar contexts. 
The data comes from two years of participation in LDPB meetings, participation in the meetings 
of various other organisations connected to LDPB as well as conversations and interactions with 
individuals who are connected to the LDPB one way or another (for a detailed list of these 
meetings and conversations, see Appendix A). I used participant observation, observation notes, 
conversations and document analysis. The methodological approach that I have employed was 
in one sense forced upon me due to the requirements under which I could work with the LDPB. 
When I enquired about observing meetings for my research, I was given one condition – I would 
have to become a full member and participant of the board and contribute to the discussions. 
 
Moreover, it became clear very soon that I was not going to be able to interact or conduct 
substantial interviews with learning-disabled participants. There were a number of reasons for 
this. First, there were multiple layers of gatekeepers – NGO staff, council staff and carers who 
thought that the disabled were in need of their protection. The first few times I inquired about 
the possibility of interviews with board members with learning disabilities, I was given a number 
of reasons why this would not be possible or productive – the individual does not like talking to 
strangers, the individual cannot sit through an interview or a chat, the individual would feel too 
anxious etc. As a result, I adapted my expectations and methods. Instead of interviews, I would 
have brief chats, informal conversations with the disabled before or after meetings (usually in 
the presence of a gatekeeper). This way I was able to access snippets of information and insights 
here and there instead of structured or semi-structured interview data. 
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 Second, being a visiting academic immediately put me in the position of an expert, where most 
people in the room – both the non-disabled and the disabled – looked up to for insight. In virtually 
any conversation, no matter how many questions I attempted to ask, the individuals wanted to 
know what I, the expert, had to say to them: How did I find the meeting? Were they doing well? 
What would I recommend to improve their meeting? As a result, I had to rely on the insights 
gleaned – with labour - from informal, spontaneous chats, rather than substantial, structured 
interview data.  
Third, having to attend the meetings as a participant rather than an observer, along with my past 
experience as a disability charity manager, made me too much of an insider. Therefore it was 
clear from the very beginning that I could have no illusion of impartiality so far as the needs of 
the disabled were concerned for their full inclusion in deliberative democratic theory. My 
understanding of this social and political phenomena was clearly shaped by the experiences and 
perspectives of those I shared the deliberative space with, but also enriched by my past 
professional experience. Therefore – bringing the phenomenological stream in once again – I will 
also have to admit that my description, analyses and conclusions regarding what really happens 
in Gloucester's LDPB meetings and how these analyses and conclusions inform deliberative 
democratic theory will be an outcome of my own personal experience of this deliberative site as 
a participant, and as an ally of the community of people with disabilities. 
Who are people with disabilities? 
So far I have used the terms ‘disability’, ‘disabled’ or ‘people with disabilities’ without so much 
of a definition. Arriving at a universally accepted standard or definition of what constitutes 
disability is not possible because disability is not a monolithic entity. Even though people 
with the same disability might share common traits and challenges, disability exists in an 
enormous variety and countless experiences. Some disabilities are visible, some are not. 
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Some are acquired gradually or at a certain point in time; some, people are born with. 
Every person with a disability is unique, so are her needs, preferences, expectations and 
interactions with her environment. Furthermore, disability is only one part of the totality 
of an individual’s identity and its role and impact will be different in every individual case.  
Therefore if we attempted to identify who is disabled and who is not, our identification 
would have to be based on a particularly narrow set of relative values and assumptions of 
normality (Oliver and Barnes 2012, 27). The identification and naming process is an 
inherently social act, which influences the responses we then give to various physical and 
cognitive disabilities (Dear et al. 1997). For some medical philosophers, even clinical 
diagnoses are speech acts and in this capacity “they establish social realities and roles 
independently of whether they are true or not and state or communicate any facts” 
(Sadegh-Zadeh 2011, 415). When we also consider the fact that new diagnoses are added 
or existing diagnoses are revised in every new edition of the diagnostic guides that mental 
health professionals use, we are faced with a very complicated picture of what mental 
health, illness, good health and diagnostics are.8 
Informed by these insights and in order to acknowledge the fluidity of disability, I use the term 
‘disability’ in a broad and functional sense to denote a person’s relevant abilities and the extent 
to which these abilities match the demands of a particular reasoning and decision making task 
(Wong et al. 2000, 296). The particular reasoning and decision making in question correspond to 
democratic deliberation, and the person is disabled – cognitively, physically, or both – to the 
extent that the demands of the deliberative space render her unable to deliberate. This 
conceptualisation of disability is also informed by and compatible with both the World Health 
                                                     
8 Mental health professionals use two guides: The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, first published in 1952 and revised for the fifth time in 2013 and psychiatric illnesses section 
of the International Classification of Diseases, currently in its 10th edition. Therefore new diagnoses 
are added, or existing diagnoses are revised or changed in at least every 10 years 
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Organisation’s definition of disability, which sees it as a participation restriction among other 
things, and the social and critical models of disability, as the discussion in the following chapters 
will make clear.9 The common thread in these conceptualisations is that disability is not located 
in the person, but in the “complex of embodied differences rendered pathological by discursive 
and material practices” (McKinney 2016, 114). The focus on the restriction and the inability to 
deliberate – rather than the type or nature of the disability itself – enables us to use one form of 
disability experience (i.e. the exclusion caused by one form of disability) to address a variety of 
other experiences. In other words, what matters for this discussion is not the exact nature of the 
disability itself, but the resulting exclusion that certain demands impose on that disability.  
Learning Disability Partnership Boards and Meetings 
 
When I started thinking about the inclusion of the disabled in deliberative sites, I could find no 
reference in the literature to any instances of deliberation where the disabled were included in the 
group of interlocutors. I was preparing therefore for my enquiry to be mainly theory reliant, with 
no insights from practice. One day in a conversation with a mental health charity worker I heard 
about the Learning Disability Partnership Board (LDPB) meetings mentioned in passing. When I 
asked him to tell me more about these meetings, I soon realised I stumbled on a unique 
deliberative setting that had gone unnoticed by deliberative democrats. In the following days I 
contacted the LDPB board chair in Gloucestershire and stated my interest in conducting empirical 
research. The response from the chair was very positive, indicating that I was welcome to 
attend their meetings, however they had one condition – I was not allowed to stay on the 
side. I would be expected to become part of the community as an insider who contributed 
to their meetings. 
 
                                                     
9 The definition of disability used by WHO covers impairments, activity limitations and participation 
restrictions. See http://www.who.int/topics/disabilities/en/ (Last accessed in 1 March 2015) 
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I have already explained above the implications of this condition for my methodology. In the next 
two years LDPB meetings became for my work a laboratory of ideas in terms of what happens 
when the disabled and the able-bodied meet for deliberation. Most of the ideas developed in this 
work are a result of my participation and observations in meetings, and interactions with both 
the disabled and non-disabled LDPB members. Many of these observations are mentioned in the 
following chapters. Therefore it is important to give a brief summary of what LDPBs are about 
and how they work. I provide that summary below. 
 
In March 2001 the UK government published Valuing People, the first white paper for people 
with learning disabilities in 30 years and dubbed “a new strategy for learning disability for the 
21st century” (Department of Health 2001).10 This new strategy aimed to address the major 
problems people with learning disabilities and their services were facing, and introduced four 
new key principles as an overarching framework: rights (that people with learning disabilities 
should have equal legal and civil rights), independence (that people with learning disabilities 
should be given the chance and means to lead more independent lives), choice (that people with 
learning disabilities should have more choice and be able to express and achieve their 
preferences) and inclusion (that people with learning disabilities should be included in 
mainstream society). 
 
The new approach was different not only because of its content, but also because it allowed 
people with learning disabilities to play a direct part in formulating government policy. Insights 
gained from a series of visits to local groups of learning disabled people by the Service Users’ 
                                                     
10 This white paper and strategy replaced Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped, London: 
H.M.S.O., 1971. The agenda established for the next two decades was markedly different from the 
previous ones, in that, it adopted a less medical and more person-focused approach and focused on 
reducing the number of places in hospitals and increasing provision in the community. It committed 
the Government to helping people with learning disabilities to live “as normal a life” as possible, 
without unnecessary segregation from the community. It emphasised the importance of close 
collaboration between health, social services and other local agencies. See Valuing People p. 17. 
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Advisory Group, published in a report titled “Nothing about Us without Us” were incorporated in 
the objectives of the new policy.11 In this report, as well as in the Valuing People document, 
several issues that people with learning disabilities face were raised. To mention a few, it became 
apparent that people with learning disabilities have little control over their own lives although 
almost all – including the most severely disabled – are capable of making choices and expressing 
their preferences.12 Despite this fact, they had little involvement in decision making at the local 
or national level, they were not taken as central to the planning process and not enough effort 
was being made to communicate with them in appropriate and accessible ways. Moreover, they 
no longer wanted to be treated as passive recipients of services, but instead wanted to be 
involved in the decision making, planning and delivery processes as active partners. 
 
Valuing People identified some of the biggest barriers to the involvement of people with learning 
disabilities in decision making processes as limited awareness of or support for local groups, little 
or no community involvement, lack of accessible communication between decision makers, 
service providers and people with learning disabilities, lack of training and development 
opportunities (for both people with learning disabilities, their carers, as well as frontline service 
providers and local decision makers), and unevenly developed citizen advocacy and self-advocacy. 
Lack of secure funding added another layer of difficulty for the potential improvement of these 
issues. In the face of these significant challenges the white paper set out new national objectives 
for services for people with learning disabilities, supported by new targets and performance 
indicators for local agencies.13 
  
                                                     
11 The Service Users Advisory Group included representatives from People First, Mencap, Change and 
Speaking Up. 
12 Valuing People, 4.1. 
13 These eleven objectives aim to cover every aspect of disabled people’s lives, at every age and stage in 
life: maximising opportunities for disabled children, transition into adult life, enabling people to have more 
control over their own lives, supporting carers, good health, housing, fulfilling lives, moving into 
employment, quality, workforce training and planning, and partnership working. 
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In 2009, nearly eight years on from Valuing People, a new three-year strategy for people with 
learning disabilities, titled Valuing People Now was introduced. Using the tagline `making it 
happen for everyone`, Valuing People Now reiterated the four key principles and acknowledged 
the progress made in the last seven years. The new goal was taking forward the implementation 
of the policy set out in Valuing People especially by reaching more people with learning 
disabilities, emphasizing personalisation and partnerships. Valuing People Now also 
acknowledged once again that “citizenship is also about contributing to society, in whichever way 
we can”. Although people with learning disabilities have traditionally been viewed as recipients 
of care and of services, they too have a role to play as contributors. Wherever possible, people 
with learning disabilities should be supported to work, pay taxes, vote, do jury duty, have 
children, and participate in community activities or faith groups.14  
 
Perhaps one of the most exciting innovations of the Valuing People agenda was the establishment 
of Learning Disability Partnership Boards within the framework of the existing Local Strategic 
Partnerships. The 150 Learning Disability Partnership Boards across the country would have lead 
responsibility  for ensuring the implementation of the new Valuing People Now objectives at the 
local level. Every local authority in England and Wales was thus instructed to develop local action 
plans to this end by October 2001. The rationale behind the LDPBs was extending the partnership 
model to learning disability services, as effective partnership working by different agencies was 
seen as the key to achieving social inclusion for people with learning disabilities. The Government 
expected all local agencies to partner in their provision of services for people with learning 
disabilities. These included social services, health, education, employment, housing, transport, 
leisure and the Benefits Agency. 
                                                     
14 Valuing People Now, p. 28. 
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LDPBs would bring together public, voluntary and independent agencies. Their membership 
would include senior representatives from social services, health bodies (health authorities, 
Primary Care Trusts), education, housing, community development, leisure, independent 
providers, and the employment services. Special mention was made of the participation of the 
representatives of people with learning disabilities and carers as full members. LDPBs had to 
particularly ensure that people with learning disabilities and carers are able to make a real and 
meaningful contribution to the Board’s work. The cultural diversity of the local community had 
to be reflected in its membership, therefore minority ethnic representation had to be 
encouraged where appropriate and necessary. Local independent providers and the voluntary 
sector also had to be fully engaged and included by the local council. 
 
LDPBs were essentially designed based on deliberative democratic principles, although this was 
not explicitly acknowledged. They would work within the four key principles framework, ensuring 
the availability of service options to meet people’s assessed needs (rights), including the agencies 
responsible for housing, education, employment and leisure in local planning and commissioning 
(independence), opening up wider services options for all people by coordinating greater 
integration between agencies (choice) and giving people with disabilities, their families and 
carers the opportunity to be involved in local partnerships (inclusion). To achieve these goals, 
they relied on the active participation of all stakeholders in decision making. Monthly LDPB 
meetings would become the deliberative sites where decisions that affect the lives of people with 
disabilities would be made. 
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Valuing People in Gloucestershire 
Gloucestershire LDPB was established in accordance with the Valuing People directive. When I 
started attending regular LDPB meetings in 2014, the board had already been well established. 
In 2010 Gloucestershire County Council produced The Big Plan, an 80 page document which 
would guide the services for people with a learning disability in Gloucestershire between 2010 
and 2015.15 The Big Plan was founded on the principle that people with learning disabilities have 
the same human rights and responsibilities as everyone else. These included the right to choose 
to live independently, the right to exert as much control as they can over their lives and the 
services they use, and the right to participate in every aspect of their local community. It also 
highlighted the role of participation and partnerships as the key means of putting people first. It 
promised greater say in monitoring, planning, delivery and in some cases managing the services 
targeting people with learning disabilities. To help make this happen, council staff was going to be 
trained to encourage and promote an enabling approach in their work.16   It also promised to ensure 
that the voices of carers are present in all aspects of planning and delivery of services.17 
The LDPB makes sure that the Big Plan is put into action. It makes decisions about how the Big 
Plan Development Fund is spent. It reports annually to Public Health, Gloucestershire Health and 
wellbeing board. Also regularly reports to the Joint Commissioning Partnership and the Learning 
Disabilities Programme Board. It consists of several “action groups”, which are smaller deliberative 
meetings tasked with a particular aspect of The Big Plan: Employment, Housing and Supported 
                                                     
15 The Big Plan 2010 – 2015 replaced the previous strategy for learning disability services in Gloucestershire 
which ran from 2004 to 2009. The new plan was introduced in light of the changes in government policy (as 
exemplified in the four documents which were published in within that period: Valuing People Now, Putting 
People First, Healthcare for All and P.S.A. 16), changes in the expectations of local people and the 
improvements in services that the earlier strategy had brought about 
16 Big Plan, p. 17. 
17 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Living, Health, Community Relationships and Leisure, BME (black and minority ethnic) and Newly 
Arrived Communities and Putting People First.18 
Each of these action groups have their own charter of strategy and activities, and meet 
regularly. Quarterly reports from the action groups are presented and discussed at the larger 
LDPB meetings, which are held every two months. The board reports to the Gloucestershire 
County Council Cabinet and Public Health England annually. The Joint Commissioning 
Partnership Board as well as the Learning Disabilities Programme board also receive regular 
reports from the LDPB. 
Soon after The Big Plan was announced, the Learning Disability Partnership Board held a 
conference to get the views of the public, and especially the community of people with 
learning disabilities on the new framework. Over 140 people from each area of the county 
were present. The suggestions from the community to the council leaders were in favour of 
the emphasis on participation and partnerships. However they demanded substantial rather 
than tokenistic involvement: listen to us and do what we say, make the information better 
and more accessible for everyone, keep deliberative groups small so all can talk, show us 
evidence of putting what we say into practice, involve us in planning and service changes, 
help providers change by offering more training, come out and talk to local groups, do more 
to involve people from black and minority ethnic groups and people with higher levels of 
disability.19 These demands would also set the agenda for the next five years of LDPB 
meetings. 
 
The Partnership Board has two co-chairs: one non-disabled, and the other with a learning 
disability. Board meetings are attended by people with learning disabilities (also called self-
                                                     
18 These sub-groups change from year to year. The list here mentions all groups that have been set up 
since 2010, meaning that some of them might not be in existence anymore. 
19 Big Plan, p. 40. 
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advocates), carer representatives, a lead joint commissioner, representatives from the 
various teams of the council, representatives from 2gether Trust, representative from the 
Jobcentre Plus, representatives from the BME Community Development Group and 
representatives from other voluntary organisations. When the need to vote arises after 
discussion, only members are allowed to vote. Decisions however can only be made at a 
meeting where minimum quorum is in attendance. That is, a minimum of 2 people with 
learning disabilities, 2 family carers, 2 people from statutory organisations and 1 person from 
an organisation providing a service to people with learning disabilities. LDPB meetings take 
place in the physically accessible meeting rooms of the Shire Hall (i.e. Gloucestershire Council 
House). Action groups also meet in the same building. 
 
In this introduction I have set the stage by introducing deliberative democracy’s deficiency 
regarding the inclusion of the disabled and discussed why this problem is significant. I have 
then proposed my solution to the problem by introducing a model of inclusion. The chapter 
outlines indicated how I intend to build this model. We are now ready to start building this 
model by laying the theoretical foundations in the first two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Deliberative Democracy and the Deliberative Citizen 
Introduction 
 
Despite its critical and emancipatory roots, deliberative democratic theory has been cluttered 
with liberal assumptions which exclude people with disabilities from deliberative sites. To 
surmount the exclusionary results of these assumptions we need to innovate in particular to 
pursue the role of an ethics of care in a more nuanced and deepened conception of deliberative 
democracy. In order to begin this task, this chapter traces the development of deliberative 
democracy from its inception to the present day, with particular emphasis on how the theory 
and its practice in deliberative sites developed over the decades in response to the demands of 
politics in the real world. After three decades of interactions between deliberative democratic 
scholarship and its practice, it would be impossible – and not to mention unnecessary – to 
provide a comprehensive account of the theory, its critique as well as its application around the 
world. My aim, therefore, is not to provide a detailed analysis. Rather, I intend to lay the 
groundwork and put the signposts in place for my own project, which is to do with the place 
and inclusion of people with disabilities in a deliberative democracy today. Therefore each 
concept or topic treated below is chosen because of its significance for the case I will be building 
in the following chapters. 
 
The chapter is divided in two sections. In the first section I follow the often repeated “turns” of 
deliberative democratic theory to describe its development. Several points become apparent in this 
discussion. First, deliberative democracy’s earlier normative promise is still relevant for an 
emancipatory and inclusive politics due to the conceptual tools this period provides us with. In my 
review of the normative period I discuss two of these tools, the ideal speech situation and validity 
claims, in detail. Second, the theory has been subjected to a number of modifications as its 
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assumptions and claims were tested in experiments or applied to daily politics. The review of the 
second, empirical period tells us how deliberative democracy has evolved over the years to meet 
the demands of social and political realities. Third, deliberative experiments and exercises have 
shown us that deliberative democracy’s potential and promise can go much further than what 
takes place in single deliberative sites. In my review of the systemic period, I discuss how the 
expansion of deliberative democracy’s boundaries and scale requires us to think about 
deliberation in many different contexts. Finally taking note of the advances as well as the 
limitations in these “turns” is crucial for this project, because I also propose a further set of 
modifications in a variety of contexts in order to secure the inclusion of people with disabilities 
in deliberative democratic decision making processes. 
 
One of these modifications comes into focus in the next section, where I take up the question of 
the deliberative citizen. Here I problematize the construction of the deliberative citizen as a 
competent citizen in the liberal sense. This construction is linked for the most part to the Rawlsian 
genealogy of deliberative democracy, but also taken for granted in contexts where deliberative 
democracy has flourished in liberal hands, as the examples I provide demonstrate. My goal in 
bringing up this point is to highlight the undue burdens such a construction puts on the shoulders 
of average citizens. I contend that this liberal orientation is one of the reasons why the inclusion of 
people with disabilities has been off the radar for deliberative democrats. I suggest replacing 
deliberative democracy’s liberal orientation with a caring one. I summarize the claims of care 
theorists especially in contrast with deliberative democracy’s liberal assumptions. I then explore 
how caring qualities would transform deliberative practices in general, and what a caring 
orientation would look like for deliberative citizens and deliberative processes in particular, also 
bringing deliberative democracy back to its emancipatory roots. 
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I. "Deliberative Turns": Exclusion in Theory and Practice 
 
The First Generation: Normative Beginnings 
 
First coined in 1980 by Bessette, deliberative democracy has become the foremost 
democratic theory in the last three decades (Bessette 1980). It is now not only commonplace 
to talk about the “deliberative turn” in democracy, but deliberation itself has for a while been 
taken as “the essence of democracy” (Dryzek 2000, 1). Simply put, deliberative democracy is 
a normative account of democracy which bases the legitimacy of decision making processes 
in the effective deliberations of free and equal citizens who are subject to collective decisions 
(Dryzek 2000, 2; Elster 1998, 1; Bohman and Rehg 1997, ix). The emphasis on collective 
decision making in general, and viewing the democratic legitimacy of decisions as based on 
opinion transformation rather than the aggregation of preferences is not new. Indeed, 
Thucydides wrote in as early as 5th century B.C. that “instead of looking on discussion as a 
stumbling block in the way of action, we [Athenians] think it an indispensable preliminary to 
any wise action at all”20 (Thucydides and Rhodes 2009). In modern times classic writers 
ranging from Dewey to Arendt, from Rousseau to Mill and from Burke to Rawls have been 
associated with the ideals of deliberative democracy (Elster 1998; Bohman and Rehg 1997, 
12). 
The concerns of the first generation of deliberative democrats were mostly normative. They 
attempted to justify deliberative democracy and highlight its superiority to the more 
aggregative forms of democracy, and answer how discursive procedures can guarantee a more 
legitimate decision making process in a democratic polity (Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016, 
141).21 In this period it was Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls – representing critical and liberal 
                                                     
20 Although of course it would be a stretch to call the Athenian democracy deliberative in the sense 
deliberative democratic theory is understood today. 
21 Although for Saward this aggregative model which is associated with atomistic individual, self-
interested voting and the absence of consideration of the common good is a straw man built by 
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traditions respectively – whose works provided the theoretical foundations on which 
deliberative democratic theory was built. Habermas’ main influence was putting 
communication, reflection, mutual understanding, and subsequent opinion formation and 
transformation at the centre of democracy (Dryzek 2010, 3).22 Rawls’ work on the other hand 
brought deliberative democracy to the heart of liberal constitutionalism by identifying 
deliberative democracy as a well-ordered constitutional democracy. However, he envisioned 
deliberation only in matters “concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice”, and not necessarily as an institutional decision making process (Rawls 1997, 771–
72). As such, deliberation’s role was to bring about a constitution, which “the citizens may be 
reasonably expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason” (Rawls 2005, 137). In Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, Dryzek discusses 
the distinctions between these liberal and critical frameworks within deliberative democracy 
and laments what he calls the convergence of liberal constitutionalist and critical strands on 
mostly liberal terms. For him, this convergence blunts the critical edge of deliberative 
democratic theory, because while liberalism assumes that individuals are mostly motivated 
by self-interest before any conception of the common good, and therefore necessitates a 
constitution to arbitrate and negotiate between individuals’ self-interests -, a critical theory 
of democracy harbours a better chance to maintain communication that encourages 
reflection and equality in deliberative competence (Dryzek 2000, 9).23 
                                                     
deliberative democrats to support their “black and white contrast to the deliberative model, with one 
model unambiguously good, the other bad” (Saward 2000) 
22 Some, like Thomassen, go as far as claiming that deliberative democracy is the translation of the 
ideas developed in the Theory of Communicative Action (1984, 1987) and Discourse Ethics (1990) into 
the domain of politics (Thomassen 2010, 112). 
23 In Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, Chapter 1, Dryzek discusses at great length the limits of 
liberal constitutionalism as well as the dangers this convergence poses for deliberative democratic 
ideals (See Dryzek 2000, chap. 1). It is not within the scope of this chapter to provide an analysis of 
the differences between the more liberal and critical conceptualisations of deliberative democratic 
theory. However, I will return to a related discussion in the second section of this chapter, where I talk 
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Informed by Dryzek’s critique and Critical Theory’s concern with the emancipation of individuals 
– in this case as it applies to people with disabilities – in the pages below I follow a critical 
genealogy of deliberative democracy that is informed by Habermas’ thinking and in particular his 
theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984). This critical strand not only influenced 
deliberative theorists directly or indirectly, but also provides the most comprehensive account of 
the theory’s very raison d’etre. This raison d’etre can be summarized as a rejection of 
instrumental rationality as well as rational choice theorists' aggregative views of democracy.24 
Instead, politics should be thought of as a give and take of public reasoning between citizens – a 
give and take in which the aim is not securing the maximum benefit for oneself, but reaching a 
collective decision whereby each benefits to her satisfaction (Parkinson 2006). This is not an 
attempt to be taken lightly, yet this is precisely the attraction of deliberative democratic theory. 
It promises to go beyond the limits of self-interested liberalism that can at best hope to arrive at 
a compromise between citizens to “recapture the stronger democratic ideal that government 
should embody the will of the people formed through the public reasoning of citizens” (Bohman 
1998, 401). 
Perhaps partly reflecting the domination of the more liberal conceptualisations among other 
reasons, Habermas and his discursive standards have all but completely disappeared from recent 
works and discussions on deliberative democracy. Here I will revisit two Habermasian concepts, 
the ideal speech situation and validity claims, which on one hand provide a theoretical basis for 
the practice of deliberation and on the other hand give us a measuring tool against which we can 
evaluate good deliberation, and consequently a good deliberative decision-making process. As I 
                                                     
about liberalism’s construction of the deliberative citizen, how this construction relates to the needs 
of people with disabilities so far as their inclusion in deliberative decision making processes is 
concerned, and how care instead of liberal ethics can provide a better framework for inclusion 
24 Instrumental rationality is adopting suitable means to one’s ends and as such is closely linked to the 
idea of self-interest (Kolodny and Brunero 2016). 
  
32 
 
have mentioned in the introduction, the relevance of these two concepts for this work will become 
clearer when in the next chapters the focus turns on deliberative sites and opinion formation. 
Ideal speech situation describes the perfect communication scenario where it is possible for the 
interlocutors to reach a universal, unconstrained consensus. Following the critical tradition, for 
Habermas the public sphere is contaminated by the universalisation of instrumental rationality, 
which in turn stifles the space for democratic decision making processes and overpowers it by 
technical and administrative imperatives (Habermas 1984; 1992; Villa 1992, 713). While the public 
sphere is characterised by communicative distortions, coercion as well as asymmetry of voice and 
power, communication can reach mutual and rational understanding under certain conditions 
described by Habermas as the ideal speech situation. Habermas calls a speech situation ideal “if 
communication is impeded neither by external contingent forces or more importantly by 
constraints arising from the structure of communication itself” (Habermas 2003, 97). The unforced 
force of the better argument is the only acceptable constraint here. The ideal speech situation is 
characterised by a symmetrical distribution of the opportunities for all possible participants to 
choose and perform speech acts, which also makes dialogue roles universally interchangeable and 
gives the interlocutors equal opportunities to deliberate. When all participants in dialogue have 
the same opportunity to initiate communication, to continue it through speaking, ask questions, 
respond to questions, put forth interpretations, assertions, explanations or justifications, and to 
establish or refute their claims to validity, a basis for opinion formation and transformation can be 
reached in which “no prejudice or unexamined belief will remain from thematization and critique 
in the long run” (Habermas 2003, 98). 
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The ideal speech situation requires that interlocutors communicate within the rational 
boundaries provided by four validity claims, which according to Habermas are raised by 
anyone acting communicatively. He identifies the four claims as:  
The speaker must choose an intelligible expression so that the speaker and hearer 
can comprehend one another. The speaker must have the intention of 
communicating a true proposition so that the hearer can share the knowledge of 
the speaker. The speaker must want to express her intentions truthfully so that the 
hearer can find the utterance of the speaker credible (can trust her). Finally, the 
speaker must choose an utterance that is right with respect to prevailing norms 
and values so that the hearer can accept the utterance, and both speaker and 
hearer can, in the utterance, thereby agree with one another with respect to a 
recognised normative background (Habermas 2000, 22; italics in the original text). 
The ideal speech situation is a significant notion for the scholars and practitioners of 
deliberative democracy because it provides the blueprint for the ideal deliberative site: 
interlocutors who are equal, free from domination, prejudice and self-deception, outside 
distortions and strategic interaction engage in free and open communication with a desire 
to understand each other and arrive at a mutually agreeable decision. In this site everyone 
has equal access to relevant information, and everyone is open to the prospect of the 
transformation of their opinions in and as a result of the process of deliberation. While 
Habermas’ account of communication in the construct of the ideal speech situation may be 
seen as a naïve and impossibly demanding account of communication, what is important for 
deliberative democrats to take home from this notion is that it acts as a regulative ideal to 
what perfect communication looks like.25 It is an ideal to approximate in deliberative 
practice. Therefore Estlund, while favouring the idea of an ideal speech situation as a “potent 
tool” in normative democratic theory, concedes that “its role is mainly as a template to lay 
                                                     
25 For some of the critiques of ideal speech theory see Schrag 2003, 61; Elster 2016, 148–57; Ingram, 
1982, 158. For a defence of the use of ideal speech theory as a “historically grounded criteria of 
openness, impartiality and rationality” in the context of a single deliberative event, see Kemp 1987, 
177 – 201. 
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over actual deliberations in order to identify deviations” (Estlund 2006, 90). Indeed, 
Habermas himself admits that “this construction is meant to demonstrate that we are indeed 
capable of anticipating an ideal speech situation, which a competent speaker must be able 
to do if she wants to participate in discourse” (Habermas 2003, 179, n. 11). Again, “we 
assume in every conversation that we can reach a mutual understanding” (Habermas 2003, 
97). Similarly, the deliberative democrat assumes that while distortions will be inevitable in 
deliberative sites, the interlocutors will come to the site mutually presupposing something 
like an ideal speech situation.26 
Informed by and built on these theories of communication and legitimacy, the main concern 
and expectation of the first generation of deliberative democracy was that egalitarian, open 
minded, reason-centred and consequential deliberation should produce a variety of positive 
outcomes which enhance democracy and citizen participation. Deliberation was expected to 
contribute to the justice of decisions by giving everyone a chance to express their interests and 
arguments, contribute to the efficiency of decisions by collecting and filtering information 
which will in turn raise the quality of political decisions as they become more considered and 
informed by relevant reasons and evidence, contribute to public support for decisions by 
institutionalizing fair and public procedures; and protect against complacency and despotism 
by promoting a lively public sphere. It was expected to help citizens to be more active and 
engage more in civic affairs, increase their tolerance for opposing points of view, improve their 
understanding of their own preferences and help them justify their preferences with better 
arguments. It was hoped that people's recognition of their autonomy would also increase as a 
result of leaving win - lose power struggles behind, and faith in the democratic process would 
be enhanced as citizens are empowered and convinced that their government truly are “of the 
                                                     
26 It is important to clarify that while Habermas’ earlier construction of the ideal speech situation 
presented it as an ideal to be approximated, in his later works he abandoned this emphasis and 
described it purely as an assumption that an interlocutor has when entering discourse (Cf. Habermas 
and Thompson 1982, 261f and Habermas 1993, 163f). 
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people” (Barber 1984; J. Bohman 1998; Chambers 2003; J. Fishkin 1997; Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996; M. Neblo 2005; Pearce 1997). 
The Second Generation: The Empirical Turn 
The second generation of deliberative democrats focussed particularly on the application and 
suitability of the normative ideals to complex situations, societies and democracies in which 
deliberative experiments had already started. This period witnessed deliberative democratic 
theory move beyond its normative confines and become a working theory, as various initiatives 
were designed to put it into practice as well as evaluate institutions based on a medium of 
deliberation (Bachtiger et al. 2010; Ryfe 2002). It was also in this period that the early 
applications of deliberative theory, ranging from deliberative polling to mini-publics, citizen 
parliaments and more recently online communities, led to the realisation that a gap existed 
between purely normative conceptualisations of democracy and their factual base (Bohman 
1996, 15). Deliberative democratic theory’s ideals did not successfully match the facts on the 
ground, and the gap between the theory and practice had to be bridged. 
The problems that were encountered in the practice of deliberative experiments lead the 
second generation scholars to challenge the rigidity of the earlier deliberative theory in 
favour of a more generous understanding of deliberation. Dryzek 2007, for example, 
suggests that the real world practices and possibilities can be expected to diverge from the 
ideal to some degree, exhibiting the limitations of the ideal theory. Once they are identified 
– not necessarily as deviations to be mourned but as limitations to be circumvented – the 
theorist’s or the practitioner’s task is to decide what should be done about them. This in turn 
helped broaden and reframe, or even reform deliberative theory's earlier principles, which 
on one hand sharpened the critical edge of deliberative democracy, and on the other hand 
made it more accommodating of the plurality and diversity of contemporary democracies – 
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admittedly almost exclusively in liberal contexts (Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016, 142; 
Elstub 2010). Problems that were raised and challenged in this period can be grouped under 
four headings: participation, rationality, language and equality. 
Participation. Deliberative democracy can assume no more than that individuals simply have the 
disposition and capacity to deliberate although it is silent on who exactly is to deliberate, where, 
when, and how (Dryzek 2007, 238). Its limitations regarding participation become apparent when 
we turn to its practice and attempt to think about ways to make it more inclusive (Goodin 2012, 
127f). Two major problems come to the fore. First, the procedural demands of deliberation might 
scare the citizens away and prevent the presence, voice or representation of all relevant parties in 
a deliberative site. Research suggests that public participation goes up when the material and 
symbolic costs of participation are lowered and its benefits are increased for the individual (Gastil 
et al. 2012, 44). Therefore deliberative sites should rely on far more than an open door and self-
selection policy which usually results in participation that is skewed in favour of those with higher 
economic status and better education. Second, imagining that citizens do join in deliberation, 
there is no explanation as to why those who have not been part of deliberation confer any 
authority and legitimacy on the decisions reached as a result of the deliberation of some, 
emphasizing once again the need for wider participation (Parkinson 2006, 2). 
Rationality. Deliberative theorists explicitly assume individuals to have the basic cognitive capacity 
to argue with reasons, to be aware of criteria for justification, to understand rules of evidence, to 
follow the rules of inference and deduction and to reflect on their own presuppositions, and do all 
this within the boundaries of what they define as rationality (Rosenberg 2007, 6; 2014). 
Participants are expected to put their arguments in language that is understandable and 
persuasive to the largest array of people. The obvious result is that deliberative processes 
disadvantage those who speak less well, or who speak in ways that are devalued by the dominant 
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culture, thereby disadvantaging minorities and their agendas and exacerbating inequality (Walsh 
2007, 49) . Moreover, arguing that democratic discussions should be rational, moderate and calm 
implicitly excludes public talk that impassioned, emotional or extreme, which, for Sanders to 
name one, is one of the indictments of the democratic appeal of deliberation (Sanders 1997, 
358). 
Deliberation also implicitly or explicitly excludes the positive role of the emotions in 
deliberation. Deliberation in its ideal sense can serve to dichotomise reason and emotion 
and single out emotion as unnecessary or even dubious. Mansbridge et al point to the fact 
that emotions always include some form of appraisal and evaluation, and reason itself 
needs at least an emotional commitment to the process of reasoning (Mansbridge et al. 
2006, 6). Nussbaum also gives emotions a positive role in deliberation, especially 
emphasizing compassion as an essential element of good reasoning in matters of public 
concern (Nussbaum 2006). Other emotions such as solidarity or even anger can play 
equally important roles. 
Language. Disadvantaged groups are also disadvantaged when it comes to language. 
Language does not simply mirror or picture the world as it is, nor should it be seen as a 
neutral medium for communication. Instead it profoundly shapes our view of the world. 
Language competency on the other hand is a skill, which is unevenly distributed (Kohn 
2000, 5). The biased nature of language and its relationship with power is especially 
relevant in a discussion on deliberation (Mendelberg 2002, 16). The language people use 
as they reason together will usually betray their background, worldview and even social 
class, favouring one way of seeing things and discouraging others. 
Equality. Deliberative theory is built on the twin principles of formal equalisation of access 
and equal opportunity to articulate persuasive arguments. However deliberation in the 
real world is susceptible to power games and imbalances, inequalities of information and 
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expertise. Shapiro, for example, claims that the emphasis of deliberative theorists does 
not adequately attend to the degree to which moral disagreements in politics are shaped 
by differences of interest and power (Shapiro, 1999, 29). It can well be used strategically 
in order to dominate (Neblo 2005, 5). When citizens deliberate with elites, for example in 
public hearings or advisory committees, such inequalities of information and expertise come 
into play in an even more pronounced fashion. And it must be admitted that some will always 
have more access to information and to the resources needed to form informed ideas than 
others. 
Economically and educationally disadvantaged citizens are usually also disadvantaged when 
it comes to access to relevant information. The problems that the disadvantaged people face 
are often multiple and interconnected – poverty, criminality, addiction and intellectual 
incompetency usually coexist in a cycle of deprivation and intensify the problem of access 
and inequality (Barnes, M., 2001). Not only the imbalance of information or power, but also 
the perception of one as more able to deliberate than the other will exacerbate inequality. 
Among the most important determinants of individuals' influence over the group's decision-
making process is others' perception of the person as more expert or competent in the task 
at hand (Mendelberg 2002, 9; Davies and Burgess 2004). 
These problems lead both the critics and the exponents of deliberative democracy to various 
improvisations in order to make it more acceptable and applicable as an emancipatory project. 
For Sanders, for instance, if democratic deliberation requires equality in both resources and 
the guarantee of equal opportunity to deliberate, structural or economic steps must be taken 
so that all citizens indeed have the resources, time, money, education, and skill at arguing with 
confidence (Sanders 1997). That in turn requires democratic deliberation not to be regarded 
as an isolated, one-off novelty. On the contrary, its shortcomings regarding equality should be 
situated in the wider and multi-faceted context of the question of equality in general. In this 
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context, Cohen and Rogers had long argued that one of the preconditions for free and 
unconstrained deliberation is the absence of material deprivation and urged the elimination of 
gross material inequities. Free public education and state-financed child care were some of the 
concrete steps they suggested for a deliberative context to thrive (Cohen and Rogers 1983). 
For others like Fung, one way of alleviating the problem of equal voice and will and therefore 
moving individuals from silence to self-expression is to construct the public sphere in such a 
way that those without voice and will find and form it (Fung 2007, 163). And this can only be 
done by opening deliberation to ways of communication the early theory has distanced itself 
from (Walsh 2007, 45). In this context, Young also argued that the process of deliberation 
should be opened up to participants disadvantaged by traditional elite understandings of 
reason-giving by adding the elements of greeting (that communicates mutual 
acknowledgment and caring), rhetoric (various and relevant forms of speech that appeal to 
the specific situations of interlocutors in a given deliberative setting) and storytelling 
(communicating long-held traditions and values alongside opinions) (Young 1996; 
Mansbridge et al. 2006, 6). Levine observes that these and similar alternative forms of 
communication, including protests, strikes, non-violent resistance, street performances or 
media campaigns can be more effective and satisfying than deliberation especially for those 
whose voices are not heard otherwise (Levine and Nierras 2007, 15). 
 
The Third Generation: Deliberative Systems 
The concern to apply deliberative ideals to increasingly more political spaces led deliberative 
democrats not only to improvise and extend their conceptualisations of deliberative practices, 
but also ask how political institutions can be designed to render them more responsive to 
deliberative democratic ideals. However their focus was still mostly confined to single sites and 
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events (Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016, 139). While the focus on structure and process is 
legitimate and also necessary, it also betrays the blind-spot of a great majority of the 
deliberative theory agenda of the first two generations of deliberative democracy. So far we 
have seen the deliberative event mainly as a temporary practice, many times nothing more 
than a civic engagement experiment, exercised within the confines of a single issue and over a 
limited and usually short period of time (Gastil et al. 2012, 24). It has yet to be taken out of the 
confines of institutions and taken beyond mini-publics and similar design novelties. 
This is precisely what the advocates of a systemic turn in deliberative theory argue. A systemic 
approach to deliberative democracy focusses on whole systems, of which single deliberative 
forums are one part (Dryzek 2010, 7). Single deliberative forums can be useful in both reaching 
their declared goals and providing a laboratory for researchers. However as isolated instances 
they cannot give researchers more than a snapshot of any given deliberation in its own unique 
context. A deliberative system, on the other hand, describes deliberative practices that take 
place in “multiple, diverse, yet partly overlapping spaces” and underscores the 
interconnectedness of these spaces (Elstub et al 2016, 139). 
In democracies politics and political activity extend to a variety of institutions, associations and 
various sites and forms of contestation. Contributions to debate and deliberation in the public 
sphere can come from informal networks, the media, advocacy groups, social movements, 
schools, religious bodies, foundations, private and non-profit organisations, legislatures, election 
campaigns, courts and even rallies and protests. These conversations can be carried on across 
time and space, “the threads of which are picked up by people at different times, in different 
places and with different interlocutors” (Parkinson 2006, 6). Each of these actors will play a 
different role; will have their own “deliberative moments” as members of the system (Goodin 
2012, 6). 
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Elstub et al sum up the deliberative systems approach in three core notions: an attempt to 
consider deliberative democracy as a mass scale practice, acknowledging the division of labour 
within a deliberative system and allowing deliberation to exist on a “continuum of criteria” 
rather than a single prescribed exercise (Elstub et al 2016, 143). Therefore, to see the picture in 
its entirety, a systemic approach requires a recognition and inclusion of all political, 
representative and decision making structures and political talk. Reasoning together is still 
seen as foundational, but it is based on a dispersed narration and opinion generation. Indeed, 
at any one moment, people will be engaged in “many threads which change and interact 
over time” (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 6). However all deliberation will still serve a 
function toward a larger goal within a larger whole. 
Dryzek suggests understanding a deliberative system as being composed of a number of 
elements and processes (Dryzek 2009, 1385). He makes a distinction between the public 
space and the empowered space, which roughly corresponds with Habermas' two tiered 
public sphere (Habermas 1996).27 The public space is the broad realm of "free ranging and 
wide ranging communication, with no barriers limiting who can communicate, and few legal 
restrictions on what they can say" (Dryzek 2009, 1386). This is the realm of the informal 
networks, media, and a vast array of organisations some of which have been mentioned 
above. The empowered space, however, is the realm of institutions and collective decision 
making. Legislatures, councils or committees are some of the empowered spaces Dryzek 
mentions (Dryzek 2009, 1386). 
The relationship between the public and the empowered space is explained by the process of 
transmission, which is the means through which the public space influences the empowered 
space. This influence might be asserted through a variety of means: rhetoric and arguments, 
mobilisation of stakeholders, political campaigns or even the personal links between actors in 
                                                     
27 For the two-tiered public sphere see Habermas 1996, chap. 8, especially p. 373-4 
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these two types of spaces. While transmission focuses on the interaction between the two 
types of deliberative spaces, Dryzek's fourth element, decisiveness, indicates the 
consequentiality of the interaction between the two types of deliberative spaces – i.e. whether 
the decisions taken in the empowered space reflect what is transmitted from the public space. 
Finally, accountability is the means through which the empowered space is accountable to 
public space - i.e. whether there is a mechanism through which the decisions taken in the 
empowered space are justified to the broader public. 
Focusing on various sites of deliberations as parts of a larger system and acknowledging their 
contextual differences would require a differentiation of the standards, modes and levels of 
deliberation based upon the distinct properties of each site. To give one example, Parkinson 
thinks while rhetoric might be an appropriate and acceptable means of communication for 
activists (perhaps during their campaigns), it will not be an acceptable way of deliberation in 
other places (for example the court room) (Parkinson 2006, 172). This variety of contexts then 
requires a loosening of the demands regarding what counts as deliberation depending on the 
location of deliberation and the characteristics of the deliberators. We can then be able to ask 
both empirical and normative questions about the relationship between these various sites 
and their place in the functioning of the system as a whole (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 
12). 
The systemic approach allows us to think about deliberative democracy in a more holistic 
way and in large scale political and societal terms. The scope of research and analysis – which 
for so long has been limited to one-off experiments or an aggregation of them – can be 
extended beyond the individual site to see the deliberations that develop among and 
between the sites over time. It also allows us to recognise the role each part plays in the 
greater whole, as well as their unique strengths and weaknesses. Together with an 
awareness of and even an emphasis on the context, this dialogue helps the development of 
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a more informed deliberative democracy. In this sense and as I have already mentioned 
above, issues that are encountered regarding the participation of the voiceless in one 
deliberative site or context can inform and shape other contexts. One single micro site 
therefore becomes instrumental in addressing and analysing the larger issues and broader 
systematic inadequacies, shaping the possibilities of effective and inclusive deliberation 
(Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 14). 
With the advantage of two decades of deliberative experiments and some – if limited – 
empirical evidence behind us, we have enough reasons to believe that deliberative processes 
can indeed produce positive outcomes with the participation of average citizens (Bachtiger, 
Sporndli, Steenbergen, & Steiner, 2007; Fung, 2007). As a result of the ongoing discussion 
between theory and practice, deliberative democrats have indeed taken on board most of 
the critique regarding deliberation’s restricting characteristics. Meanwhile deliberative 
practices have proliferated across the world. However little has been done to move beyond 
unchecked assumptions regarding the nature of deliberators – the citizens – and their 
deliberative competencies, resulting in the continuation of the persistent exclusion of people 
with disabilities from deliberative sites and decision making processes. In the next section I 
survey a number of deliberative events to show how deliberative events reflect the theory’s 
exclusionary assumptions. 
Exclusion in Practice 
While efforts and discussions to make deliberative events more inclusive and representative 
of society abound, the resulting solutions and innovations have not gone far enough to 
accommodate people with disabilities in deliberative sites. In fact, deliberative democrats 
hardly ever mention people with disabilities as a section of society that need to be 
considered in discussions on inclusion. Surveying a number of deliberative events mentioned 
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and celebrated widely in the literature provides insights to the extent of this omission and 
shows how exclusion works in practice in liberal contexts. 
Manchester 1994: The first deliberative poll in the world 
The world’s first deliberative poll was conducted in Manchester in 1994 to discuss and 
develop policy proposals on crime.28 Fishkin, who led the team that conducted the poll, 
describes what he calls “the basic formula” of the event as follows: 
“Select a national probability sample of the citizen voting age population and question 
them about some policy domain(s). Send them balanced, accessible briefing materials 
to help inform them and get them thinking more seriously about the same subject(s). 
Transport them to a single site, where they can spend several days grappling with the 
issues, discussing them with one another in randomly assigned, moderated small 
groups and putting questions generated by the small group discussions to carefully 
balanced panels of policy experts and political leaders. At the end, question the 
participants again, using the same instruments as at the beginning” (Luskin, Fishkin, 
and Jowell 2002) 
The event was filmed by Channel 4. The presenter reminded the audience that since they had 
only two days to deliberate, they were going to have to work hard. They were “going to be 
cooped up with three hundred strangers for a weekend, and bombarded with new 
information” (Channel 4 2006). This was clearly going to be a mentally demanding event. In 
his opening speech Fishkin described the crowd gathered in the studio as “a microcosm of 
entire citizenry brought together to a single place” (Channel 4 2006). A quick scan of the room, 
however, makes it clear that people with disabilities did not belong to this microcosm. The 
part of the event where experts were quizzed took place in the studio, which was built as an 
auditorium with inaccessible seats. If there were wheelchair users in the crowd, they would 
                                                     
28 Deliberative polls combine techniques of public opinion research and public deliberation to model 
what the public would think if citizens were more informed to consider the options on a particular 
issue (Fishkin 1993). 
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have to be seated in the very front, at the bottom of the steps. However there were no 
wheelchair users in the room at least while the cameras were on.29 
Instead the event reproduced every demand and assumption of deliberative democratic 
practice regarding an able-bodied composition of citizenry. Interlocutors were expected 
to read and understand printed briefing materials before the event and volunteer to 
deliberate. They were transferred to the deliberative site by coach from forty different 
constituencies across the country (meaning long coach journeys), and had intense 
discussions that took over three hours, in a small space. They received briefings from 
experts and were shown videos on the big screen (no mention of translation to sign 
language or subtitles). They had to have a certain level of confidence to quiz experts, 
among them prominent politicians, including the then shadow Home Secretary Tony Blair. 
Besides the apparent absence of disability from visual records of the event, there is no 
indication of disability accessibility or indeed mention of disabled participants in any of 
the many articles and reports written by Fishkin on the event (See, for example, Fishkin 
1994; 1997; 2011; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002). In terms of inclusivity and an effort 
to bring together a representative sample of citizenry, the sociodemographic variables 
that were taken into consideration were region and urbanness of residence, sex, race, 
marital status, family composition, occupation and education, media usage, party 
affiliation and experiences with crime (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002, 464). The absence 
of the disabled from deliberation on crime policy was especially striking in light of the 
hate crimes that people with disabilities face in their daily lives, which makes them 
stakeholders in this policy issue perhaps more than many other sections of society. 30  
                                                     
29 Admittedly, the other part of the event, small group discussions, could have taken place in accessible 
rooms when the cameras were switched off. 
30 Disability hate crime is defined by the Association of Chief Police Officers (UK) and Crown 
Prosecution Service as “any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to 
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Listening to the City, New York, July 2002 
In 2002 AmericaSpeaks, a non-profit organisation, designed a series of deliberative events in 
New York about the redevelopment of the World Trade Centre site after its destruction.  
The deliberative meetings, dubbed by the organisation a 21st Century Town Meeting, aimed to 
ensure that “all voices were at the table”, including the general public and key stakeholders 
(Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2002). Working with local organisations and leaders, AmericaSpeaks 
brought together over four thousand interlocutors by targeting diverse communities across the 
city. When deliberation day came, the room “looked much like a microcosm of the New York 
region” (Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2002). The participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire 
before the meetings started. We do not know whether they were asked any questions regarding 
disability – or in the recruitment process – however based on the questionnaire results, what 
made them a microcosm was their diversity in terms of gender, age, race, geographical location 
and household income. 
The report written by AmericaSpeaks founder Lukensmeyer and Brigham leave many questions 
about the recruitment, presence and deliberation of people with physical and cognitive disabilities 
unanswered. We know – by inference, because it is conspicuously absent – that disability was not 
a targeted characteristic during the recruitment process. Were people with physical or cognitive 
disabilities present in the room? The event relied heavily on in-depth discussion in small groups of 
ten to twelve, using electronic flipcharts, electronic keypads and large video screens that projected 
data and information to the interlocutors. Issue experts were available to answer participants’ 
questions – these are all cognitively demanding activities. Did the printed information have easy-
read versions? Were sign language translators available, for example during the experts’ talks? 
Were the technologies used – computers, large screens, electronic keypads etc. disability friendly? 
                                                     
be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person's disability or perceived disability” (Crown 
Prosecution Service 2016). 
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Did people who had diverse speaking or listening abilities have the chance to voice their opinion 
and were they given additional time to understand others’ opinions? We do not know. In this 
microcosm, there was no mention of different physical or cognitive abilities – except, ironically, in 
New York Daily News columnist Pete Hamill’s report: “We came to the vast hangar ... expecting 
the worst. Put 5,000 New Yorkers in a room, charge them with planning a hunk of the New York 
future, and the result would be a lunatic asylum... None of that happened” (Lukensmeyer and 
Brigham 2002, 365). We know instead that the meeting was orderly. 
 
British Columbia Citizens Assembly, 2004 
The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on electoral reform was convened in 2004 and 
tasked with examining the electoral system of the province. Its 160 interlocutors were 
chosen based on proportional representation that took into account three criteria: gender, 
age and geographical (electoral) district. This number represents 7% of the citizens who 
were initially randomly selected to participate. The other 93% chose not to participate 
(Snider 2008, 3). After the selection process experts lectured the participants on electoral 
models. Small group discussions facilitated by political science graduate students followed 
the lectures. Written materials were provided to participants during this initial learning 
phase. After the learning phase, participants hosted hearings to listen to the public’s 
opinions on electoral reform. The process was completed with the deliberation phase, 
which was then followed by voting (James 2008). Web forums were also activated during 
the deliberation phase to enable the wider participation of the public in discussions. 
Demographic characteristics of the Citizens’ Assembly, collected via questionnaires which 
were distributed in the initial meetings, account for age, birthplace, visible minority status 
(race), education and occupational skill groups (James 2008, 112). Similar to the 
deliberative events mentioned above, physical or cognitive disability is not taken into 
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account as a relevant characteristic. In fact, people with disabilities are mentioned only 
once by Pearse in the volume on the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, edited by 
Warren and Pearse (2008). While describing the uses of the web forums, Pearse suggests 
that the forums allowed members “who were prevented from expressing themselves as 
eloquently as they desired by a physical disability to present their views using an 
alternative medium of communication” (Pearse 2008). 
This segregating approach to physical disability displays another way in which deliberative 
democratic practice denies voice to the disabled in deliberative spaces. We could ask further 
questions regarding the selection process. Did the organisers wonder why the 93% did not 
want to participate in deliberation? Could they have been scared of the demands of this 
deliberative event from citizens? How many of them, if at all, declined participation due to 
some form of disability? We do not know the answers, because the organisers never asked. 
There is no mention of people with cognitive disabilities in the selection or the deliberation 
process. However considering the demanding nature of lectures on politics and small group 
discussions facilitated by political scientists, and informed by the attitude towards physical 
disability exemplified above, we can attribute the silence on people with cognitive disabilities 
to their absence in the Citizens’ Assembly. 
 
Australian Citizens Parliament February 2009 
The Australian Citizens Parliament (ACP) was a three day deliberation even that took place 
in Canberra in February 2009. The participants were tasked with finding an answer to how 
Australia’s political system could be strengthened to serve the citizens better. The 150 
deliberators, one from each electorate, were selected from the electoral roll using random 
stratified sampling. The stratification took into consideration three demographic 
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characteristics: age, gender and education. ACP meetings followed the format of 21st Century 
Town Meetings organised by AmericaSpeaks (Dryzek 2009). 
 
Because no additional demographic is provided other than the three mentioned above, we 
do not know whether or how many people with physical or cognitive disabilities were present 
during deliberations. However Dryzek reflects on the physically and cognitively demanding 
nature of the deliberative process: “there was plenty [of preparations] to do leading up to the 
main event”, “the citizens worked really hard over four days” and “we also demanded a lot of 
them for research purposes” (Dryzek 2009, 2). While we do not have access to information 
about the presence of people with disabilities on site, information can be inferred from the forty 
three page handbook distributed to facilitators by the New Democracy Foundation, one of the 
co-organisers of the event (New Democracy Foundation 2008). The handbook gives detailed 
directions, tasks and tips to lead facilitators, table facilitators and scribes. Ground rules on 
discussions and very detailed guidance on how to break the ice, how to help people talk, how to 
manage those who talk too much etc. are provided. However there is no mention of disability or 
any guidance on potential special accommodations during deliberation for people with 
disabilities. Again, there is no hint of existence of sign language translators, subtitles for visual 
guides or easy read versions of documents. We are left, once again, to attribute this silence to 
the absence of people with disabilities from another celebrated deliberative event. Once again, 
deliberative democratic theory’s exclusionary assumptions are reproduced in its practice. 
 
All four cases illustrate that while deliberative democrats are not unaware of the importance of a 
deliberative site that is representative of the citizenry, the citizenry that they imagine does not 
include people with disabilities. Attempts at inclusive and representative deliberation often do not 
go further than random or stratified samples of the population. Giving each citizen an equal 
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chance of being selected to participate is deemed to be enough for a demographically diverse 
deliberative site (Hendriks 2011, 96). For Smith, random selection ensures that no citizen or social 
group from the given population is systematically excluded from participation in deliberation. He 
warns about the importance of ensuring all relevant social groups are included. However he 
concludes that when participation needs to be restricted due to the size of the population, random 
selection is “a fair mechanism to distribute this ineradicable inequality” (Smith 2009, 80).31 
Parkinson’s reminder is in the same vein. For him, failure in selecting people on all the salient 
criteria and as a result excluding important views compromises the deliberative process 
(Parkinson 2006, 76). Finally, Elstub contends that “sortition promotes justice in the Rawlsian 
sense, as it is compatible with the difference principle, because it seems that those who are 
worse off in society are more likely to be able to participate through random sampling than 
through any other process” (Elstub 2014, 175). The problem that permeates these discussions, 
however, is not that deliberative democrats are unaware of the need to include all or relevant 
sections of society. The problem is that this public that they conceive of does not have any 
members whose disabilities prevent them from deliberation as equals. In the next section, I take 
a closer look at deliberative democrats’ conceptualisation of the deliberative site and its citizens. 
 
II. The Deliberative Citizen: A New Orientation 
 
The Liberal Deliberative Citizen 
Although much work has been done on the various macro and micro aspects of deliberative 
democracy - definition and boundaries of deliberation, deliberative procedures and processes, 
the quality of deliberation, the deliberative capacity of institutions and so on - deliberative 
democrats have mostly ignored questions around the people who do the deliberating. Studies 
on the deliberators have focused on who wants to deliberate (Neblo et al. 2010), what kind of 
                                                     
31 The relevant population is typically related to the political boundary of the public authority. See 
Smith 2009, 80. 
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people take part in deliberation (Jacobs, Cook, and Carpini 2009), the quality of deliberation 
(Steenbergen et al. 2003), the civic impact of deliberation (Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007; 
Grönlund, Setälä, and Herne 2010) and the impact of deliberation on the participants’ views 
(Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002). However research on the characteristics, especially the 
deliberative capacities and competencies of deliberative citizens have been scarce to date.32  
While they acknowledge deliberative democracy’s cognitive burden and moral demands, 
they almost always seek the alleviation of this burden in solutions that are exogenous to 
the individual – easing the procedural demands of deliberation, extending the boundaries 
of what counts as deliberation, levelling the deliberative ground to alleviate power and 
status imbalances, eliminating outside interferences, accepting the use of different ways of 
communication and so on. Yet they still take for granted deliberative citizen’s deliberative 
and communicative capacities and treat them as a foundational assumption.33 To reiterate, 
the deliberative citizen is an individual who has at least average physical and cognitive 
capacities to reason and communicate, to argue with reasons, to be aware of criteria for 
justification, to understand rules of evidence, to follow the rules of inference and deduction 
and to reflect on their own presuppositions. Using Kemp’s definition of communicative 
competence, she is “able to use speech acts to produce an interpersonal relationship 
between the listener and themselves” (Kemp 1987). Besides, she is willing to respectfully 
communicate and cooperate with other individuals, with whom she shares the public 
sphere. 
                                                     
32 Among the few exceptions are Somin 1998; Carpini 1997; Posner 2005. However these treatments 
still leave the question of disability outside their scope and focus on citizens’ lack of knowledge in light 
of the immense size and scope of modern governments. 
33 Perhaps another indication that the topic is understudied can be found in the ambiguity of the 
terminology on competence. Citizen competence (i.e. the deliberative citizen), deliberative capacity, 
deliberative competence and communicative competence are used interchangeably, conflating the 
possible nuances between what each term might highlight. Moreover, different authors use the same 
term differently. For example while Dryzek’s definition of deliberative capacity focusses on the 
capacity of the structures of a political system to host authentic, inclusive and consequential 
deliberation, Rosenberg’s definition of deliberative capacity focusses on individual capacities of the 
citizens such as rationality and reasonableness (Dryzek 2009; Rosenberg 2005) 
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The handful of deliberative democrats who problematize deliberative democracy’s cognitive 
or moral demands seem to take the education of deliberating citizens as the natural solution 
to alleviate these burdens. Kahane et al, for example, treat deliberation’s moral demands 
from citizens (in particular the citizens’ need to replace self-interest with willingness to 
exchange reasons and accept the better argument) under the title of “educating 
deliberative citizens” in their edited volume. Their collection of chapters make a case for 
instilling deliberative traits such as reciprocity, reflexivity and open-mindedness in 
schoolchildren from young age through education (Kahane et al. 2010). For Lupia, 
communicative competence can be achieved by employing the appropriate “competence-
generating mechanism” which again educates deliberators for similar qualities (Lupia 2002). 
Griffin devotes a whole article to discuss the educational techniques that could accelerate 
the development of citizens’ necessary capacities (Griffin 2011). Neblo again treats 
competence as primarily an informational problem that mainly concerns the deliberator’s 
political knowledge (Neblo 2015, 152 - 190).34 Their proposed solutions, therefore, seek to 
develop a certain capacity or attitude in the individual while leaving the assumptions about 
the average physical and cognitive capacities of individuals untouched. 
At the heart of these assumptions lies the convergence of deliberative democratic theory 
with liberalism (Dryzek 2000, 78). As a result deliberative democrats follow liberalism’s 
“felicitous but unrealistic assumptions regarding the capacities of individual citizens and their 
communicative competence”, rendering people with disabilities invisible in theory and 
absent from deliberative sites in practice (Rosenberg 2014, 98). The deliberative citizen in 
turn is constructed – by way of omission – as an able-bodied citizen. What, then, are these 
unrealistic liberal assumptions about the deliberative citizen? 
                                                     
34 Political knowledge, in turn, is described as the currency of citizenship by Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996. Neblo’s discussion is mostly based on an evaluation of Converse and Zaller’s respective 
approaches to the problem of citizen competence. 
  
53 
 
Liberal theories start from self-sufficient and independent individuals and assume their 
equality and autonomy. Having acknowledged deliberative democracy’s Rawlsian 
conceptualisation before, we find in Rawls’ citizens free, equal and rational individuals jointly 
agreeing upon and committing themselves to principles of justice in a hypothetical state of nature 
– the original position (Rawls 1999; Freeman 2014). These self-sufficient and independent 
individuals are fundamentally egocentric and primarily engaged in pursuing their self-interests. 
Out of their competition and fear of other individuals arise the need for compromise, and 
therefore a social contract (Sevenhuijsen 2004, 12). In other words, the tie that connects 
individuals is their mutual need for security and desire to advance their self-interests. The contract 
relies on the prospect of personal gain or advantage and the principles of justice are determined 
by imagining what these free and consenting individuals would mutually agree to endorse in order 
to pursue their individual and economic interests. Liberals suggest that the design of political 
institutions should also reflect the same model, leading to institutions that are acceptable to equal, 
independent and consenting individuals. 
The problem with this construction of the liberal citizen is that these autonomous and equal 
individuals are assumed to have ‘normal’ physical and mental capabilities which enable them to 
have a clear understanding of their own needs, as well as the ability to communicate their 
understanding and preferences to others (Kittay 1999, 8). Rawls defines a citizen as “a normal 
and fully cooperating member of society over a complete life”, leaving those who do not conform 
to the “normal” range of physical or cognitive capacities outside the original position and the 
contracting scenario (Rawls 2001, 233). Rawls’ parties to the original position are “roughly similar 
in physical and mental powers” (Rawls 1999, 109). He is not however unaware of this exclusion. 
In his own words, “since we have assumed that persons are normal and fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life, and so have the requisite capacities for assuming that 
role, there is the question of what is owed to those who fail to meet this condition, either 
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temporarily (from illness and accident) or permanently, all of which covers a variety of cases” 
(Rawls 2005, 21). However he chooses to postpone the answer:  
“I shall assume that everyone has physical needs and psychological capacities within 
the normal range, so that the questions of health care and mental capacity do not 
arise. Besides prematurely introducing matters that may take us beyond the theory 
of justice, the consideration of these hard cases can distract our moral perception by 
leading us to think of persons distant from us whose fate arouses pity and anxiety. 
The first problem of justice concerns the relations among those who in the everyday 
course of things are full and active participants in society and directly or indirectly 
associated together over the whole span of their life” (Rawls 1999, 83). 
When he finally comes back to the question, and that is after “normal” citizens have agreed 
on the principles of justice, the justice that is owed to people with physical or cognitive 
disabilities is a matter of legislation, allocation or distribution of resources: 
“Variations that put some citizens below the line as a result of illness and accident 
can be dealt with, I believe, at the legislative stage when the prevalence and kinds 
of these misfortunes are known and the costs of treating them can be ascertained 
and balanced along with total government expenditure. The aim is to restore people 
by health care so that once again they are fully cooperating members of society” 
(Rawls 2005, 184).35  
Therefore for Rawls citizens who are “below the line” are excluded from exercising 
citizenship on more than one level. First of all, they are excluded from the original position. 
Consequently, they are excluded from the contracting scenario, as they are assumed to be 
incompetent to cooperate with others. Finally, at the legislative stage, they are but recipients 
                                                     
35 Rawls’ account of the just response to disabled people is laden with negative notions and 
perceptions of disability, many of which I will problematise in detail in the next chapter. To mention 
some briefly, for Rawls disability is an illness – a completely medical problem, which distances the 
disabled from full and active participants of society. It is a “misfortune” – people with disabilities, 
therefore, are victims of bad luck. Their bad luck arouses pity and anxiety in others. The appropriate 
response to disability is health care provision to help the disabled become fully cooperating members 
of society 
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and passive members of society, whose misfortunes and treatment costs are a matter of 
government expenditure on health care. 
Rawls’ exclusion of people with physical or cognitive disabilities from the original position 
and thereby putting able-bodiedness at the core of liberalism is unsurprisingly taken to task 
by many. To mention a couple, Nussbaum problematizes the fact that the parties who are in the 
original position are the same individuals for which principles are chosen. Because these people 
have similar physical and mental powers and because they are fully cooperating members of 
society, she expects that the principles chosen in the original position will reflect and protect the 
interests of the able-bodied and not those who lack the abilities to participate in the original 
situation (Nussbaum 2006, 16; Cureton 2008, 9). For Kittay, because the notion of dependency is 
vital to all human experience and in particular the disability experience, justice has to account for 
it. Therefore dependency needs must be included not at a later legislative state, but instead in 
the very original position. Therefore Kittay’s argument also challenges the core requirements that 
define membership in the original position (Kittay 1999; Hirschmann 2013, 97, 113). 
 
From a Liberal to a Caring Orientation 
The absence of disability from deliberative sites suggests that deliberative democrats have 
followed the liberal pattern regarding disability – even if tacitly. I maintain that this liberal 
orientation and the consequent conceptualisation of the deliberative citizen as an able-bodied, 
self-interested individual with “normal” physical and cognitive competencies is problematic for 
at least two reasons. First, it is not a realistic picture of citizenry – societies are made up of 
more than average citizens, therefore conceptualising the deliberative citizen as an individual 
whose competencies require full cooperation in society leaves a significant number of citizens 
out of the deliberative sphere.36 Second, solutions in search of a more inclusive deliberation 
                                                     
36 Citizens who are left out by this conceptualisation are not limited to those with disabilities – the 
elderly, the frail and many others are also potentially left out.  
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(e.g. extending the definitions and methods of deliberation, educating citizens for deliberation 
and so on) end up trying to alleviate the symptoms of the problem (i.e. the problems that the 
liberal orientation create), rather than its root cause (i.e. the liberal orientation itself). 
While a liberal construction of the deliberative citizen leaves out those who do not fit the bill, I 
suggest that a construction of citizenship that is based on principles of care provides a more 
adequate ground for the inclusion and accommodation of people with disabilities as equal 
interlocutors in deliberative democracy. Replacing the liberal orientation with a caring 
orientation also provides wider incentives to engender mutual respect, understanding and 
reciprocity between citizens with varying degrees of physical, cognitive or communicative 
competencies when they come together for deliberation. Therefore where ideal deliberative 
citizenship is concerned a shift needs to be made from the orientation of a contracting citizen to 
the orientation of a caring one. The following paragraphs, then, imagine how a caring orientation 
would transform the practice of deliberative democracy and reclaim its emancipatory potential. 
In order to do this I first define care ethics briefly and contrast it with a liberal orientation in the 
context of deliberative citizenship. I then move on to explore the practical implications of a caring 
orientation, especially focussing on what it would mean for institutions and policies to have a 
caring orientation. 
 
Definitions and Claims of a Caring Orientation 
Care is a complex concept and its literature contains a good deal of diversity and ambiguity, 
depending on the emphasis of the authors and the area of social science in which they work. I do 
not intend to provide a complete summary of care ethics literature here. Rather, my goal is to lay 
the conceptual groundwork before I ask how a caring framework can inform and shape deliberative 
democracy for disability-inclusive deliberative sites and practices. With that in mind, I will follow 
Bubeck’s definition of care, which she summarizes as “the meeting of needs of one person by 
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another where face-to-face interaction between the carer and cared for is a crucial element of 
overall activity, and where the need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly be met by the 
person in need herself” (Bubeck 1995, 130). This definition is significant for our purposes as 
it emphasizes personal interaction especially when one of the parties is vulnerable or 
dependent.37  
In contrast to liberalism, care theory begins with the individual as already situated in 
networks of interdependent relationships (Engster 2007, 7). These relationships arise not 
only from the need for survival, development and social functioning, but also from the 
human need to relate. Care theory challenges the liberal conception of citizenship and its 
institutions on at least two accounts. First, it problematizes the liberal construction of the 
detached, independent individual and finds the liberal perception of equality elusive. 
Second, it challenges the liberal emphasis on autonomy and the stigma that this emphasis 
creates around dependency. 
Virginia Held contends that “before there could have been any self-sufficient, independent 
men in a hypothetical state of nature, there would have to have been mothers and the children 
these men would have been” (Held 1993, 195). For Held, therefore, the liberal image of the 
individual citizen who is abstracted from an interconnected social existence is unrealistic and 
deficient. Held’s mothers would have had to have been good enough at the care of their 
children to develop the basic capabilities and social skills to engage with fellow humans and 
form social contracts (Engster 2007, 43; Held 1993, 195). However the care and the 
                                                     
37 Among others, For Held care is a form of labour, but also an ideal that guides normative judgment 
and action (Held 2006, 36). She characterises these judgments and actions as clusters of practices and 
values. Tronto and Fisher’s description is much broader, where they describe care as “a species activity 
that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as 
well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment”( Tronto and Fisher 
1990, 35). For Engster, care is “everything we do to help individuals to meet their vital biological needs, 
develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and 
suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in society” (Engster 2007, 28). Slote maintains 
that care is a kind of motivational attitude of empathy (Slote 2007). Sevenhuijsen similarly defines care 
as “styles of situated moral reasoning that involves listening and responding to others on their own 
terms” (Sevenhuijsen 2004, 85). 
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dependency that are in question are not simply a private preference limited to the parent and 
infant relationship. They are universal because everyone has assumed the role of receiver at 
some point in their lives (e.g. childhood, old age, short or long term illness etc.). Again, 
everyone will most probably also assume the role of providing care. The extent in which these 
roles are exercised will vary for each individual, but the point remains – individuals have 
found, and will find themselves in positions in which they need care, as well as in positions in 
which they are the caregivers, sometimes even simultaneously. 
This picture of dependency as common human experience is clearly at odds with the classical 
liberal perception that vulnerability and needs are only located in a minority, those who are 
not fully cooperative members of society over a lifetime. The liberal norm of self-sufficiency 
construes dependency and the need for care as an exception - a handicap, an ailment, a burden 
or at best a necessary evil (Tronto 1994). Moreover, it clearly creates an unrealistic, even 
harmful subject ideal, because as Sevenhuijsen notes, it encourages citizens to look for needs 
and problems in others rather than in themselves in the exercise of their citizenship 
(Sevenhuijsen 2004, 28). It creates a rift between the independent and dependent, the able 
and the un-able as exemplified in the earlier construction of the original position, whereby the 
independent, able and therefore powerful individual does not share the same space with 
different and mostly objectified others (who are in need of medical intervention too, if they 
are disabled) (Tronto 1994; Young 2011[1990]). 
The claim of care theorists is that a framework of care is better equipped than a liberal 
framework to deal with power imbalances and dependencies that imbue all relations. I have 
already mentioned above that dependent individuals are excluded from the original position 
and therefore denied a voice in the contracting scenario. While their interests are postponed 
by Rawls till after the social contract, their well-being and preferences can be voiced in proxy 
by those who are able to contract – to the extent that those who can be party to the contract 
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care about them. It is true that a Rawlsian contract would allow for the possibility that 
representatives may imagine themselves as dependents, however this allowance does not 
necessitate that a representative will do that. Moreover, liberal theory does not explain why 
any of the contracting parties should care about people with disabilities especially when 
there is no gain for them, no advantage to them to do so. 
The perspective of care, on the other hand, proposes a different set of assumptions, where 
individuals are always understood to be in a condition of interdependence. It fully recognizes 
caring and dependency as a basic matter of justice (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Kittay 1999; 
Young 2002). The problem the care ethicists see in the assumptions of liberalism is not that 
they are flawed. They are simply too limited to account for those who lead vulnerable, 
dependent lives. In the care framework the individual is in a state of engagement – both 
social and moral – and the liberals’ starting point of moral indifference and calculated self-
interest is countered with non-contractual recognition and reciprocity. Some obligations are 
simply unchosen regardless of mutual advantage and by virtue of human interdependency 
(Engster 2007, 7; Held 1995, 17). When caring and interdependent citizens become aware of 
inequality in general and the needs of the dependent others in particular, they are moved to 
look for means to achieve equality and to meet the needs of their fellow citizens. For Goodin, 
it is the vulnerability of the dependent individuals to our actions and choices that creates a 
moral obligation to respond. This is not a negative obligation to simply refrain from 
exacerbating inequalities and causing them harm, but a positive obligation to meet their 
needs when we are in a position to do so (Goodin 1986, 110–11). To put this framework in 
context, Kittay suggests a new, complementary principle for Rawls' theory of justice: “To 
each according to his or her need, from each to his or her capacity for care, and such support 
from social institutions as to make available resources and opportunities to those providing 
care” (Kittay 1999, 113). 
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Within this framework, there seems to be overall agreement about the necessary qualities 
(or virtues, as some prefer to call it) of a caring disposition (Noddings 2003; Tronto 1994). 
Three qualities are often mentioned: attentiveness, responsiveness and respect. Attentiveness 
means noticing when another person is in need and being prepared to respond appropriately 
(Blum 2010, 30–61; Engster 2007, 28). Caring begins with the recognition that others need our 
attention and commitment (Sevenhuijsen 2004, 20). However a distinction needs to be made 
here. Attention in this sense is attending to the needs of particular others in actual contexts. It 
is not an exercise – like the Rawlsian exercise – that aims to arrive at a fair decision by asking 
how the abstract individual in this situation would want to be treated. Therefore the 
knowledge that forms the basis of a possible response comes directly from engagement with 
others, and not from a hypothetical construction or philosophical introspection. 
Responsiveness requires discerning the precise nature of others’ needs and making sure that 
they are receiving the particular form of care that they need – as opposed to the care others 
think they need. Care recipients come from a myriad of backgrounds. Therefore a caring 
orientation will have to attempt to meet care recipients’ needs according to the particular 
circumstances they find themselves in. Finally, respect means that those in need of care are 
treated with dignity, and not presumed incapable of understanding or communicating their 
needs just because they are on the receiving end of care. We can also add a fourth, perhaps 
overarching quality of emotional engagement or connection. Emotions such as compassion 
and sympathy can motivate the person who is in a caring position (Himmelweit 1999). I am not 
suggesting the existence of personal or emotional connection as a precondition to a caring 
relationship. My point is that emotions like sympathy and compassion – which presumably 
already exist in interdependent relationships – may as well be acknowledged as a further 
resource that binds the above qualities together.38 Having reviewed the main tenets of a caring 
                                                     
38 39 Some care theorists further argue that activities should be considered caring only when they help 
and support “persons who according to generally accepted social norms ... cannot take care of 
themselves” (Bubeck 1995, 129; Schwarzenbach 1987, 155; Waerness 1984, 71) (Bubeck 1995, 129; 
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orientation, we can now continue to explore how a caring orientation can transform the practice 
of deliberative democracy in order to accommodate the inclusion of people with disabilities. 
 
Care in Practice 
Once human interdependency is recognised as the more appropriate original position, the central 
focus of a caring orientation becomes the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting 
the pressing needs of those dependent on us for the care that they need (Held 2006, 10). A caring 
disposition clearly suggests an alternative way of engaging with one’s fellow citizens. In this 
endeavour emotions such as sympathy, sensitivity and responsiveness are valued alongside 
rationality as equally important resources to better ascertain what a caring disposition 
recommends in a particular situation. Kittay’s re-formulation makes it clear that a framework of 
care does not simply suggest a new individual or societal disposition, but has implications for 
politics and policy, institutions and their practices. 
 
A caring disposition and response must indeed lead to policy implications, because we can fulfil 
only some of our obligations to others through personal caring relationships. Many of our 
obligations extend beyond the household and its familial concerns. We can only fulfil these 
obligations through acting collectively, which inevitably leads to the necessity of organizing 
political, economic and cultural institutions at least in a way that is conducive to caring policies 
and practices for individuals in need of care (Engster 2007, 2). Political institutions and policies 
can be organized in such a way that they can establish the background conditions necessary for 
care in the family or community, empower personal caring practices, and even help create a 
caring society by providing care to individuals in need on a much larger, systemic scale. If a 
                                                     
Schwarzenbach 1987, 155; Tronto 1998; Waerness 1984, 71). Waerness in particular draws a 
distinction between necessary care and personal services, and excludes from her definition of 
caregiving all personal services such as making dinner for individuals who are capable of performing 
this task themselves (Waerness 1984). This distinction is important because it separates out those 
cases where individuals are truly in need of care from those where care is trivial. 
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caring disposition is no less important at the institutional level than it is at the personal level, 
how can politics and policies embrace and imbue a caring disposition in the context of 
deliberative democracy? What would a caring deliberative democracy, and a caring 
deliberative citizen look like? 
In her overview of the literature, Ruddick suggests that three distinct yet overlapping readings of 
care have emerged over the years: a caring orientation defined in opposition to an emphasis on 
justice, caring as a kind of labour and as a particular relationship (Ruddick 1998, 4). What is 
significant in these readings is that regardless of whether care is seen as a value, disposition or 
practice, the caring person or institution is always invited to respond to the other individuals or 
situations around her. Perhaps it is appropriate to talk about care as a response, as much as a 
value, disposition or practice. The response in question, as Barnes observes, is not based in 
procedural rights which emphasise universal principles and therefore require similar and specific 
practices in every context, but instead invites the caring person or institution to explore the 
particular so that the appropriate responses of action or inaction can be determined (Barnes 
2012, 172). 
In a policy setting of course it will be impossible to know, understand and finally attend to 
everyone’s particular history, story and need.39 In this regard, a caring disposition must 
                                                     
39 We are, of course, primarily talking about attending to inclusion or communication related needs of 
individuals, in the context of deliberative decision making processes. It has already been mentioned 
that one of the goals of a caring disposition is to help individuals meet their basic needs and achieve 
basic capabilities. In a more general sense policies and provisions should start with helping individuals 
meet their basic needs (be it nourishment, shelter, medical care or protection from harm) when they 
cannot reasonably do it on their own. Beyond meeting basic needs, these policies should also help 
individuals develop basic capabilities like mobility, literacy, numeracy, reason and participation in public 
life, including social and political life. Part of the responsibility of these policies should be making sure 
that people who need care are not subjected to unnecessary or additional pain, suffering or barriers in 
the pursuit of their basic needs or capabilities mentioned above. Moreover, these policies should 
examine the most relevant and effective ways to show care to those who are in need. In many instances 
this will mean initiatives and programmes to be formulated and run by the direct involvement of 
potential care recipients. The desire to develop the right – relevant and effective - programmes will in 
many instances also mean that the development and delivery of programmes are transferred to the 
local and personal level, where listening and responding can take place through face-to-face, personal 
interaction rather than central planning. 
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recognise that each disability is different, and therefore different individuals may have different 
levels of needs. A service that is sufficient to help one individual may not be sufficient to help 
another one, even though those two individuals are medically diagnosed with the same disability. 
Therefore an important aspect of a caring disposition is meeting care recipients’ needs according 
to the particular circumstances they find themselves in, as well as their particular preferences 
(Engster 2007, 26). A relevant, efficient and finally successful policy must be grounded on as much 
knowledge as possible (Robinson 1999, 156). As a result, policies, programmes and provisions 
that are developed at the local level and ideally through a process of face-to-face interaction 
between the care providers, care recipients and other stakeholders will more likely be relevant 
and effective in order to meet the particular needs of different individuals. Involving care 
recipients in identifying their own needs and developing as well as delivering programs will also 
help avoid the danger of paternalism or commodifying needs (Tronto 1994, 137). Therefore 
developing and delivering policies, programmes and provisions at the local level, and ideally 
through a process of face-to-face interaction between the providers, recipients and other 
stakeholders will always have more chances of successful outcomes. 
It is at this very point that deliberative democratic norms become very relevant and instrumental 
to include the traditionally marginalized in the polity. Deliberative sites have a particularity about 
them that not many other democratic processes or spaces have. That is, every deliberative site is 
a mini polity where individuals are present with their particular histories, identities, views, 
preferences, interests, concerns, problems etc. The deliberative decision making or problem 
solving process is a move, using Gilligan’s terminology, from the contextual and the narrative to 
the formal and the abstract (Gilligan 1990). Deliberative sites are sites where individuals 
acknowledge each other as concrete others with a history, identity, and affective-emotional 
constitution and not as generalised others who are simply rational beings entitled to the same 
rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves (Benhabib 1992, 159). 
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Therefore already latent in deliberative democracy – in particular in its Habermasian form – are 
the spaces and processes where particular needs of care recipients could be responded to if a 
caring disposition were embraced by policies and interlocutors instead of a liberal orientation. 
When deliberative policy recognizes those that have been left outside, and interlocutors 
acknowledge each other as concrete others, deliberative democrats have no reason to 
conceptualise the individual as liberals do, leading to the exclusion of some. Deliberative sites, 
armed with the qualities of a caring disposition, can become the very sites where the needs of 
those who need special accommodations for inclusion in decision making processes can be met. 
They can become the sites, the mechanisms through which institutions as well as deliberators 
can learn about, acknowledge and respond to the particular needs of care recipients. On the 
other hand care recipients – those who are traditionally excluded from decision making 
processes due to physical or cognitive disabilities – can become part of a polity in and through 
these sites. 
The characteristic qualities of a caring orientation were summarised above as attentiveness, 
responsiveness and respect. These qualities can be reflected in policies and institutions in a 
number of ways. Although, as Tronto observes, few theorists have examined the basic political 
institutions of a caring society, we can have a fairly clear idea of how deliberative processes and 
citizens can embrace a caring disposition. First of all, deliberative institutions and citizens can 
exhibit attentiveness by truly acknowledging that not all are autonomous and independent in the 
liberal sense, and although some will never be fully cooperating over a complete lifetime, they are 
nevertheless members of the society and polity as fellow humans and citizens. In practical terms 
this means rejecting the glorification of able-bodiedness and the stigmatization of neediness. 
Attentiveness in this sense can then alert both deliberative policies and citizens to the particular 
needs of individuals in deliberative contexts and to become part of deliberative processes. These 
needs can arise in various areas – needs regarding physical access to the deliberative site, clear 
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communication and so on. Second, responsiveness enables deliberative policies and citizens to 
identify the ways through which particular needs can be met. Third, respect requires that each 
individual is treated equally and with dignity in the deliberative site, entitled to communicating 
her preferences. Policies that operate with these qualities and deliberative citizens exhibiting this 
caring orientation then enable the participation of the disabled in deliberative sites whereas they 
would have been otherwise marked off as incompetent and therefore outside the deliberative 
sphere. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to lay the groundwork for a more detailed analysis that will take 
place in the following chapters. With this goal in mind, I have traced the development of 
deliberative democracy following its several “turns”. In the first section I summarised normative, 
empirical and systemic periods of deliberative democracy and particularly focussed on a number 
of notions or concepts that come to the fore in each of these periods. The ideal speech situation 
and the associated validity claims are emphasized.  The need for modifications in the earlier 
theory, which became clear in the empirical period, opened the way for a more critical approach 
to the theory’s claims. I have discussed some of these well-known critiques, preparing the way 
to bring my own critique in the following section. I summarised the systemic conceptualisation 
of deliberative democracy, focussing on its emphasis of the different sites of deliberation and 
their relationships. The concepts explored here, such as decisiveness and transmission will again 
be used in the analysis I provide in the following chapters. 
In the second section I took Rawls’ original position to task and suggested that deliberative 
democracy’s convergence with liberalism made the inclusion of the disabled difficult. This section 
started with problematizing liberalism’s conception of the self as autonomous, independent and 
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self-interested. Even though liberal democratic institutions are committed to the equality of 
citizens through the recognition of rights, due processes and the rule of law, they are not sufficient 
for achieving a caring polity because their foundational claims about the individual (as exemplified 
in contract theories) do not leave sufficient room to ensure attentiveness, responsiveness and 
respect. To replace deliberative democrats’ liberal orientation with a caring one will on one hand 
make citizens, institutions and policies more thoughtful, and on the other make the inclusion of 
those individuals who live as care recipients – children, the frail elderly, the long term ill, and of 
course people with physical and cognitive disabilities – in deliberative decision making processes 
a closer possibility. A caring orientation will give citizens and policymakers a reason to look beyond 
self-interest, majority or interest group demands. 
The possibilities explored and the insights gained in this discussion will directly inform the 
discussions in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. There is a direct and unavoidable relationship between the 
embodied nature of disability and the face-to-face caring response this embodiedness demands. 
These demands and the responses to them will be the topic of Chapter 3. A caring orientation 
once again opens up many possibilities for which a liberal orientation does not have a vocabulary 
in the context of preference shaping and opinion formation. I will explore these possibilities in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5, on the other hand, will take the discussion from its single-site context to a 
multi-site, macro context of deliberative systems. Here the interrelatedness of deliberative sites, 
as well as citizens will guide the discussion on the spatial characteristics of deliberative 
democracy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Mapping the Discussion: Paradigms and Models of Disability 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown the extent to which disability and the disabled are absent from 
the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. I have contended that the roots of this 
absence can be traced back to deliberative democracy’s liberal genealogy. However political 
theory in general has not paid adequate attention to the issue of disability either, and disability 
studies have stayed in the periphery of wider debates and discussions for the most part. The 
purpose of this chapter is to close the gap between the two areas of scholarship and to bring to 
the attention of deliberative democracy the development and claims of the scholarship on 
disability, especially as they pertain to the inclusion of people with disabilities in public life and 
democracy. An awareness of disability issues and especially the claims of the scholarship on 
disability is important for deliberative democratic theory for a number of reasons. First, it informs 
deliberative democrats that their unfounded assumptions about the able-bodiedness of the 
deliberative citizen are closely linked to perceptions of disability found throughout history and 
reproduced by political theory. Second, the disability studies literature provides us with the 
vocabulary through which we can understand and evaluate the blind spots of deliberative 
democratic theory regarding the inclusion of people with disabilities. Finally, only by taking into 
account the insights gained from the scholarship of disability studies can we recognise, counter 
and alleviate the marginalisation and exclusion of people with disabilities from deliberative 
decision making processes. 
With this purpose in mind, the chapter starts with a brief overview of the underlying themes in 
societies’ perception of disability historically. This survey makes it clear that the roots of today’s 
attitudes towards to disability can often be found in the past. The discussion then moves on to 
introduce the debates around the so called disability models. It is not my intention to provide a 
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comprehensive review of disability history or models in this section. The discussion is selective 
for the sake of clarity and focus stays largely within the British context. The aim is to keep the 
focus on the aspects of disability history and models that inform the larger project and that relate 
directly to the analysis of the dynamics of deliberative sites and decision making processes. The 
discussion does not involve taking a position between the models, instead it seeks to identify and 
make use of each model’s contribution and insights. 
The vocabulary and insights we find in the disability studies literature, especially those that are 
gained from models of disability, show us that deliberative democracy has an ableist bias when 
it comes to the competencies of deliberative citizens. Building on the discussions on the main 
tenets of deliberative democracy and the construction of the deliberative citizen found in the 
previous chapter, and taking its cues from the claims of disability studies literature, the last 
section then unpacks in what ways deliberative democracy is ableist. This chapter finishes the 
ground-laying work that has started in the previous chapter. By the end of this chapter we will 
have reviewed both relevant deliberative democracy and disability studies literature, flagged the 
problems and blind spots regarding the inclusion of the disabled in deliberative democracy, and 
as a result prepared the background for the discussion and analysis which will take place at the 
intersection of deliberative democratic theory and disability studies in the next three chapters. 
Perceptions of Disability: Three Paradigms 
 
While we have to keep in mind at the outset that there is no single, universal story of disability, 
we can still identify themes and responses to disability that are common to a wide range of 
temporal and geographical contexts. The most comprehensive and detailed exposition of the 
history of disability are provided by Mike Oliver in his seminal study The Politics of Disablement, 
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followed by Henri Jacques Stiker’s The History of Disability (Oliver 1990; Stiker 1999).40 Oliver 
identifies three overarching paradigms in which societies deal with disability. In the first paradigm 
disability is associated with the supernatural and a link is established between the person’s 
visible, outer condition and her inner being. The second paradigm situates disability in between 
illness and wellness, inside and outside, and ultimately life and death, which is explained by the 
notion of liminality. In the third paradigm disability is evaluated in terms of its economic meaning 
and societies’ response to disability is explained from a historical materialist perspective. 
 
1. Disability associated with a moral condition 
Up until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, and in some parts of the majority 
world even to this day, disability is regarded as an affliction that denotes moral condition, God’s 
will, disfavour or even judgment, and is as much a social problem as it is an individual one. Ancient 
Athenians as well Spartans saw disability as a sign of gods’ anger and exposed their sickly or 
deformed infants by the decision of a council of wise men. That the decision was made by a council 
(and not the parents) indicates that in disability, the whole group – the state – was implicated 
(Spinelli 2008; Stiker 1999). Similarly The Old Testament declared people with disabilities – along 
with prostitutes and menstruating women - legally or ceremonially unclean and unfit to make 
sacrifices at the altar lest they defile the temple and the community. Not only those who 
presented the sacrifice, but the sacrificial animals as well had to be free of physical blemish. 
Consequentially, the Essenes excluded “the slow witted, the fools, the silly, the mad, the 
blind, the crippled, the lame, the deaf, the underage” from their community, because their 
presence would defile the community in whose midst “the holy angels dwelled” (Stiker 1999, 
25). 
                                                     
40 The Politics of Disablement has been updated in 2012 under the new title The New Politics of 
Disablement (Oliver and Barnes 2012). 
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The association of disability or physical deformity with sin persisted well into the modern 
period and to our day. English Puritan Thomas Tuke wrote in the 17th century that “the 
condition of the mind is discerned in the state and behaviour of the body” (Tuke 1616, 17). 
Indeed, ballads and pamphlets produced in this period regarded “monstrous” births as signs 
of warning and punishment from God and called the parents as well as the rest of the 
community to repent (Turner and Stagg 2006, 21). This paradigm is neither limited to the 
premodern or early modern West, nor left in history. Aall-Jilek’s work among the Wapogoro 
people of Tanganyika is a well-known example of its persistence into the 20th century, 
admittedly in a non-western context (Aall-Jilek 1965). Similar beliefs were widespread well 
into the 21st century in Turkey, where many families who have members with disabilities 
viewed their “predicament” as a result of God’s judgment on them, perhaps due to their 
past sins. Today in shame based cultures and societies with a strong belief in the 
supernatural (like medieval Europe), people with disabilities are seen as a source of shame 
to the family and the wider community. That shame must be done away with or covered. 
Therefore the honour of a family or dignity of a community require the disappearance from 
society of the individual who “by his appearance or abject habits” puts his relatives or 
community on the spot – once again, disability affects the whole community (Foucault 1989, 
67). 
 
2. Disability betwixt and between 
Oliver associates the second paradigm with the concept of liminality, which was first  
described by Turner as any “betwixt and between” situation, time or place (Turner 1967,  
10).41 Liminality is essentially ambiguous, unsettled and unsettling. In this view people with 
disabilities are relegated to an in-between existence by society. The person with a disability exists 
                                                     
41 Turner himself built on and expanded the concept of “liminality” and the “liminoid” which was first 
introduced by Arnold Van Gennep in his seminal essay The Rites of Passage (Gennep 1961). 
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in a state of social suspension: “neither this nor that, neither sick nor fully well, neither dead nor 
fully alive, neither out of society nor fully in it” (Murphy 1990, 112; Turner 1967, 97). She is invisible 
and “roleless” (Fine and Asch 1985). The ship of fools Foucault describes in Madness and 
Civilization is probably one of the most striking examples of this idea. Ship of fools narratives were 
literary compositions of the Renaissance landscape that featured strange drunken boats that glide 
along the calm rivers of the Rhineland and the Flemish canals, carrying the madmen who were 
driven out by inhabitants of the towns. These people were not pushed to inexistence, but to life 
in betwixt and between at “infinite crossroads” (Foucault 1989, 7). They were neither of the town 
nor of the countryside. They merely floated about in a state of “absolute passage” that never came 
to an end.42 
The notion of liminality can help explain a variety of phenomena and experiences related to 
disability. First, the idea of “holy innocents” comes to mind. This was one way societies in different 
places and ages have constructed the individual with especially hidden or mental disabilities. It was 
seen among pre-conquest American societies and was prevalent in the l’enfant du bon Dieu 
formulation of medieval Europe. The belief was that these individuals were special in that they were 
incapable of committing evil deeds voluntarily. The holy innocent was harmless and sometimes 
played the role of a mediary between God and the people. People felt closer to God around people 
with disabilities (Wolfensberger 1975). Therefore they were not shunned, but given a status betwixt 
and between the categories of worldly and heavenly. This concept too made its way to our age, 
especially as illustrated in popular cinema: Raymond, the idiot savant character played by Dustin 
Hoffman in Rain Man, Bob Wiley with various mental disorders played by Bill Murray in What 
About Bob? and of course Forrest Gump, played by Tom Hanks are some of the famous 
characterizations of the holy innocent in cinema (Levinson 1988; Oz 1991; Zemeckis 1994) . 
                                                     
42 43 Historical records attest the existence of these Narrenschiff. Frankfurt, Nuremberg and Mainz 
drove away their “madmen” to ships or entrusted them to merchants and pilgrims. See Foucault 1989, 
8. 
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The “king’s fool”, prevalent again in medieval Europe, perhaps shares similar roots with the 
holy innocents. The king’s fool is almost always a person with a physical or mental disability, 
many times both. William Somer, the famous Tudor palace jester, was a “natural fool”, 
described in 1616 by Nicholas Breton as “abortive of wit, where nature had more power than 
reason” (Lipscomb 2011). Somer had a keeper who looked after him because he could not 
care for himself. Like all other fools employed by noble households, he existed in that liminal 
space he was allocated to, described by Prentki as the “twilight of the semi-detached” (Prentki 
2012, 2). His disability took him out of society, but did not throw him into nonexistence. 
Instead, the king’s fool was given a role in a space where he was freed from the obligations 
that were demanded from other subjects. In that role he had freedom to speak truth to 
power. Again, partly because he was considered to be in closer communion with the 
supernatural world. 
Modern institutions where people with disabilities were kept in Europe until recently and in 
the majority world to this day carry some characteristics of these liminal spaces, this time in a 
more physical sense. Foucault tells the story of the lazar houses where people with disabilities 
were kept at a “sacred distance” from the rest of society (Foucault 1989, 6). They were neither 
cured nor left alone, but kept separate in designated places. They had a physical reality, but 
they were not permitted a social reality (Turner 1967, 237). They had to be in another place, 
because letting these liminal personae to be seen in a place they did not belong to would both 
create a scandal and also pollute the community – reminding us that biblical cultic motifs still 
persisted into the modern age. However physical or spatial liminality need not be associated 
only with past or present institutions for the disabled. In many societies where disability is 
perceived as a source of shame for various reasons, some of which are mentioned above, 
people with disabilities may be imprisoned to a liminal existence in their own homes.43  
                                                     
43 44 I grew up across from a house where a large family with a disabled member lived. The family 
member who was in her late thirties and had a mental disability was strictly kept inside the house she 
stood by her window the entire day, watching the street. She was most likely sedated. I never saw her 
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3. Disability as economic burden 
The third paradigm has strong economic underpinnings and is identified by Oliver as the “surplus 
population thesis”. In this paradigm weak or dependent members pose a threat to the survival 
of the larger community in conditions where economic survival is a constant struggle (Oliver 
1990, 21). When times are hard, people with disabilities who are deemed incapable of 
contributing to the survival or the future of the community (along with the aged and the 
permanently infirm) are among the first to be discarded - killed or exposed at birth, forced out of 
the community etc. (Erevelles 2001, 100). This paradigm is closely related to a historical 
materialistic reading of disability history, which suggests that there are strong economic reasons 
for capitalist societies to exclude people with disabilities. 
Exclusion, however, need not be the only response to disability that is primarily informed by 
economic concerns. Following Stiker, Arneil recounts how the shift from a supernatural outlook 
to secular social evolutionary theories and statistical science created a new rift between those 
who are able-bodied (therefore normal) and those who are disabled, therefore abnormal or even 
deviant (Arneil 2009, 220). One of the main responses to disability in this new division is 
rehabilitation, which assumes the existence of a potential rather than fully formed personhood. 
Rehabilitation, then, is the act of moving the individual from potential to actual personhood. This 
process usually involves an economic dimension as well, in that personhood is closely linked 
to the individual’s economic productivity or contribution to society. 
 
II. Models of Disability 
As I mentioned at the outset, similarities between different societies’ responses to disability 
regardless of the temporal or geographical context is striking. Meanwhile we have of course seen 
progress through the course of history in the treatment of people with disabilities. Disabled people 
                                                     
out of the house. When the family left the house, they locked her in her room. When there were other 
family members in the house, she was free to move around inside. When they had guests, she was 
locked up in the room again. A sad, confined existence betwixt and between, neither dead, nor fully 
alive, physically there, but socially non-existent. 
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are not put in ships to wander the countryside or chained up in detention centres44, and no laws 
are written anymore to encourage them to beg cap-in-hand in street corners.45 On the other hand, 
people with disabilities are still denied full participation in public life, albeit in more subtle ways. As 
indicated in one of Oliver’s paradigms, it is still common to see disability regarded as a personal 
tragedy, a consequence of the person’s physical or cognitive deficiencies. Indeed, this individual 
deficiency model has dominated the 19th and most of the 20th century, and was labelled by disability 
activists and scholars as the medical model. What came to be known as the social model of disability 
arose as a response and a reaction to this individualist approach. While in the medical model 
disability is strictly the attribute of the individual, the social model (or models to be more accurate) 
of disability locate disability in the individual’s environment. Finally the recently developing critical 
model attempts to avoid a dichotomy between the individual and her environment, and 
instead establishes a dynamic link between the two (Masala and Petretto 2010). 
 
The Medical Model 
If disability amounts to the absence or reduction of an individual’s physical or cognitive 
capacities, this individual deficit had to be alleviated through rehabilitation, treatment or cure, 
which was the job of medicine. Disability was seen as a deviation from the norm and considered 
a pathology for which the individual was responsible. The pathology had to be diagnosed and 
treated in order for the person with disability to fully be part of society. Medicine, then, confined 
                                                     
44 At least not as regular practice in the Western context. However treatment of people with 
disabilities in many care homes is still far from adequate. For example a Panorama investigation 
broadcast in 2011 exposed the physical and psychological abuse of the residents at Winterbourne 
View , a public funded hospital for people with learning difficulties), by care staff. As a result the 
hospital was closed and 11 members of staff were convicted of nearly forty charges of neglect and ill 
treatment of those in their care. In the aftermath of the widely publicised scandal, the Department of 
Health commissioned a review to set out the government’s response. The report recommended a 
programme of action “to transform services so that people ... are cared for in line with best practice, 
based on their individual needs and that their wishes and those of their families are listened to and at 
the heart of planning and delivering their care” (‘Winterbourne View Hospital: Department of Health 
Review and Response’ 2016, 9). 
45 The Vagabonds Act of 1530, passed under Henry VIII as part of the Tudor Poor Laws, mandated that 
only licensed individuals could beg. Licenses were only given to “impotent poor”, which effectively 
only applied to the elderly and the disabled. The intention behind the law was to provide relief for the 
elderly and the disabled rather than discipline beggars (Webb and Webb 2013 [1906]). 
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people with disabilities, not in order to avoid scandal as Foucault might have suggested, but in 
the name of rehabilitation, treatment or cure (Foucault 1989, 66). For most of the last century 
people with disabilities were relegated to special institutions – hospitals, asylums, rehabilitation 
centres. It was also during this time that medicine – modernist and positivist in its approach – 
felt the need to define and classify disability, when young men returning from battlefields 
physically impaired, not to mention the civilians impaired by war, needed state assistance. 
 
Policy makers started using the word “disabled” only after the emergence of the welfare state in 
the middle of the twentieth century, and to refer to the specific eligibility criteria for access to 
benefits and services. For example a person who lost his fingers and leg below the knee was 50 
per cent disabled, whereas the amputation of a foot or the loss of an eye constituted a 30 per cent 
disability rate according to the British National Insurance Benefit Regulations (Oliver and Barnes 
2012, 16). The striking fact in all this, of course, was that it was the medical professionals who had 
the authority to decide who had a disability and who did not. While not consciously constructed 
by anyone this model was “more part of the mental furniture of common sense” (Bickenbach 
1999). Academic work on disability was again characterised by individualistic and medical 
explanation, and dominated by medicine and psychology. 
 
The Social Model 
Activists and organisations started challenging the medicalised and individualist readings of 
disability especially from the 1960s onward. Largely reflecting their own experience of 
discrimination and disadvantage as people with disabilities, they sought to shift the emphasis of 
the response to disability from changing the individual to changing the world around the person 
with disability because, once again, personal is political so far as the experiences of people with 
disabilities are concerned (Bickenbach 2009, 110). 
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In November 1975, representatives of the Disability Alliance and the Union of the Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), then a small organisation run by people with disabilities, 
came together to discuss their positions on how to raise the concerns of people with disabilities 
onto the political agenda. The document in which their discussion is summarised, titled 
Fundamental Principles of Disability, was going to become the text that would shape and harbour 
the basic tenets of a social model of disability, on which many other scholars and activists built 
further in the following years. Paul Hunt, representing UPIAS read the following statement, of 
which themes will be unpacked in the following paragraphs in an attempt to give a summary of 
the basic tenets of the social model. 
In our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something 
imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and 
excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed 
group in society. It follow from this analysis that having low incomes, for example, is only 
one aspect of our oppression. It is a consequence of our isolation and segregation, in 
every area of life, such as education, work, mobility, housing etc. Poverty is one symptom 
of our oppression, but it is not the cause. For us as disabled people it is absolutely vital 
that we get this question of the case of disability quite straight, because on the answer 
depends the crucial matter of where we direct our main energies in the struggle for 
change. We shall clearly get nowhere if our efforts are chiefly directed not at the cause 
of our oppression, but instead at one of the symptoms (UPIAS 1976, 3). 
It is society which disables physically impaired people. The social model refuses the 
explanation that disability is a consequence of an individual’s physical or cognitive deficiency. 
Instead, disability is located in the wider environment - a disabled person is always “disabled 
by” the disabling barriers in her environment. Disability, then, is not a biological, but a socio-
cultural construct (Lang 2007, 4). In other words, disability is not the individual’s deficit, but 
the society’s response to her physical or cognitive difference, which is perceived by the 
society as misfortune or tragedy. Some proponents of the social model in fact go as far as 
saying that disability or disablement has nothing to do with the body, it is “wholly and 
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exclusively social”, therefore it can only be understood within a framework which suggests 
that it is culturally produced and socially structured (Oliver 1996, 41; Michalko 2002). 
The social model has a strong historical-materialist current, represented by Finkelstein, 
Oliver, Gleeson and Thomas among others. In line with Stiker’s maxim that “there is no 
phenomenon that does not arise from history and from social history” they draw on a 
Marxist interpretation of the world in order to explain the underlying reasons behind the 
exclusion of people with disabilities from public life (Stiker 1999, 158). Finkelstein provides 
an evolutionary explanation of the history of people with disabilities in society. His first 
phase covers the pre-industrial period where the mode of production and social relations 
did not necessarily separate people with disabilities from their family or communities – 
although they were still at the bottom of the social hierarchy. In phase two, with the 
advance of industrial capitalism, changes in the organisation of work from a rural to a 
factory-based system and the birth of individual wage labour brought a dramatic change 
to the experience of people with disabilities (Finkelstein 1980; Oliver and Barnes 2012, 55). 
Those who could not sell their labour started facing systematic exclusion from capitalist 
societies. Workhouses, sheltered workshops, rehabilitation institutions, enforced 
dependency, etc. were once again the society’s primary response to professionally manage 
and control disability (Thomas 2004, 22). 
Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments. The social model makes a clear 
distinction between disability and impairment. The UPIAS document defined impairment as 
“lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organ or mechanism of the body” 
and disability as “the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social 
organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and 
thus excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social activities”46 (UPIAS 1976, 
                                                     
46 The restriction of disability to “physical impairments” was subsequently abandoned in favour of a 
definition that included physical, sensory and cognitive impairments. See Oliver and Barnes 2012, 21. 
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14). Disability, as explained above, is structural and public while impairment is individual and 
private (Shakespeare 2013, 216). The distinction between disability and impairment helped 
the proponents of the social model to challenge the dependency and need for rehabilitation 
of the person with a disability. If disability was a social instead of a medical problem, the 
solution to this problem had to be found not in cure or rehabilitation, but in social and 
political change (Hughes 2004, 63). 
Disabled people are an oppressed group in society. The social model maintains the historical 
materialist duality between the oppressed and the oppressor and defines people with 
disabilities as an oppressed group. The oppression and negative social attitudes towards 
people with disabilities undermine not only their personhood, but also their place in society 
as full citizens. Disability becomes a positional marker between those who dominate and 
those who are subordinate, those who control with power and those who lack power and 
therefore control over their own lives. Power, which presupposes political, economic and 
social hierarchies renders the disabled population as outsiders in peripheral regions – 
whether this periphery be understood in the context of global, regional or urban/local spaces 
of power and powerlessness (Charlton 1998, 30; 2010, 195). 
One of the striking features of this oppression is that it is internalised by people with disabilities. 
Overwhelmed under the gaze of medicine and its professionals, people with disabilities do not 
anymore know their real selves, needs and capabilities (Charlton 1998, 27). This is none other 
than another example of false consciousness and alienation, reminding us once again of the 
Marxian hues in the social model. As a result of this internalised oppression, people with 
disabilities see themselves as lacking or deficient, normalise their suffering and pain as part of 
being disabled, are more prone to exempt themselves from the work and employment process 
and finally accept their position in society as one of charity or welfare recipients (Abberley 1987, 
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17). The social model in turn advocates a world where discrimination and injustice are removed 
along with stereotypes, a world where people are not expected or forced to be the “same” in 
order to be recognised and included in public life (Barton 2004, 287). 
On the answer depends the crucial matter of where we direct our main energies in the struggle 
for change. In transferring the location of the “problem” of disability from the individual to her 
larger socio-economic environment, probably one of the most important contributions of the 
social model is to give precedence to the importance of politics, citizenship and empowerment 
of those with disabilities in public life. If the blame rested with the barriers that were erected by 
the abled society, removing or dismantling these barriers in every aspect of public life became 
the goal of disability activists. Identifying the problem, the enemy if you like, enabled them to 
develop a strategy and roadmap for the emancipation of people with disabilities. This, of course 
meant much more than removing physical barriers. The social model advocated the pursuit of 
a strategy of social change or even social transformation. 
Although the social model was instrumental in a significant change of approach to disability 
studies as well as policy, it has not been without its critics. It has been criticised on many different 
accounts, the accusation of reductionism being the reoccurring theme in many of these 
critiques. For example Stuart and Begum et al find the social model lacking because of its 
neglect of the relationship between disability and race or ethnic minority status (Stuart 1992; 
Begum et al. 1994). Crow, French, as well as Morris use the insights gained from feminist 
politics in order to blur, or perhaps de-construct the dichotomy between disability and 
impairment (Crow 1996; French 2004; Morris 1991, 1996). For Crow, it is a big failure on the 
part of the social model to have rejected the personal experience of pain and limitation, 
which are usually part of impairment. 
While the authors above do not reject the social model but seek to improve or reform it, others 
like Shakespeare and Watson announced back in 2002 that the time has come to leave the 
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social model behind as it was suffering from fervent policing and has taken on a very rigid, 
almost religious character (Shakespeare and Watson 2002, 23; Thomas 1998). Shakespeare’s 
more recent critique of the social model should also be noted as it will be particularly relevant 
in the proceeding discussion. He suggests that in an effort to counter the deep seated idea that 
people are disabled by their socio-economic context and are defined by their incapacity, the 
social model has moved from one extreme to another, which defines disability entirely in terms 
of social oppression and social barriers (Shakespeare 2014, 17). Impairment is a problem that 
affects every aspect of a disabled person's life. People with impairments are disabled by the 
society as well as their bodies. If we are to accept Oliver’s claim that disability has nothing to 
do with the body then to analyse disability on the basis of impairments or organise around 
impairments become redundant (Oliver 1996, 41). Moreover, if disability is only about that 
which is social, then any attempt to cure impairment must be met with suspicion – they can 
only be seen as distractions from the real problem. On the other hand, the social and the 
physical are often so intertwined that disability and impairment cannot always be easily 
extricated (Shakespeare 2014, 22) We cannot know where impairment ends and where 
disability starts and where the distinction between the two lies. Finally, a purely structuralist 
account of disability misses the fluidity of disability itself. There is no one single disabled 
entity or identity – no one today is purely one thing (Said 1994). Therefore the “disabled” 
label cannot adequately sum up an individual’s experience. Some individuals will simply not 
want to be identified – labelled if you will – as disabled whereas the social model has a very 
rigid and visible conception of who is in and who is out of the world of disability. 
 
Critical Disability Studies 
In recent years a new and influential group of disability scholars have been using the term "critical 
disability studies" (CDS) to explain their position in disability scholarship (Corker 1999; Campbell 
2009; Goodley 2010; McRuer 2010; Shildrick 2012) . While CDS agrees with the social model in its 
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critique of liberalism's construction of and approach to disability and its emancipatory outlook, it 
rejects the social model's objectivist account of disability. The social model has made significant 
gains to improve the lives of people with disabilities, however its efforts to create a counter-
culture and assumption that its own version of the world is the correct and true version often 
makes it blind to the nuances of the disability experience (Gabel and Peters 2004, 588; 
Shakespeare and Corker 2002, 3). As hinted above, it strictly operates on the principles of 
contradiction and of the excluded middle, leaving no space for the possibility of any third 
dimension between its binaries: medical vs. social, impairment vs. disability etc. (Jay 1981; 
Shakespeare and Watson 2002, 588). The critical disability studies approach attempts to go 
beyond these binaries to include the cultural, psychological, embodied, social, relational and 
representational aspects of disability in the account. It recognises the complexity - or even the 
ambiguity - of the disabled identity, the multiple disadvantage of people with disabilities and the 
intersectionality of the disability experience (Shuttleworth and Meekosha 2009, 58). As some of 
the terms already used hint at, it is in an ongoing conversation with feminist, queer and 
postcolonial studies, employing and appropriating their insights for disability scholarship with 
a concern for disability emancipation. In this, CDS also sits more comfortably than the social 
model with postmodernist and poststructuralist accounts of disability experience and 
scholarship. 
 
Like the social model, CDS is vocal in its critique of liberalism which construes disability as a 
misfortune or personal tragedy that needs to be dealt with.47 Disability should be prevented 
if at all possible. To put it bluntly, in a utopian world, liberalism would seek to abolish 
disability on the basis that human beings are not meant to “suffer” disability (Pothier and 
                                                     
47 Remember Rawls’ treatment of disability as misfortune in Chapter 1, Section II. See Rawls 1999:83 
and 2005:184 
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Devlin 2006, 11).48 If prevention fails, treatment and cure, or rehabilitation are sought. 
Inherent in this response to disability is liberalism’s construction of normalcy and what 
counts as “normal”. The abled-bodiedness of the normal is inevitable, normal is privileged 
over that which is abnormal, and the organisation of society reflects this inevitable 
privileging. This perspective of misfortune leads to pity and charity – the “appropriate” 
responses to disability as opposed to inappropriate responses like awkward avoidance or 
prejudice – reinforcing the perception that the disabled are passive, needy individuals who 
are at the mercy of the society because of their predicament. In this context, disability is 
always viewed from the perspective of the able-bodied. The disabled individual is imagined 
to be going through severe suffering, experiencing life as a completely dependent and 
valueless person. To bring the discussion full circle, we recall liberalism’s construction of 
personhood in terms of economic activity. The disabled individual is needy, because she 
falls short of the economic competence of a “normal” person. If economic productivity is 
an essential aspect of personhood and therefore part of liberalism’s construction of 
normalcy, can it relate or respond to disability in any way that would not attempt to 
normalise or eradicate it?(Pothier and Devlin 2006, 2.) 
Probably the most fundamental and immediate difference between CDS and liberalism is how 
each one conceptualises the self. CDS questions liberalism’s emphasis on liberty, choice and 
especially autonomy, asking whether these are discursive artefacts. When we take into 
consideration the fact that some people with disabilities live in complete dependency, can liberty 
or autonomy really be co-constitutive with the self? Taking the point one step further, how does 
lack of autonomy due to disability interact with the liberal conception of citizenship? Are those 
disempowered from participating in public life – sometimes even by being literally closeted away 
                                                     
48 To take this point even further, it would be unthinkable today to construe differences such as race, 
gender or sexual orientation in the same way and seek to abolish them. To explore this point further, 
see Pothier and Devlin 2006, Introduction. 
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– citizens? The inevitable question of productivity of course comes up. Does genuine citizenship 
also require a capacity for productivity – bringing us to the logical consequence that those who 
cannot be productive are less worthy of citizenship? (Pothier and Devlin 2006, 17.) This challenge 
does not necessarily target liberal rights per se, but their failure in responding adequately to the 
existence, needs and interests of people with disabilities by excluding disability from the scope 
of the normal in their perception of equality (Hosking 2008, 12). The result is what Pothier and 
Devlin call a regime of dis-citizenship, where people with disabilities might have the formal rights 
of citizenship, but are far from exercising substantive citizenship due to liberalism’s 
conceptualisation of self and the citizen in close relation with autonomy and productivity, as we 
have discussed in the preceding chapter (Pothier and Devlin 2006, 1). 
Following the critical tradition, CDS looks below the surface of the status quo and seeks the 
potentiality for or desirability of things being other than they are. In doing that, it problematizes 
the liberal construction of individuality and personhood, and politicises the question of disability. 
It is a “self-consciously politicised theory” and its goal is the pursuit of empowerment and 
substantive as opposed to formal equality as well as citizenship (Hosking 2008, 15). Disability is 
not first of all a question of medicine or health as Rawls thought, nor is it just an issue of 
sensitivity and compassion; instead it is a question of politics and power - power over and power 
to (Pothier and Devlin 2006, 9). In its analysis of power and politics of disability, CDS contends 
that what is social cannot be reduced to empirically derived facts and a responsible critique of 
the status quo must both have a reflexive awareness of the historical development of our own 
thinking (e.g. above discussion on the assumptions of liberalism) as well an openness to 
engagement with ideas emerging from different experiences, contexts and cultures (Meekosha, 
Shuttleworth, and Soldatic 2013, 2). With this awareness the critical disability scholar links 
theory with praxis in what is essentially a transformative, emancipative endeavour for the full 
and substantive inclusion of those with disabilities in the public and political sphere. 
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As it has already become apparent a critical, emancipatory concern lies at the core of critical 
disability studies’ raison d’etre. Critical theory stands between theory and praxis in a struggle 
for a participatory society. Protest of suffering as well as the need for both autonomy and 
participation make up some of the basic tenets of a critical approach. As a result, social 
processes and cultural meanings that impinge on social actors, restricting their ability and 
opportunity to participate in society are put into focus and analysed by critical social 
scholarship. 
CDS attempts to move beyond the medical vs social models binary. It suggests that the social 
model’s rigid separation between the body and culture is not tenable on various accounts. First of 
all, in the social model the body exists merely as a biological entity and does not have a history. The 
individual experiences his or her body as an object outside and apart from his or her whole being. 
The person exists separate from her body, and then the person thinks and talks of her body as 
something other than the person (Hughes and Paterson 1997). Second, the social model does not 
provide a language in which pain, aches, infections or impairments can be recognised or 
acknowledged.49 People with impairments or those who live with constant pain are disabled 
not only by the society and its structures, but also by their own impairment or physical pain. 
Difference and the personal experience of pain and limitation cannot and should not be 
denied. As Shakespeare and Watson argue, “We are not just disabled people, we are people 
with impairments and to pretend otherwise is to ignore a major part of our biographies” 
(Shakespeare and Watson 2002, 11).50  
                                                     
49 For a more detailed analysis on the role of physical pain and suffering see Crow 1996; Morris 1991. 
50 To emphasize their point, Shakespeare and Watson give some striking examples that take the social 
model to its logical extreme: If physical impairment or difference is completely irrelevant in our human 
experience, why do we worry about land mines or road accidents? On what grounds is it sensible for a 
pregnant woman to take folic acid tablets, and can we claim that she is being oppressive to people with 
disabilities by taking the tablets? (Shakespeare and Watson p 13.) 
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The recognition of bodily difference is important since different impairments generate 
different responses. These differences – and responses to them – have significant impacts at 
the individual and social levels. Therefore while on one hand the medical model sees in 
disability only an impairment – a physical deviation – to be rid of, and on the other hand the 
social model refuses to attribute any significance to impairment, the critical disability studies 
approach avoids both extremes in an attempt to deal with disability as a whole – with its social 
and physical, phenomenological and cultural aspects. In this view it would be wrong not to 
reduce the impairment of an individual if at all possible, but it would be as wrong not to 
challenge the structural or social barriers before the individual just because there is no 
prospect of the impairment disappearing (Shakespeare and Watson 2002, 13). An impairment 
may never be completely eradicated, a completely barrier free environment may be an 
unsustainable myth or even an utopia, but there is still much to be done realistically to make 
sure that people with disabilities can participate in public life (Abberley 2002). 
To sum up the above points, CDS attempts to move beyond the tension between the medical 
and social models by questioning the very foundational assumptions of these models about 
normalcy, independence, interdependence, the social construct of disability but also non-disability 
and by expanding its enquiry into a much larger range of issues such as the intersection of disability 
with class, gender, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity and a host of other socially constructed 
categories. For example the experience of a white, middle class man who develops his disability 
later in life will be significantly different than the experience of a coloured woman who was born 
with disability (Hosking 2008, 11) How should we deal with the difference in this case, by 
completely ignoring it, or by acknowledging and responding to it? What theoretical tools do we 
have to acknowledge or respond to it? CDS recognises these questions regarding difference and 
accepts them as inevitable. 
  
86 
 
Moreover, its conception of difference extends beyond the ability vs disability binary to a 
conception of “disabilities” as well as the intersection of different axes of oppression concerning 
disabilities. CDS recognises the multiplicity of difference and disadvantage as well as the 
intersectionality of oppression that people with disabilities experience. The social model’s 
neglect of the impaired body and the problems that arise out of this neglect has already been 
mentioned above. As feminists have understood long ago, the body is one of the loci of 
oppressive social relations – it embodies oppression. Therefore, once again, the body cannot be 
understood as simply biological or bounded, but should be seen as one more axis along which 
social inequalities as well as systems of privileging and power are reproduced. Along with the 
other axes such as gender, race, class, sexuality and age, disability is a marker in the divide 
between the powerful and the powerless, those who have a voice and those who do not 
(Shakespeare and Corker 2002, 2). 
While the social model’s diagnosis and language of oppression is correct and discrimination 
against the disabled alive, the experience of people with disabilities cannot be merely reduced to 
oppression. In the encounter between the abled and the disabled, a conflictual paradigm (i.e. 
dominant abled vs. subordinate disabled individual) can explain what is taking place only partly. 
In this encounter mutual fear and mistrust must be recognised. The need for education (of the 
abled as well as the disabled) and increased visibility (i.e. sharing and presence in the public 
space) become more pronounced. Moreover, oppression cannot be described only as the able-
bodied approaching and dealing with the disabled person in inappropriate, insulting, demeaning 
or patronising ways, but also in the self-perception of the disabled person, and her internalisation 
of these ways and practices (Lang 2007, 30). 
At this point, CDS espouses an embodied approach. It is an embodied theory in at least two ways. 
First, CDS locates the body at the centre of the discussions around disability. This point has already 
been explored above, so it will not be explored further until the next chapter. Second, CDS is 
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embodied in the sense that it emerges from the bottom up, from the daily, lived experiences of 
people with disabilities. Whereas the ivory tower of academia can be disembodying, CDS aims to 
engage with social values, institutional priorities and policies, and political will as they are the real 
issues that real people face with in their daily lives (Pothier and Devlin 2006, 9) This embodied 
approach is a consequence of its intentionally locating itself between theory and practice, as 
already mentioned in the preceding section. 
Finally, CDS recognises the ambiguity of the disabled subject and resists any attempts or 
temptations to essentialise disability. CDS is not a grand theory of disability, simply because 
disability is not a monolithic entity with an essential nature. Some disabilities are visible, some 
are not. Some are acquired gradually or at a certain point in time; some, people are born with. 
Some are permanent, others are temporary. Defining what is permanent and what is temporary 
is in itself a challenge that requires long informed discussions, let alone defining disability. The 
range of potential disabilities is endless. For some disability is constructed depending for the most 
part on what is valued by the society at a certain sociopolitical conjuncture. For them, some 
personal characteristics are understood as defects – most of the time as a result of how they 
relate to productivity – and persons are manufactured as disabled (Pothier and Devlin 2006, 5). 
Others like Swain and French take it so far as to claim that everyone is – or will be - disabled in 
one way or another, so we cannot look for a stark distinction between the disabled and the able 
(Swain and French 2000). Similarly for Davis everyone is impaired: impairment is the rule and not 
the exception (Davis 2002, 32). 
Perhaps one way to work with or work around this ambiguity is to look beyond the impairment 
or disability itself, to the effects on the life of the individual. French delineates four factors that 
influence the way people with disabilities experience the consequences of their impairments in 
daily life: the precise period in a person’s life when they acquired their impairment, the relative 
visibility of the impairment, the severity of the impairment – or perhaps the extent to which it 
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deviates from the norm – and finally other possible illnesses that the impaired individual might 
have (French 1994). Focusing on the functional consequences help avoid the risk of labelling and 
categorising disabilities. Yet again, as discussed above, disability is not simply how the 
environment limits the functioning of the impaired person. Impairment is real and both biological 
and external factors are relevant in a discussion of disability (Shakespeare 2014, 58) Therefore if 
disability is constructed at the intersection of the environment and the biological, responses to 
disability must take both factors into account. 
Finally, the ambiguity of disability should also prevent us from making the assumption that we 
know the disabled subject. If disability exists in such enormous variety and countless experiences, 
we cannot know the whole picture. Besides those who may not be aware of their impairment 
(does this mean they are not disabled?), some may not call themselves disabled (for many 
reasons, some of which should be obvious to the reader by now), others may not want to identify 
themselves with the disability community or not call themselves a minority unlike others who do 
(Shakespeare and Watson 2002, 25). When we consider the fluidity of disability in light of the 
above discussion, the need to problematize the notion of normalcy and what counts as 
normal once again comes to the fore. 
The review so far on the perceptions and models of disability provide us with the insights and 
language with which we can now turn to deliberative democracy. The discussion below will show 
us the extent to which the claims of disability scholarship about the marginalisation or exclusion 
of people with disabilities in society are reproduced in deliberative democratic theory. 
 
III. Deliberative Democratic Practices Risk Ableism 
In a time where diversity is valued and embraced, people with disabilities have been absent from 
texts or discussions on diversity (Jaeger and Bowman 2005, x). As Ian Birrell observed, in the midst 
of the “discussion of diversity and self-congratulatory talk of tolerance”, people with disabilities 
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are still “stuck in the shadows of society” (Birrell 2014).51 Deliberative democrats too have left 
people with disabilities outside the scope of deliberative sites despite the theory’s emancipatory 
concerns and emphasis on equality. They have not grappled with questions and debates around 
able-bodiedness, disability and inclusion, which, given deliberative democracy’s emancipatory 
ideals, ought to be key discussions for deliberative democrats. This exclusion, mainly by omission, 
risks rendering deliberative sites ableist. Using the insights gained from the above discussion as 
reference, I explain below what I mean by ableism and the risk thereof. 
In general terms, ableism refers to “promoting certain psychophysical features as superior or fully 
human” (Mladenov 2016). It denotes an attitude “that devalues or differentiates disability through 
the valuation of able-bodiedness equated to normalcy” (Ho 2008). Wolbring defines it as “the 
favouritism for certain abilities for example cognition, competitiveness or consumerism and the 
often negative sentiment towards the lack of favoured abilities” (Wolbring 2006). For Campbell it 
is a “network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body 
that is projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human” (Campbell 
2009, 5). The common point between the various definitions is the belief that disability is 
inherently negative and should be rehabilitated, cured or if possible, alleviated.52  
                                                     
51 For instance, in a survey conducted by Scope recently, nearly half (43%) of the public said they do 
not know anyone who is disabled and fewer than 17% of people said they have friends who are 
disabled. In the same survey two thirds (67%) of the people said they feel uncomfortable talking to 
disabled people (Aiden and McCarthy 2014). Evidence from a similar survey also shows that a 
significant proportion of society assume that disabled people are less capable than able-bodied 
people, in need of care and dependent on others (Grewal et al. 2002). 
52 Discussions on related terminologies of “ableism”, “disablism” and the more recent “dis/ablism” 
abound. To give a brief explanation of the distinctions between the three, while ableism promotes 
certain competencies, disablism renders individuals inferior and threatens to exclude, eradicate or 
neutralise them because of their impairments. Dis/ability on the other hand emphasizes that ableism 
and disablism “can only ever be understood simultaneously in relation to one another” (Goodley 
2014). Given that the nuances between the three terms are not significant enough for the purposes 
of this work, I find it unnecessary to burden the discussion and will use “ableist” to denote the ways 
in which deliberative democracy favours able-bodiedness and excludes disability. 
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Deliberative democrats’ demands from citizens, which were discussed in the previous chapter 
risk ableism to the extent that they promote certain cognitive and communicative competencies 
as necessary for participation in deliberative practices and therefore for individuals to count as 
deliberative citizens. These demands favour able-bodiedness as a precondition to be a full 
deliberative citizen. Adapting the very definition of disability espoused by the proponents of the 
social model and cited above, deliberative democrats take no or little account of people who 
have disabilities and thus exclude them from participation in deliberative processes (UPIAS 1976, 
14). The omission of people with disabilities from deliberative sites undermine not only their 
personhood, but also their place in society as full citizens  – disability becomes the marker of 
difference between those who are accepted as full citizens to deliberative sites and can 
therefore deliberate, and who are not citizens in the deliberative sense of the word. 
In Chapter 1 four groupings of problems were identified regarding deliberative 
democracy’s assumptions about citizen competence: participat ion, rationality, language 
and equality. These were suggested as barriers to the full participation of average – able-
bodied – citizens. However their exclusionary properties are exacerbated in a context 
where we attempt to imagine people with disabilities as prospective deliberative citizens. 
They can also help us identify the specific ways through which deliberative democrats may 
risk an ableist outlook. 
The problem regarding participation was that the demands of deliberation might prevent 
the presence, voice or representation of all relevant parties in a deliberative site. When 
these demands favour able-bodiedness, the cost of participation might make it impossible 
for people with disabilities to be part of deliberative decision making processes. These 
demands may be related to physical access to deliberative sites or confidence and self-
esteem issues that are required to participate in deliberation. Moreover, if the deliberative 
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event is using an open door or self-selection policy, participation will still be skewed in 
favour of those with higher economic status and better education – both of which people 
with disabilities usually lack.53 The examples in the previous chapter from four deliberative 
events also provide evidence that an open door policy is probably inadequate to recruit 
people with disabilities to deliberative sites. 
When it comes to rationality, deliberative democratic practices favour able-bodiedness against 
those who deviate from the norms that also define competent liberal citizens. This in turn links 
rationality to basic cognitive capacities to formulate and defend arguments in an 
understandable and persuasive way. As a result while those who speak less well, or who speak 
in ways that are devalued by the dominant culture are disadvantaged, those who cannot speak 
at all, those who take longer to formulate or understand arguments, or those who process 
information and ideas less well are kept out of deliberative decision making processes 
altogether. A similar situation is true for the use of language, which in some instances might act 
as a barrier for people with disabilities – people with disabilities are usually not the most 
elaborate orators. 
In terms of equality, the problems that people with disabilities face are often multiple and 
interconnected – poverty, lack of qualifications, lack of education, unemployment, depression 
often coexist with disability in a cycle of deprivation and intensify the problem of access and 
inequality (Barnes 2001). These interconnected problems also have a negative impact on relevant 
and accessible information for people with disabilities. As a result, while deliberative theory is built 
on the twin principles of formal equalisation of access and equal opportunity to articulate 
                                                     
53 Disability is both a cause and effect of poverty. For more on the cyclical relationship between 
disability and poverty see C. Hughes and Avoke 2010; Lustig and Strauser 2007. Disabled adults are 
nearly three times as likely as non-disabled adults to have no formal qualifications (30% to 11% 
respectively). See Office for National Statistics 2012. 
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persuasive arguments, in practice people with disabilities are given neither access to the site nor 
opportunity to voice their preferences. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to bring to the attention of deliberative democracy the 
development and claims of the scholarship on disability issues, especially as they pertain to the 
inclusion of people with disabilities in public life and democracy. Becoming familiar with the 
vocabulary of disability studies serves to inform deliberative democrats about their unfounded 
assumptions about the able-bodiedness of the deliberative citizen and help recognise the blind 
spot of deliberative sites regarding the inclusion of people with disabilities, which in effect risk 
rendering these sites ableist – at least by omission. With this goal in mind I briefly surveyed historical 
attitudes towards disability which are still persistent today. Many of these attitudes will come up 
when we start discussing deliberation and deliberative sites, linking this discussion with the 
following chapters and reminding us once again that an awareness of these attitudes is an 
important first step in our analysis of the exclusion people with disabilities face in deliberative 
democratic theory and practice. 
The history and discussion on the medical, social and critical models of disability that are provided 
in this chapter show that there is not a single disability theory or agenda that can guide our 
analysis. Although the community of scholars involved in this work is relatively small, the variety 
of approaches and the wealth of insight, especially as a result of links with other disciplines is 
remarkable. In the next few paragraphs I pull together the relevant themes from this body of 
work which will guide the discussion in the next chapters. 
The first guiding theme is the rejection of normalisation as a response to disability. Along with 
the rejection is a call to shift the gaze from a focus on the construction of disability as a deviance 
from the norm to a focus on disability as one form of existence among others. One way of 
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problematizing the norm is to challenge the diagnostic perspective that emphasises individual 
deficiency and imposes able ways of living – what McRuer calls “compulsory able-bodiedness” 
(McRuer 2006). Another way would be to challenge the idea of a rational, independent – liberal 
- subject who acts as a citizen. I have already problematized this construction of the deliberative 
citizen and proposed an alternative in the preceding chapter. In the next chapters I will explore 
what happens in the deliberative site when the liberal citizen is replaced with the caring citizen 
and when care becomes the guiding orientation as opposed to self-interest. The second theme 
is the rejection of binaries, especially the binary of the mind versus the body in favour of a more 
embodied conceptualisation of disability. Disability is not only medical versus social. It is not only 
body/physical versus environmental/structural. It requires a much deeper and more complex 
conceptual analysis, which takes into account both the physical and ideational environment in 
which the person lives, as well the person’s impairment and the effects of that impairment. The 
implications of this rejection of binaries will become clearer and more relevant in the discussion 
on the disabled body and spatiality in the next chapter. 
The third theme is the multi-dimensionality of the disability experience and struggle. Just as 
disability cannot be considered as simply consisting of one or two dimensions, the engagement 
in disability studies or its emancipatory framework must be carried on along different axes of 
analysis. The present enquiry, therefore, cannot limit itself to include social, economic and 
political planes, but must extend to the psychological, cultural, discursive and carnal. To give an 
example, if disability is not simply about having a medical condition but about the way in which 
medical conditions come laden with meaning and connotation, the enquiry must discover first 
and take into account what they and essentially the construction of the difference based on them 
mean for the disabled person, her participation in public life as a citizen and for this project. These 
three overarching themes will become the lenses if you like through which we will look at 
deliberative democratic theory and its sites in the next three chapte 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Embodiedness of Disability and Deliberation 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I highlight the embodiedness of the disability experience and the 
embodiedness of deliberation, and draw connections between the two to contribute to 
the case for the inclusion of people with disabilities in deliberative democracy and its 
decision making processes. As I have indicated in the introduction, political theory seldom 
connects citizens and bodies, and deliberative democratic theory is no exception in that it 
does not engage with deliberative citizens as embodied citizens. While the body with its 
functions and impairments lie at the heart of the disability experience, discussions on what 
constitutes deliberation mostly ignore the bodily dimensions of communication. 
Acknowledging the embodiedness of deliberation therefore addresses this theoretical gap, 
but at the same time helps open up the discussion to multiple possibilities for the practical 
inclusion of people with disabilities in deliberative sites. 
In the following sections I first provide a brief discussion on how the body is conceptualised 
in social science. This discussion will also illuminate the links between theories of the body 
and models of disability. I will then explain what I mean by the disembodiedness of 
deliberative democratic theory and its deeply implicit assumption that the deliberative 
citizen has a “normal” body. The goal in these sections is to show that the present orthodoxy 
of disembodied deliberation and the assumption of normality excludes people with 
disabilities from deliberative sites and once again renders it ableist. 
I will then challenge the twin issues of disembodiedness and normality, and present an 
alternative conceptualisation of deliberation and the deliberative site where the disabled 
subversively appear in the deliberative site in their embodied, “abnormal” state. I will analyse 
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what their embodied presence in the deliberative site means and does. In this alternative 
deliberative site, the embodied presence of the disabled achieves a number of things. First, it 
makes citizens accessible and available to each other. Second, it disrupts the deliberative site and 
exposes the otherwise invisible physical organisation and the power relations embedded in this 
organisation. Third, it politicises the deliberative site which is depoliticised by the hegemony of 
rationality and order. By being present in the deliberative site in the first place and by attempting 
to communicate in ways that are unexpected, perhaps deemed to be unintelligible or even 
unacceptable by deliberative standards, people with disabilities both challenge the boundaries 
of what counts as deliberation and demand recognition in deliberative democracy. Fourth, and 
finally, their very act of embodied presence brings into light their exclusion and therefore 
performs one type of deliberation. The questions of how this presence can be translated into 
preference as well as how the physical organisation of the deliberative site can be used for 
inclusion will be taken up in detail in the following chapters. 
 
I. The Body and Embodied Citizenship 
It is an oft-repeated fact that the study of the body is a latecomer to social science. The Western 
philosophical tradition has always had a cognitive bias that identified humanity with the mind while 
overlooking humans' physical being (Shilling 1993, 10). In Elias' words, philosophy has always 
conceived of us as homo clausus - thinking statues who are imprisoned in bodies that cannot 
provide us with reliable knowledge about the outside world (Elias et al. 2000). This silence and the 
persistent absence of the body is – in another oft-repeated claim – often attributed to the legacy 
of Cartesian dualism or distinction between the mind and the body.54 In this dualism the mind is 
the location of cognitive processes like thinking, writing, reasoning, reflecting, arguing, and 
                                                     
54 As widely repeated as it is, the critique of the Cartesian duality itself should not be embraced 
uncritically. For example Baker and Morris problematise the traditional hard distinction that is 
ascribed to Descartes using his own writings, and label it as the “Cartesian Legend” (Baker and Morris 
2005). 
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debating whereas the body is associated with mostly involuntary and fixed set of physiological 
processes like respiration, digestion etc. Cognitive processes both take place independently of the 
body, and take primacy over it. The mind is the active subject that takes control of the body, which 
is merely a passive object, a special kind of entity, a container (Russell 2011, 11; Blackman 2008, 
5). 
This naturalistic view conceptualised the body as a pre-social and merely biological container, 
whose expected role – if it had any role at all - was to conform to normative values. The Judeo-
Christian tradition, for instance, established a link between the moral state of a person and his body, 
and rendered the body as weak, sinful and in need of strict regulation under a moral order (Brown 
2008). The mirror opposite of this body would be one which defied or disrupted that order: the 
disabled, feeble minded, the uncivilised or the savage (Mercer and Race 1987). Where a link was 
established between the body and morality, the denigration and rejection of the body which 
threatened the moral order had at times lethal consequences. The eugenics movement of the early 
twentieth century, which targeted different racial groups, sexualities, the disabled and the “feeble 
minded”, particularly if they were also women, shows how far the rejection of some bodies could 
go. This view of the body shares some assumptions with the medical model of disability, which sees 
disability as a deviation from the norm and considers it a pathology for which the individual is 
responsible. The order that the body is subjected to does not have to be religiously inspired. It might 
well be productivity, for example, especially in advanced capitalist societies where the individual’s 
worth is linked closely to his participation in the labour process. As a result the medical model 
focuses on intervention that aims to normalise a disabled person’s work functions, often at 
the expense of his individual needs.55  
Although naturalistic views of the body – as well as the medical model of disability – are still 
persistent, social constructionist views regarding the body has gained wider acceptance 
                                                     
55 For more on the relationship between disability and individual worth in capitalist societies, see 
Abbas 2016, Economy, Exploitation and Intellectual Disability. 
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starting from the second half of the twentieth century. The anthropology of Mary Douglas 
viewed the body as an image of the social system, a metaphor of society (Douglas 
2002[1966]). In this view, it is impossible to consider the body without involving at the same 
time a social dimension, because the social body determines how the physical body is 
perceived and experienced (Douglas 1996). Other social constructionists like Laqueur and 
Jordanova also emphasized how bodies have been invested with a wide range of social 
meanings (Laqueur 1992; Jordanova 1990). Meanwhile for Foucault the body was both 
completely constituted by discourse and at the same time critical to operations of power 
(Foucault 1979a). Finally Goffman focused on social interaction and the relationship between 
an individual's self and social identity, and examined the body in relation to managing and 
presenting the body, as well as stigma that is attached to the body (Goffman 1990b). If power 
relations have a hold upon the body, the body is also directly involved in a political field. 
Regardless of whether we see the body simply as something we have or something we are, 
it is already something more than a container or a substance. The body is a site of meaning, 
potentiality, practice and performativity. It is a basic theme for symbolism (Douglas 2002, 
163). As feminists have long recognised, the body is one of the loci of oppressive social 
relations – it embodies oppression. Therefore, once again, the body should be seen as one 
more axis along which social inequalities as well as systems of privileging and power are 
reproduced. Along with the other axes such as gender, race, class, sexuality and age, the 
body is a marker in the divide between the powerful and the powerless, those who have a 
voice and those who don’t (Shakespeare and Corker 2002, 2). 
It is interesting to note that while feminist, black or gay liberation movements were politicising 
the body by highlighting the social meanings attributed to bodies, the social model of disability - 
in many ways the first expression of a disability liberation movement - all but completely rejected 
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the body’s significance and relevance in the struggle for equality.56 During the years when the 
left was devoted to the body in the social construction of race, gender and sexuality, the 
forerunners of the disability liberation movement were running away from the issue. The social 
model, terrified by the essentialising gaze of the earlier medical models, rejected the significance 
of the body altogether.57 Nevertheless - and as the proponents of the critical disability theory 
noticed - if disability is an embodied reality, any attempt to overcome the exclusion of people 
with disabilities must take into account the bodily dimension of exclusion. 
A recent, third approach to the body aims to overcome the blind spots and limitations of solely 
naturalistic or social constructionist views. Identified by Shilling as the emergent or embodied view 
of the body, this third way acknowledges that the body is both shaped by the social and can exert 
its own agency in society (Shilling 2012, 103). Naturalistic perspectives must be acknowledged 
because while the embodied subject has biological and neurological properties, she is not merely 
biological matter. She has feelings, beliefs and a reflexive consciousness that constitute the basis of 
her agency (Capra 2004; Archer 2013). Similarly, rationality is not something that is wired into us. It 
is both an ever developing activity through which we make sense of the world, and an activity 
that emerges for the kind of organisms that we are - we reason this way or that way because 
of the bodies that we have, but also because of the social contexts in which we live and the 
symbolic systems that we inherit (Johnson 1999, 99; Elias 1991, 171). Building on these 
developments, Giddens suggested that the body has appeared as the vehicle of new 
emotional intensities (Giddens 1993). A few years later, Bryan Turner’s The Body and Society 
announced the arrival of the ‘somatic society – a society within which our major political and 
moral problems are expressed through the conduit of the human body’ (Turner 2008 [1996], 
                                                     
56 “Disability has nothing to do with the body” – See Chapter 2. 
57 On the other hand, while many progressives decried racism, sexism and socio-economic bias, they 
did not see that their own information systems that relied on reading, writing, seeing, thinking and 
moving were laden with assumptions about physical or mental normality, rendering them ableist by 
omission as well. See Davis 1995, 4. 
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6). We are, as a result, living in societies where the body has come to the fore as a social as 
well as academic issue and become constitutive of the self (Shilling 2012, 4).58  
This new focus on the body in social theory has spilled over into political theory mainly via 
feminist scholars who challenged the mind-over-the-body dichotomy and the mainstream 
model of the disembodied citizen (See for example Lister and Campling 2003; Yuval-Davis and 
Werbner 1999; Jones 1990; Hartsock 1983). While the citizenship literature constituted the 
citizen primarily as an agent who exists and operates in the public sphere and kept the body 
separate from the citizen, feminist scholarship advocated a thoroughly embodied 
citizenship.59 These developments regarding the body and its move from the periphery 
towards the centre of political studies will undoubtedly have repercussions for deliberative 
democratic theory and practice, as individuals - potential deliberators - become increasingly 
reflexive about their own embodied identities. Therefore it is time to start theorising what 
embodied deliberative citizenship is, how it should inform our theoretical and practical positions 
about deliberation, and for the purposes of this work, what the convergence of these two forms 
of embodiedness – of citizenship and disability – means in particular for the disabled and their 
inclusion in deliberative sites. The following sections will attempt to answer some of these 
questions. 
                                                     
58 As the health, shape or the appearance of the body becomes the focus of especially visual media, 
we see that growing numbers of people see their bodies as integral to their highly differentiated and 
individualised identities, and shape or present their bodies accordingly. This new focus - perhaps 
obsession - is largely attributed to the growth of cosmopolitan contexts, the proliferation of global 
and visual media and the internalisation of the body's valorisation as a bearer of symbolic value in 
consumer culture (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994; Roberson and Suzuki 2002; Kim 2010). 
59 Beasley and Bacchi’s works provide a stark example to understand how much prominence has been 
ascribed to the body in feminist literature in terms of its relationship with citizenship. Their claim is 
that there are two types of political subjects: those who are in control of their bodies and those who 
are controlled by their bodies; because “bodies give substance to citizenship and citizenship matters 
to bodies” (Beasley and Bacchi 2000; Bacchi and Beasley 2002). 
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Deliberative Democracy is Disembodied 
Deliberative democratic theory and its deliberative sites take for granted this mind / body 
dualism. No account of deliberative democracy takes into account the embodiedness of 
interlocutors in a deliberative site, or the embodiedness of deliberation itself. In the classical 
account of deliberation the mind is disembodied, reasoning is logic-like and literal, a 
manipulation of propositional structures (Johnson 1999, 84). Take, for example, the Discourse 
Quality Index (DQI) developed by deliberative democracy scholars Steenberger et al to measure 
the quality of deliberation in a given site (Steenbergen et al. 2003). DQI takes speech as its 
measure of analysis, which the authors define as “public discourse by a particular individual 
delivered at a particular point in a debate” (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 27). DQI relies on several 
coding categories: participation, level and content of justification, respect and constructive 
politics. The authors use a parliamentary debate to illustrate the coding and analysis of the 
quality of deliberation. In this illustration two coders first read through the debate transcripts 
and code the relevant speeches. They then compare their coding and in the case of 
disagreement read through the speech again until they agree on a particular code. 
The authors do not clarify whether they were present or not in the House of Commons during 
this 5-hour debate, although they indirectly suggest that their analysis relies purely on the 
published text of the debate.60 As a result the embodied aspects of the deliberation that took 
place in these five hours is completely absent from their analysis. Were there any bodily cues 
– eye-rolling, shouting or laughing, that would have had an influence on the deliberators? We 
cannot tell. The authors admit that their model does not account for humour but they do not 
mention the possibility and significance of the non-verbal and bodily aspects of 
                                                     
60 “The above example shows how a discursive text ... can be quantified using the indicators of the 
DQI” (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 37). 
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communication such as shouting, laughing, crying, standing up, raising hands (for example in 
disbelief) and so on. And it is in this sense the body is the absent present in deliberative 
democratic theory’s conceptualisation and analysis of what counts as deliberation. The body 
is only relevant so far as it enables a speech act or an act of recognition or will. This is simply 
another incarnation of the mind over body dualism, which elevates the mind over the body: 
the body slips back into absence. 
Despite deliberative democratic theory's neglect of the embodied nature of deliberation and 
deliberative sites, deliberation is already and inescapably embodied. However the body only 
becomes noticeable when it forces itself to our consciousness by displaying a visual difference, 
in particular in the case of those whose differences render them visible in a matrix of 
asymmetrical power relationships (Shildrick 2002, 49). In the context of able-bodiedness versus 
disability, the body is revealed "not through the prowess of the strong, but through the 
troubles of the weak, the ill, the infirm, the wounded, for health is silent" (Fraser and Greco 
2004, 20).61 The attention that feminism, black and gay civil rights movements gave to the body 
can partly be explained by this realisation that bodily difference engenders asymmetrical 
power relationships (Fraser and Greco 2004, 2). That is why Haraway notes that while a 
man’s epistemological agency is transparent and objective, it is the woman’s – or a 
coloured person’s – body that sets her epistemological agency apart as opaque, not 
objective, biased and reporting only the self ( Haraway 1997, 32). Whitehead observed in 
as early as 1938, “no one ever says, 'Here am I, and I have brought my body with me'" 
(Whitehead 1968 [1938], 156). However when the disabled person enters the deliberative 
site, she does in a way say to those present, "here I am, and I have brought my body with 
me”. 
                                                     
61 62 This difference can result from a sudden or progressive impairment of one of its functions which 
interferes with daily activities and disturbs an order we would have otherwise taken for granted. 
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In Chapter 1, I have suggested that the ideal speech situation (along with validity 
claims) establishes the criteria through which the quality of deliberation and 
deliberative sites can be understood and acts as a pointer to what perfect 
communication in a deliberative site would look like. This hyper-rational Habermasian 
construct betrays all that is wanting in deliberative sites: "participants in the ideal 
speech situation lead notably disembodied lives" (Keat 1982, 5).62 Deliberation in 
search for consensual decisions is equated with linguistic communication in a narrow 
cognitivist sense. The significance of human embodiment, emotion or imagination is 
completely ignored although our experience of both communication and being with 
others is simply and always an embodied experience (Crossley 1996, 124).  
 
At this point Crossley's reading of how the embodiedness of deliberation relates to what 
goes on during deliberation is insightful. He suggests that embodiment is actually one of the 
ways through which systematic distortions are introduced into communication. If Habermas 
intends that the ideal speech situation will overcome the influence of structural factors like 
class, status and power, these distortions are usually introduced into communication through 
the mediation of our embodiment – through speech, accent, clothing, comportment, gesture and 
bodily attitude, which reveal our background . Moreover, these bodily markers "comment upon 
whatever else is being said" (Crossley 1997, 31), just like a person's appearance and embodied 
actions comment upon what it is they say (Paterson 2012, 174). Sometimes the interlocutor 
shares information expressively. Perhaps she emits or exudes information – instead of speaking 
it – to someone who gleans it. A raised eyebrow, a pleading look, clenched teeth or an averted 
gaze are all messages that a sender conveys by means of her current bodily posture or activity. 
The transmission of such messages will occur only during the time that the body is visible and 
present to sustain this activity (Goffman 1963; Fraser and Greco 2004, 82). Therefore the 
                                                     
62 Similarly, the Habermasian public sphere is also disembodied. 
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embodiedness of deliberation is not only a given that has so far been ignored, but also a 
significant factor that has a direct impact on what takes place in the deliberative site. 
 
Deliberative Democracy Assumes Normality 
In Chapter 1 I showed how a reproduction of liberalism’s assumptions of physical and mental 
capabilities of the citizen imposes an undue burden on deliberative citizens. In the above section, 
I suggested that a disembodied construction of deliberative citizen is an illusion since both citizens 
and deliberation are embodied. This construction, which takes for granted the abled-bodiedness 
of the individual also designates able-bodiedness as normal, while setting those who are not able-
bodied as abnormal. The link between disembodiedness and normality is further reinforced 
because it is the normality of the citizen that renders him disembodied.63 In this section, I will 
mention the works of three different authors to explore deliberative democracy’s assumption of 
normality from different angles. Lennard Davis’ work on the normal, Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson’s normate and Robert McRuer's compulsory able-bodiedness provide us with the 
vocabulary which I use in the later section to explain how deliberative democracy’s 
assumption of normality operates in the illustrative case of a Learning Disability Partnership 
Board meeting in Gloucestershire. 
In Enforcing Normalcy, Lennard Davis talks about the introduction of the normal to our 
vocabulary in contrast to the ideal. The ideal body existed as the mytho-poetic body that is 
related to the body of the gods since the ancient Greeks. This body was never attainable by a 
human; it was depicted in art or imagination as a copy of something that never existed in this 
world (Davis 1995, 25). The grotesque on the other hand was related to the inversion of the ideal 
and signified the common people who fell short of that ideal. The concept of norm or the average 
                                                     
63 And vice versa – the abnormal is embodied. As I have discussed above, while the normal body slips 
back into absence, the abnormal body becomes visible. 
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for the human body was introduced by the French statistician Quetelet, who thought that the 
law of error used by astronomers to locate a star and averaging all the errors could be applied to 
human's physical features. With Quetelet, the average man was born as a physically and morally 
average construct, and a generalised notion of the normal as an imperative was born (Davis 1995, 
23). Imperative, in that, unlike the ideal, the majority of the population somehow had to be part 
of the norm, and therefore would be evaluated against it. 
In my discussion in Chapter 2 on the conceptualisations of disability I have suggested with the 
Critical Disability Theory approach that it would be a mistake to attempt to identify who is disabled 
and who is not by using a narrow set of relative values and assumptions of normality, because 
disability is an extremely fluid phenomenon and every individual's disability is uniquely personal. In 
Chapter 1, while discussing the liberal notions of citizenship, I have also suggested that liberalism 
assumes "normal" physical and mental capabilities. The abled-bodiedness of the normal is taken 
for granted, the normal is privileged over that which is abnormal, and the organisation of society 
reflects this inevitable privileging. The problem with this assumption is that the "able" body has 
no definitional core - it is transparently average or normal, and the disabled body is defined only 
in contrast to this average, as any body that is "outside the norm" (Mitchell and Snyder 2013, 
276). 
At this point Garland-Thomson's neologism, the normate comes closest to accurately describing 
this citizen. The normate "designates the social figure through which people can represent 
themselves as definitive human beings. [It] is the constructed identity of those who, by way of 
the bodily configurations and the cultural capital they assume, can step into a position of 
authority and wield the power it grants them" (Garland-Thomson 1997, 8). A normate narrowly 
defined in this sense would leave us with, in Goffman's words, "only one complete unblushing 
male [in America]: a young, married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual Protestant father of 
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college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight and height, and a recent record 
in sports" (Goffman 1963, 128). 
There is a similar, implicit deliberative normate at work within deliberative democratic theory. 
The deliberative normate has the capacity to deliberate logically, rationally and communicatively. 
As I suggested in Chapter 1, the deliberative citizen is an able-bodied, transparently average 
citizen in both the physical and the mental sense. Discussions on the deliberative competence of 
citizens focus mostly on "normal" citizens, who are again at either end of a spectrum of average.64 
A construct organised in this way around notions of the normal has the effect of devaluing all 
other practices and phenomena that fall outside or differ from the norm, designating them as 
irrelevant, undesired or simply in need of correction (Fraser and Greco 2004, 17). Interventions 
that challenge a strict view of rationality and seek to expand the definitions of deliberation (e.g. 
through including passion, emotions, testimony and storytelling; see Chapter 1) in effect try and 
challenge this very norm and expand it, by presenting a more authentic - albeit imperfect - citizen 
in contrast to the deliberative normate. This hegemony of normality can also be related to what 
McRuer calls compulsory able-bodiedness (McRuer 2010). McRuer establishes a link between 
queer and disability studies based on the pathological past homosexuality and disability share. 
According to McRuer, just as it is commonplace to talk about heterosexuality's invisibility in queer 
studies, able-bodiedness - even more than heterosexuality - "still largely masquerades as non-
identity as the natural order of things" (McRuer 2006, 1). 
 
                                                     
64 In one of the relatively later texts on citizen competence, Rosenberg discusses basic analytical 
capacity, capacity for rational evaluation and self-reflection, and communicative competence, yet 
does not once feel the need to mention that the citizens in question are still average citizens and there 
is still a whole range of citizens whose capacities are entirely outside the spectrum of the discussion 
presented in this text. (Rosenberg 2014). 
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Disembodiedness and Normality at Work 
The illustrative case of a Learning Disability Partnership Board meeting in Gloucestershire will 
help us understand further how the twin issues of disembodiedness and normality operate in a 
deliberative setting. As I have indicated in the introduction, LDPB meetings are one of the few – 
if not the only – deliberative sites where the disabled and the able-bodied deliberate together. 
On 29 January 2014, the "Better Buses Focus Group Meeting"65 of Gloucester Learning Disability 
Partnership Board had a meeting in the Shire Hall, the City Council building. Out of the twelve 
people present, six were people with mental disabilities and the rest were NGO workers 
(disability advocates) or council staff, including the integrated transport manager and a cabinet 
member of the city. The disabled in the room had various degrees and combinations of learning 
disabilities, speech impediments and dyskinesia66, some of which were immediately, while 
others were less visible. 
The purpose of the meeting was to improve the travel conditions for disabled people in 
Gloucestershire and agenda items ranged from easing the process to obtain bus passes to a 
more accessible Traveline website, from the new Travel Buddies Scheme to problems with 
the local Stagecoach Company. The disabled participants had been prepared for this meeting 
beforehand with the help of disability advocates who worked closely with the disabled 
community as staff of a local NGO. When it was time for them to present their case 
(regarding problems they face with the Stagecoach company), they referred to the texts 
written beforehand. Together they stood up facing the room and started reading their 
                                                     
65 “Better Buses” was a one-off sub-committee tasked with exploring the best transport improvement 
options for people with disabilities. It consisted of people with disabilities, the County’s transport 
manager and two other administrative staff, and a number of representatives from non-profit 
organisations. It reported to the LDPB chairs. 
66 Involuntary muscle movements. 
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presentations in order. Their presentation was not orderly, however, because the first 
presenter left the room suddenly without explanation just as they were about to start. They 
had to wait for a few minutes for him to come back. Once they started, some could read the 
texts with more ease than the others, while one of them struggled with reading so much that 
he eventually gave up. When one presenter struggled to read a word, the person next to him 
would try and help. During the same presentation, one of the disabled interlocutors - who 
was in the audience – started talking about his memories of childhood travels with his 
friends. Meanwhile, another disabled interlocutor was shaking his head uncontrollably - 
although it was apparent that he was interested in the presentations. 
After the presentation and the following discussion about Stagecoach, another disabled 
member of the group stood up to present his report on the Travel Buddies scheme, which 
had been launched to give people with disabilities in Gloucester more freedom and 
confidence in public transport by providing them with volunteer travel partners from the 
disabled community. The presenter had prepared a PowerPoint presentation again with the 
help of a disability advocate. During his ten minute talk the slides on the screen were 
completely different than the content of his talk – which he improvised at the scene. The 
disability advocate who co-authored the PowerPoint slides had to intervene multiple times 
during the presentation, either to help the presenter keep the focus on the content of the 
slides, or to remind him of things he forgot to mention. During the long presentation some 
disabled members of the audience were visibly distracted and showed signs of boredom. 
However the discussion that followed the presentation was livelier, with each interlocutor 
having the opportunity to voice their opinion on the topic. 
A similar reliance on written text for communication is also taken for granted in the monthly 
LDPB meetings. At the start of every meeting the co-chairs (one disabled, the other non-
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disabled) together welcome the participants, present the agenda of the meeting and manage 
the flow of information throughout the rest of the meeting. Usually the disabled co-chair 
welcomes the interlocutors and presents the agenda. However she finds it very difficult to read, 
and in the end the non-disabled co-chair intervenes, guiding her on the text with her finger 
word by word, making the welcome and presentation quite laborious for both the speaker and 
the listeners. Yet during the course of the deliberations - when she is not following a text - the 
disabled co-chair is considerably more relaxed and can communicate her preferences easier. 
A number of assumptions became visible in the course of a relatively short deliberative 
meeting. First, there was reliance on written text.67 The assumption that the disabled 
interlocutors could best present their case by directly reading from a prepared text or using a 
PowerPoint presentation shows how deeply engrained normalising tendencies can run even 
those who would identify as allies of the disabled. Compulsory able-bodiedness need not be 
an institution or organisation forcing the disabled to conform to certain practices by rules and 
regulations. It may become visible, like in this case, in the assumptions, expectations or visions 
of how the disabled can or should participate and communicate in a deliberative setting. 
Again, the intention behind the reliance on text need not be silencing the disabled person, 
but to regulate the content or the length of the speech as well as her façade, to give the 
person - and through her to the process of deliberation - an appearance of normality. 17th 
century English clergyman Thomas Tuke wrote that "the condition of the mind is discerned 
in the state and behaviour of the body" (Tuke 1616, 17). Here the attempt to bring the 
deliberating person within the bounds of the normal and help him present himself as close 
as possible to the normate to maintain an orderly discussion is seen in the attempt to 
regulate the forms of communication - of the body - with the help of written text, regardless 
of whether or not communicating through text is the best way of communication for the 
disabled person. 
                                                     
67 Which also reminds us of the reliance of the DQI on written text, as we have discussed above. 
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While in the above examples maintaining normality is related to regulating forms of 
communication that are deemed appropriate or acceptable, the body itself is often the 
signifier for the normal. I remember the first time I entered the Shire Hall to attend an LDPB 
meeting. I had arrived ten minutes before the start of the meeting, therefore I had to wait in 
the lobby before being greeted and ushered into the room where the meeting would take 
place. After only a quick scan of the waiting area I realised I could notice with considerable 
ease a few individuals who were waiting for the same meeting. The meeting was for the 
learning disabled and none of the individuals waiting with me had immediately visible 
disabilities. Yet something in the way they were dressed, the loaded and heavy backpacks 
some of them carried, and the way some of them paced the room set them aside visibly. Once 
in the meeting room, the visible difference between the disabled and non-disabled individuals 
continued. The way they presented themselves was different. Non-disabled individuals were 
dressed and groomed significantly differently – one could say better – and they had an air of 
formal confidence. The disabled, on the other hand, were much less formally dressed – some 
of them were in track-suit bottoms – and they generally seemed to be nonchalant about how 
they looked. The difference was so striking that there was not a single non-disabled person 
who dressed like the disabled, and not a single disabled person who dressed like the non-
disabled. In another context the difference in looks could have been dismissed as irrelevant. 
However in this setting, it was the main determinant which dictated who was who, which in 
turn had an impact on communication. A non-disabled person - with some exceptions – 
always addressed the disabled person with a polite, smiling confidence, slowly and carefully, 
perhaps extra diligent to show that they cared about communicating with the disabled 
person. The disabled persons on the other hand seemed more at ease. Although I was the 
new person in the room and before I had the chance to introduce myself, both the disabled 
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and the non-disabled already "knew" that I was one of the non-disabled. I was wearing a 
button down shirt and a blazer. 
De Swaan says "Maintaining normality is hard work. A body must be rested, cleaned, 
groomed and clothed every day; it must be fed properly and decorously at the correct time, 
and it must be made to walk the right tracks and talk the right things" (De Swaan 1990, 1). In 
many settings the failure to present oneself to a gathering in situational harness is likely to 
be taken as a sign of some kind of disregard for the setting and its participants (Goffman 
1963). In the LDPB meetings the non-disabled in the room were more favourable towards 
the disabled – in a way that would make deliberative democrats proud, they were there to 
listen and to talk in a way their interlocutors would understand. Nevertheless, it was still 
these differences in the looks and the attire of the individuals which determined how 
individuals addressed each other. For the able-bodied at least, the appearance and 
presentation of the disabled body set the tone in a deliberative setting. This difference in 
addressing can be said to be done in good faith, with the intention to understand and to be 
understood clearly, or in a patronising, or even worse, manipulative way. Therefore 
regardless of the intention of the ensuing communication, what is important to note here is 
that the bodily difference first divides the visual field into two - between those who are 
normal and who are not – and then influences how interlocutors address each other. And 
this is precisely why the embodiedness of deliberation and its impact must be acknowledged, 
studied, and responded to as a significant element of what takes place in the deliberative 
site. 
 
II. Employing Embodiedness for Inclusion 
In the above sections I have discussed the embodiedness of citizenship and deliberation, and set 
them against deliberative democracy’s disembodiedness and its assumption of normality where 
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deliberative citizens are concerned. I have shown how the relatively recent literature on the body 
should contribute to our understanding of deliberation. I have also illustrated how a deliberative 
event that is unaware of its normalising tendencies can fail to engage the disabled interlocutors 
in meaningful deliberation and leave the voices of the disabled outside deliberative decision 
making processes. 
Following and expanding on Clifford 2011, at this point I suggest employing the embodiedness of 
disability as a political claim to make visible and overcome the exclusion whereby the unexpected 
presence of the embodied citizen becomes a demand for recognition and voice in the deliberative 
site. The sheer presence of the embodied citizen in the place that it is not expected to be present 
constitutes a political act which strongly communicates – performs if you will – the inaccessibility of 
that site.68 In this view the disabled citizen – far from being dismissed as irrelevant or incompetent – 
becomes the very means of a struggle for inclusion. The political significance of the body is neither 
new for activists, nor is it limited to the experience of disability. To count but a couple of examples, 
Rosa Parks’ refusal to give up her bus seat to the white man in 1955 was a bodily act of resistance 
and confrontation that highlighted the oppression that African American citizens faced daily. 
Similarly, when in 1990 American disability rights activists left their crutches and wheelchairs 
behind and crawled up the stairs of the Capitol – a direct action which is now famously known as 
the Capital Crawl – to encourage the passage into law of the Americans with Disabilities Act, it 
was the embodiedness of their disability that became both the focus and the means of their 
direct action. Both cases are examples of activists employing the unexpectedness of their bodies 
to make a political statement about inclusion / exclusion. 
Similar acts of claim making are also acknowledged beyond the world of activism, in political 
science literature. Isin’s work on acts of citizenship and Munoz’ work on disidentification follow 
                                                     
68 Inaccessibility need not to be a result of physical access barriers, and disability not a physical 
disability, as the context makes clear. 
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similar ideas in two separate tracks. For Isin, citizenship itself is defined by dynamic struggles 
over rights rather than membership. He summarizes the binding thread of investigations of 
these struggles in acts of citizenship, which have four main characteristics. First, actors are not 
conceived of in advance as to their statues, but instead come into being as citizens through 
enactment. The subjects that are not citizens act as citizens by constituting themselves as those 
with the right to claim rights. Second, acts that articulate claims produce new sites of 
contestation, belonging and struggle. He counts bodies, streets, networks as potential sites of 
contestation for citizenship. Third, acts of citizenship involve multiple and overlapping scales of 
contestation, belonging and struggle. Finally, acts of citizenship shift the focus from what people 
say to what people do (Isin 2009, 371; Isin and Nielsen 2008; Isin 2012, 108 - 135). 
 
Following this construction of citizenship, people with disabilities can constitute themselves as 
deliberative citizens by virtue of entering into deliberative sites with their embodied selves, 
regardless of whether the demands of the site accept them, extend them an open invitation or 
not. Imagine, for example, in the case of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the possibility of citizens with disabilities demanding to be included in the 
deliberative site rather than being content with access to web forums (Pearse 2008).69 
Deliberative sites then become the very sites of contestation for people with disabilities, where 
they start challenging the ableist norms of deliberative practices that leave them outside 
deliberative decision making processes. Their embodiedness becomes a site of contestation 
simultaneously, as both people with disabilities and their able-bodied counterparts attempt to 
make sense of this new, embodied citizenship and embodied deliberation. 
Jose Munoz on the other hand focuses on identity as a site of struggle where essentialised, fixed 
positions clash against socially constituted definitions. Identity is produced at the point of contact 
                                                     
69 In the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly people with disabilities were expected to contribute to the 
deliberative decision making process through web forums. See Chapter 1, “Exclusion in Practice”. 
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between essential understandings of the self and socially constructed narratives of the self 
(Munoz 1999, 6). Munoz's concerns in his work are the essentialised identities that the cultural 
logics of heteronormativity, white supremacy or misogyny form. His response to these logics is 
disidentification - public enactments that contest the hegemonic supremacy of the majoritarian 
public sphere. These performances provide a moment of negotiation where deviant identities 
arrive at representation by jolting the social order: 
Disidentification is meant to be descriptive of the survival strategies the minority subject 
practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that continuously 
elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of 
normative citizenship ... Thus, disidentification is a step further than cracking open the 
code of the majority; it proceeds to use this code as raw material for representing a 
disempowered politics or positionality that has been rendered unthinkable by the 
dominant culture." (Munoz 1999, 4). 
Although Munoz's focus is on queer identities, there is an intriguing link here between his queer 
subjects and disabled individuals because as we have seen in Chapter 1 the disabled identity has 
also been located between the essentialising gaze of the medical model and the social model of 
disability, which sees disability as completely socially constructed. The disabled can respond to this 
in various ways.70 First, they can accept to identify with the dominant discourse - in our case the 
discourse that renders them unable to become part of deliberation. As a result their exclusion from 
deliberative sites would continue, they would stay invisible to deliberative democratic theory, as 
they already are. This response brings us back to the problem we have found in random sampling 
for the recruitment of deliberators. We have noted that even when deliberative democrats take 
into consideration disadvantage and the minority voice, their stratification has so far been blind to 
disability. However, even if they finally decided to include or even over-represent the disabled, in 
light of the physical and social inaccessibility of deliberative sites and the stigma that people with 
                                                     
70 Adapted from Michel Pecheux’s classifications regarding good and bad subjects (Pecheux 1983). 
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disabilities face, it would be highly unlikely for the disabled to accept the invitation to deliberate.71 
A second response is rejecting the dominant discourse - counteridentification - perhaps similar to 
the way the social model did. The social model rejects the location of d ability in the person as we 
have seen, and its stricter versions reject the relevance of the body for disability altogether. In terms 
of participation in deliberative sites this response would constitute a dead-end, since the social 
model's rejection of the body, coupled with deliberative democracy's disembodiedness and narrow 
understanding of what constitutes deliberation, would still render the disabled speechless even if 
they were in a deliberative site. 
The third response, disidentification, can work as a feasible strategy against the dominant 
exclusionary discourse. The disabled can carve up for themselves an in-between space from 
where they can challenge both the essentialist and social constructionist accounts of disability 
– a space where both the embodiedness of their experience is acknowledged and the demands 
of deliberative democracy are challenged. They can be present in deliberative sites, not 
necessarily with the identities and performances expected from "normal" deliberative citizens, 
but with their different, disabled, unruly, and certainly visible identities. As a result they perform 
a meditation on what it means to be an embodied, disabled deliberative citizen. 
What, then, can an act of citizenship that poses the disabled body as a political claim, or 
disidentification that challenges deliberative norms achieve in the deliberative site? What 
can the embodied presence of the disabled citizen do, for the inclusion of people with 
disabilities in deliberative sites? 
                                                     
71 Regardless of disability, response to the invitation to deliberate has always been low, as mentioned 
in Chapter 1. See for example Snider 2008 on the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly. 
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First, embodied presence makes fellow citizens accessible, available and subject to one 
another. 
First of all, the embodied presence of the disabled person in the deliberative site alongside the 
non-disabled makes fellow citizens accessible and available to one another (M. Fraser and Greco 
2004, 83). In Chapter 2, I recounted how societies' response to disability has been one of 
stigmatisation, exclusion or relegating disability to somewhere neither in nor out. People with 
disabilities are not shut into asylums anymore (at least in the Western world), and the fantasy of 
a ship of fools is distant. However similar themes of avoidance, distance or management are still 
some of the themes that characterise the encounter between the disabled and non-disabled 
persons Garland-Thomson suggests that the initial exchanges between the normate and the 
disabled differ markedly from exchanges that take place between non-disabled people 
(Garland-Thomson 1997, 12). The encounter requires a much more demanding and perhaps 
awkward organisation and interpretation of information, as my reflections in the above 
paragraphs regarding how the non-disabled interact with the disabled also confirm. In fact, 
regardless of the context, social interaction between the normal and the stigmatised is 
described as “one of the primal scenes of sociology where the causes and effects of the 
stigma must be directly confronted by both sides” (Goffman 1990a, 13). 
Let me offer an autobiographical account of the first time I walked into a mental asylum in 
Ankara, Turkey. The institution that housed hundreds of people with physical and mental 
disabilities displayed all the stereotypes about a mental asylum. Cold, barren floors and 
walls, barred windows, long and dark corridors, a peculiar smell in the air - a mix of 
chemicals and bodily fluids - and "patients" - either visibly disturbed and sometimes 
screaming, or subdued by drugs. I remember not wanting to touch anything - anyone - and 
taking a long shower when I arrived at home at the end of the day. A few weeks later I 
started managing a disability charity in partnership with the institution, which meant that I 
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had to visit the asylum a few times a week. In the short course of a couple of months I no 
longer found it difficult to address or chat with people with disabilities. The peculiar smell 
in the air “disappeared” in time. Being in the same closed space was not any different than 
being in the same space with a non-disabled person, and the odd touch on the arm did not 
startle me as it would have done in the beginning. As a non-disabled person, sharing the 
same space regularly with disabled persons was instrumental in removing the distance that 
was caused by unfamiliarity, stigma and my own ableist prejudices. Although the experience 
I recount above is quite extreme, the point is clear. In most cases, the non-disabled see the 
disabled person as all body. Garland-Thomson summarizes my experience in the institution 
in her own words: 
“In a first encounter with another person, a tremendous amount of information must 
be organised and interpreted simultaneously: each participant probes the explicit for 
the implicit, determines what is significant for particular purposes, and prepares a 
response that is guided by many cues, both subtle and obvious. When one person has 
a visible disability, however, it almost always dominates and skews the normate’s 
process of sorting out perceptions and forming a reaction. The interaction is usually 
strained because the nondisabled person may feel fear, pity, fascination, repulsion or 
merely surprise, none of which is expressible according to social protocol. Besides the 
discomforting dissonance between experienced and expressed reaction, a non-
disabled person often does not know how to act toward a disabled person. Perhaps 
most destructive to the potential for continuing relations is the normate’s frequent 
assumption that a disability cancels out other qualities, reducing the complex person 
to a single attribute” (Garland-Thomson 1997, 12). 
While the stigma, avoidance and distance may dehumanise the disabled person, encountering 
one another and sharing the same space helps re-humanise the disabled in the eyes of the 
non-disabled. This encounter is especially significant when surveys like the Scope survey I 
quoted above tell us nearly half of the able-bodied people surveyed do not know anyone with 
disabilities, and two thirds would feel uncomfortable in their presence (Scope UK 2016). In 
contrast, when persons are present to one another they function not merely as physical 
beings but also as communicative ones. Moreover, this is not a learning or overcoming 
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process for only the non-disabled, as the encounter can often also teach the disabled person 
how best to interact with the non-disabled. 
Being copresent can also change the disposition of the non-disabled majority to the disabled 
minority. In Chapter 1, I reflected on how a liberal conceptualisation of citizenship and the 
image of a deliberative site made up of autonomous, self-interested, able and contracting 
individuals is inadequate to account for difference between citizens and to provide an 
adequate ground for mutual respect, understanding and reciprocity to develop where there 
are irreconcilable communicative or cognitive imbalances between interlocutors. I have also 
suggested that a shift needs to be made from the disposition of a contracting citizen to the 
disposition of a caring citizen, because an ethics of care is a more appropriate framework 
and disposition for interlocutors in order to redress the imbalance of power due to cognitive 
difference and to provide the ground on which mutual respect, understanding and 
reciprocity can be built for the inclusion of people with disabilities in deliberative sites. 
At the practical level, co-presence can initiate this kind of shift from self-interested to caring. 
The disabled body enters the deliberative site as a vulnerable body, exposed to the gaze of 
the non-disabled especially in the first encounter(s). Turner says human vulnerability is the 
foundation of common human experiences and interests (Turner 2008, ix). However - and 
perhaps because of that - the response to vulnerability is almost always a caring response. 
As Goodin observes, vulnerability creates a moral obligation to respond (Goodin 1986, 110). 
The caring response to vulnerability was first brought to my attention during a LDPB meeting 
in the Shire Hall, Gloucester. It was ten minutes into the monthly meeting and the non-
disabled co-chair was addressing the audience made up of both disabled and non-disabled 
members when a disabled member of the partnership board walked into the room, late. Her 
visible disabilities affected her mobility as well as her speech. Seeing her enter the room, and 
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while she was slowly walking to her chair, the co-chair stopped talking and went to the back 
of the room to pour some tea and served her with biscuits. Having made sure the late 
member was comfortable, the co-chair then walked back to the front of the room and 
continued with her talk. 
When I reminded the co-chair of this short disruption to the meeting a week later and asked 
her to reflect on it, she did not even have a clear recollection of what she did - it was, in her 
words, very natural to do that, she didn’t even see it as something extraordinary until I brought 
it up. At that point I asked her whether she had ever done a similar thing in a council meeting 
room where only the non-disabled professionals were present. Would she stop her talk to serve 
some tea to the person who arrives late? Her answer was "of course, no", on the contrary she 
would probably be annoyed at the late arrival of the person. Human vulnerability, visible in this 
example in the form of disability, opens up a space of caring for fellow humans, where individuals 
are inclined to attend to each other's needs and voice. In this space individuals can become 
accessible and available to one another. A deliberative site where the disabled are present 
alongside the non-disabled can become the space where mutual respect, understanding and 
reciprocity develops instead of distance, avoidance, fear and stigmatisation. 
Second, embodied presence spatializes the deliberative site.72  
Second, the embodied presence of the person with disability spatializes the deliberative site. The 
spatiality of the deliberative site is a surprisingly underdeveloped topic.73 Space is not a 
contextual given and the deliberative space, as any space, is always created and organised. Any 
attempt to narrate the deliberative site which ignores the significance and even urgency of this 
physical and spatial dimension will be incomplete (Soja 1989, 24). Seen this way, the deliberative 
                                                     
72 The discussion on spatiality is taken up in detail in Chapter 5. 
73 Parkinson emphasizes the importance of “physically going” to perform a political act (e.g. voting) 
and being physically present and visible in a public place, however does not develop this idea further 
to include the significance of the spatial arrangements in a deliberative setting. See Parkinson 2012 
and Parkinson 2016. Also see Goodin 2012, 93. 
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site is not merely the space within which the relationship between the able and the disabled 
express themselves, but also the sites within which these relations are constituted. 
The arrival of a disabled body problematizes the workings of the deliberative site which in any 
other sense might appear to be neutral, independent or idealised: who is included and who is 
not included, who has access, how the space is organised, who is promoted or relegated to which 
corner or position in the deliberative site and so on. Therefore a visual – spatial analysis of the 
deliberative site gives us clues to how we create difference, in this context between the able and 
the disabled (Cresswell 1996, 154). When present in deliberative sites, people with disabilities 
might once again discover their status by means of the spatial arrangements, behaviour of the 
able in their gestures, in the nervousness they might exhibit, in their avoidance of eye contact or 
the distance they keep (Young 2011). Just as the disappearance of the body as the customary 
mode of daily life is disrupted by such factors as impairment, pain or disease, the sudden and 
unexpected appearance of the disabled body in the deliberative site opens up the whole site to 
the experience of the body (Paterson and Hughes 1999, 602). In other words, with the arrival of 
one unruly body, the whole site – which is otherwise disembodied – becomes embodied. 
Third, embodied presence politicises the deliberative site 
Through spatializing the deliberative site, the embodied presence of the person with disability 
re-politicises the deliberative site that is restricted and de-politicised by reason, and enacts the 
person as a political subject (Prokhovnik 2014, 477). The confrontation and even rupture caused 
by the arrival of the unruly body is almost always messy. The civil image of the deliberative site 
gives way to one of unusual sounds, less controlled physical movements, slow speech, individuals 
who walk around when they should be sitting, who erupt in loud laughter when they should be 
silently listening, who talk about their bus journeys with childhood friends when they should be 
talking about their preferences on new transport options.74 But then inclusion is messy. The 
                                                     
74 Some of the behaviours I witnessed in person during Learning Disability Partnership Board meetings. 
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embodied presence of disability in the deliberative site is perhaps none other than democratic 
life the way Rancière sees it - a democratic life that constantly disturbs and challenges the 
democratic structures for voice and space (Rancière 2010, 36). Rancière makes a distinction 
between politics and the political. Politics for him is the set of procedures whereby the 
organisation of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems of legitimising this 
distribution is achieved (Rancière 2004, 28). Whereas politics stands for the orderly space and 
polices the status quo, the political is the constant struggle that highlights and challenges the 
status quo that is otherwise presented as the natural order (Deranty 2003, 1145). It is always a 
demand for recognition and justice that challenges and disrupts the wrong order and logic of the 
police by a different logic, that of equality and recognition. To be political is to appear in the space 
of non-recognition. Interestingly, Rancière often explains the relationship between politics and 
the political in spatial terms: 
“Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s 
function. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse 
where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was 
once only heard as a noise” (Rancière 2004, 30). 
While what Rancière talks about here is not the disabled body in the deliberative site, we are 
tempted to read the text literally, with the question of disability in mind. Using his terms, rationality 
– which was meant to protect the interlocutors from power games in the first place – has become 
the de-politicising police of the deliberative site. It has come to represent order and civility rather 
than transformative or emancipatory equality. Remember how New York Daily columnist Pete 
Hamill associated deliberation with order in his report on the 21st Century Town House Meeting 
(Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2002). When the disabled, unruly body appears on the deliberative site 
with its refusal of conventional order, it puts the police to an egalitarian test. The disabled body 
itself becomes an intervention in the visible and sayable (Rancière 2010, 27). At this very encounter 
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between the unruly body and rationality we find the political. The arrival of the disabled body re-
politicises the deliberative site. 
Fourth, embodied presence performs deliberation. 
Finally, the embodied presence of the person with disability performs deliberation. The 
physical presence of the person with disability can be understood as speech where the 
disabled person cannot reason by speech. To develop this point, consider J. L. Austin’s speech act 
theory and his development of the idea of performative utterances. Austin argues that we can 
cast aside the difference between saying and doing because often to say is to do. The kind of 
utterance that performs an action when issued is called “performative”, because “the issuing of 
an utterance is the performing of an action” (Austin 1976, 6). Moreover, performative can be 
void of an explicit grammatical form. Not only verbal utterance, but silence can also efficaciously 
enact a command, and therefore qualify as a linguistic performative to the extent that it is 
communicative.75 In this context, I suggest inverting the equation that Austin and Searle develop 
between speech act and performance, to argue that “the performing of an action is the issuing 
of an utterance” (Searle 1969). In our context, the embodied presence of the person with a 
disability communicates – or performs – such an utterance, in that it brings the interlocutors in 
deliberative sites face to face with the exclusion and the stigma of the disabled. 
 
Embodied presence highlights exclusion by making it visible. Disability does not exist in the 
deliberative universe until the person with disability appears in the deliberative site. Before she 
arrives in the space where her unruly presence is not expected to be, there is no exclusion to 
speak of. However when she becomes present and visible, the exclusion of those with 
disabilities comes to the fore. Her embodied presence deliberates by performing exclusion. 
                                                     
75 75 See, for example, “masqueraders” (Austin 1976, 4). 
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There are strong grounds for deliberative democrats to embrace the notion that communication 
is embodied as much as it is linguistic. Through this embodied communication, the privileged – 
in this case the able-bodied – become aware of their habitual actions and stereotypes that 
contribute to the exclusion of the disabled, because the embodied presence of the person with 
disability forces the interlocutors to pause and think about the meaning of her presence in their 
midst and respond to this presence. As Sandahl and Auslander observe, despite the fact that 
disability is a ubiquitous human experience, people with disabilities almost always seem to 
cause a commotion in public spaces. An encounter with disability elicits surprise, attracts 
attention. It is a cause for pause and consideration. Disability inaugurates an act of 
interpretation by functioning as a signifying difference. Therefore in daily life, “disabled 
people can be considered performers, and passers-by, the audience” (Sandahl and Auslander 
2005, 2). In this sense, embodied presence perhaps becomes the opening line of 
deliberation: “Although I have been excluded, I am now here – I exist, and I have things to 
say”. 
This political appearance is necessary for those who are invisible and have no access to the 
spaces of recognition and speech. Using Nield’s words, “one must take one’s place in order 
to be able to speak” (Nield 2016). Judith Butler, following Rae Langton, provides further 
insight into the meaning of this appearance. In a situation where the ability to perform 
speech acts is a measure of citizenship, an inability to perform speech acts that one might 
otherwise wish to perform is one mark of powerlessness (Butler 1997, 86; Langton 2009). 
Therefore the embodied presence of the person with disability as performance turns the 
body from a powerless object which is merely a biological container – that is perceived as a 
faulty one, from a medical point of view – into an experiencing and communicating agent, a 
citizen that is amongst and in relation with other agents. This embodied agency becomes a 
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mark of power, a voice that exposes the limits of universality – in this case of disembodied 
reason – and challenges the voicelesness of those who are rejected by that universal. 
What, then, do these insights mean in practice for the inclusion of the disabled in deliberative 
sites? A number of practical steps come to mind. First, deliberative democrats must take into 
consideration and take seriously the embodiedness of deliberation. This will mean different 
things in different contexts. For scholars of deliberative democracy, for example in the 
context of an evaluation tool like the Discourse Quality Index, this will mean acknowledging that 
while deliberation is talk-centric, it is not all talk. Therefore any attempt to measure what 
happens during deliberation must take into account the embodied aspects of deliberation. For 
practitioners of deliberative democracy, for example organisers or facilitators of citizens’ 
assemblies, mini publics and so on, this will mean not simply relying on random sampling, not 
even stratified random sampling, but making sure that people with disabilities appear in the 
deliberative site by the use of quotas and similar proactive measures. For people with disabilities 
and their allies, this will mean not to be content with being excluded or relegated to a 
segregated space, but demanding to be included in deliberation physically just like every other 
deliberator. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I focused on the embodiedness of the disability experience and deliberation, and 
explored the ways in which this embodiedness can contribute to the inclusion of people with 
disabilities in deliberative democracy. The discussion on the arrival of the body in political science 
by way of anthropology and sociology showed why conceptualising the body and the body itself 
are significant for our purposes. While the body is significant, the present understanding of 
disembodied deliberation, and the expectation – or demand – of normality results in the 
exclusion of the disabled from deliberative sites. I challenged this understanding by showing how 
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all communication is embodied, and suggesting a number of ways how the embodiedness of the 
disabled body in particular can be the means for a more inclusive deliberative site that takes into 
account the voices of not only the average deliberators, but of citizens with different cognitive 
and physical abilities. 
Much of deliberative democracy’s emancipatory potential lies in its deliberative sites’ role 
as spaces of political appearance and inclusion. For marginalised people, deliberative sites 
can be one of the few spaces where their interests are brought to public discussion. 
Therefore political presence is especially necessary for those who are invisible and have no 
access to the spaces of recognition and speech like deliberative sites. That is why, quoting 
Nield, “one must take one’s place in order to be able to speak” (Nield 2016, 131) Place 
taking can be emancipating not only for people with disabilities, but for others who might 
also be - at least partly - marginalised due to the corporeal differences they bring to 
deliberative sites. Differences based on class, gender or race almost always have a visual 
element that disrupts the uniformity of the deliberative site. Therefore the embodiedness 
of these forms of marginalisations should also be investigated. 
Finally, although embodied presence communicates a great deal and therefore performs 
deliberation, admittedly it cannot communicate preference. Presence still needs to be 
translated into preference. How, then, can the preference of the person, whose cognitive or 
physical disability prevents her from communication, be made present in the deliberative 
site along with her? If deliberative sites are spaces of transformable and endogenous 
decision-making, how can the preferences of people with communication disabilities both 
contribute to and be transformed in the decision making process? I will explore the answers 
to these and other questions in the next chapte 
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CHAPTER 4 
Deliberative Perspectives 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I have discussed how political appearance and visibility of the body 
in general, and the physical presence of people with disabilities in deliberative sites in 
particular are significant for the inclusion of the disabled in deliberative sites. I have 
reflected on how this embodied presence can turn an otherwise excluded and even 
forgotten individual to a communicating citizen. I have suggested that the inclusion of the 
perspectives and preferences of people with disabilities in deliberative democracy should 
start with their physical inclusion in deliberative sites, because embodied presence 
constitutes deliberation in many ways.1 However presence itself cannot constitute 
deliberation fully, because its epistemic contribution is limited and possibly ambiguous. 
Presence can be the first step to bringing the perspectives of people with disabilities into 
the deliberative site, however it cannot communicate clearly their preferences in 
deliberative settings – presence itself cannot reason. That is why, while "one must take 
one's place" in the deliberative site, the place taking must also be followed by reasoning, by 
some form of communication that clearly conveys to all interlocutors the perspectives and 
the preferences of those who are present in the deliberative site. 
This chapter is a defence of disability inclusive deliberation from an epistemic point of 
view. It claims that the physical presence of people with disabilities in deliberative spaces 
goes beyond the claims of the previous chapter and brings an epistemic superiority to the 
deliberative decision making process, consequently leading to epistemically better 
outcomes. It explores how then, the perspectives and preferences of those whose 
cognitive or physical disabilities prevent them from deliberation can be included in the 
deliberative opinion formation process, and how this inclusion will lead to better outcomes. To 
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put it another way, the goal of this chapter is to move from physical, perhaps initial inclusion of 
the disabled to a more substantial inclusion, whereby the perspectives of the disabled are 
brought into the pool of all perspectives in the deliberative site, and the reasoning as well as the 
preferences of the disabled are given as much consideration as those of others. 
A discussion on deliberative reasoning and opinion formation especially in the face of physical 
and cognitive difference cannot avoid addressing the question of deliberative competence, or 
more accurately the perceived deliberative competence of the interlocutors. In the first section 
below I tackle this question and suggest that full deliberative competence, and its derivative, 
perfect reasoning, are simply myths. All deliberative sites are already cognitively diverse 
regardless of whether one or some of the interlocutors are medically diagnosed with a disability 
or not, and the deliberation of the physically or cognitively disabled with the non-disabled is not 
a case of setting the deliberatively incompetent up against the competent. Instead, all 
interlocutors are located on a wide spectrum of cognitive and deliberative differences and 
abilities, and disability is only one marker among many others that determine where an 
interlocutor is found on the deliberative competence spectrum. 
After establishing that deliberative competence is not an absolute which some people have and 
others have not, in the following section I take a deeper look at opinion formation in the presence 
of cognitive diversity. I explore how the presence of people with disabilities in the deliberative site 
and in particular the encounter between disability and able-bodiedness contributes to the 
epistemic superiority of inclusive deliberation. I discuss how the initially limited epistemic 
contribution of the physical presence of people with disabilities becomes more significant and 
substantial by expanding the pool of perspectives available for endogenous opinion formation 
and how this presence can lead to better outcomes in terms of epistemic quality. I also suggest 
that a particular set of socio-psychological responses triggered by the encounter between 
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disability and able-bodiedness are also instrumental for the opinion formation and 
transformation process. Here I also discuss the socially significant by-products or secondary 
benefits of this physical presence: the social bonds that inclusive deliberation fosters between 
citizens. 
The third section focuses on the implications of the ideas brought up in the first two sections and 
explores how these ideas can be put into practice. Here the main issue that needs to be 
addressed is how the perspectives and the preferences of the disabled can be legitimately and 
adequately represented in cases where the disabled cannot directly deliberate due to 
communication barriers. In this section I suggest that the answer should be sought in human 
interdependence in general, and the care relationships people with disabilities find themselves 
in particular. Informed by the discussion on care ethics in Chapter 1, I argue that relationships of 
care can be potential bases for representational claims or mutual enactments of citizenship, 
whereby the disabled are physically present in deliberative sites with the persons who care for 
them as communicative-others who share and represent their perspectives, and who act as 
translators of their preferences. In this section I introduce a number of cases and scenarios to 
show whether or how communication barriers can be overcome in different degrees with the 
help of non-disabled representatives of the disabled in the deliberative site. 
 
I. Deliberative Competence and Epistemic Superiority of Cognitive Diversity 
 
At the outset two important points that are critical for this discussion at the intersection of 
deliberative competence, cognitive diversity and epistemic superiority need to be 
established. First, no interlocutor is fully competent in deliberation and all deliberation 
already takes place between cognitively diverse interlocutors. Second, cognitive diversity is 
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not only inevitable, but should also be celebrated because of its role in enriching the 
epistemic quality of decisions. 
Any discussion on what happens when the disabled and the non-disabled share the same 
deliberative space and how the presence of disability interacts with opinion formation 
should immediately acknowledge the essentialist trap that constructs the competencies of 
the disabled and those of the non-disabled as fixed. We have already established in 
Chapter 2 that no single disability identity exists and disability is a fluid category. What 
follows is that people with disabilities have a range of competencies that are unique to 
each individual. The same is true for individuals with no disabilities. Complete rationality 
and complete deliberative competence are improbable for any interlocutor. Any 
individual's physical and cognitive abilities will be different and relative, regardless of 
whether the individual is medically diagnosed with a physical or cognitive disability or not. 
Individuals' causal reasoning is often distorted by their own perceptual biases, leading 
them to see and notice some things more readily than others, to attribute to them more 
causal influence than others or to ignore some relevant information altogether (Rosenberg 
2014; McArthur 1981; Ross 1977; Kahneman 2012). Similarly, most people's reasoning is 
more piecemeal rather than integrative, more concrete rather than abstract. They may 
often have multiple, even conflicting opinions on a given topic. This might mean that their 
view of facts is influenced by their own perceptions and preferences, once again leading 
to a problem of bias. As Uhlmann et al note, people reason less like judges who assess the 
evidence before arriving at conclusions, and more like attorneys who start from the 
conclusions and then seek evidence to support that conclusion (Uhlmann et al. 2008). 
  
129 
 
Yet discussions on deliberative competence tend to treat competence as fixed, implying in 
the language used that an individual either has full competence, or lacks it altogether. 
When Cohen says, for example, that “no one with the competency to speak and act may 
be excluded from discourse”, he does not leave room for a sufficiently broad spectrum of 
competencies regarding speaking or acting – does stuttering, for example, count as a lack 
of speech competency? (Cohen 2002, 23). What about public speaking anxiety? Critics of 
deliberative democracy’s cognitive demands – many of them noted in previous chapters – 
follow the same pattern: most people do not have deductive skills, they lack the capacity 
of self-reflection or rational evaluation (Kim, Wyatt, and Katz 1999, 370). A more accurate 
assessment of deliberative competence would have to adopt a less monolithic and more 
nuanced attitude towards competences and admit that none of the interlocutors in a 
deliberative site - regardless of whether they are diagnosed with a cognitive disability or 
not – fully have the logical, integrative or reflective skills and abilities that deliberative 
democrats characteristically demand. Consequently, in a scenario where the disabled and 
the non-disabled share the same deliberative space, positing that deliberation would be 
taking place between fully competent and fully incompetent interlocutors would be 
misleading. 
Cognitive diversity does not necessarily imply the existence of cognitive problems or 
disabilities either. People see the world in a variety of ways, which affects their 
interpretation of the world, the problems that they see in it, as well as working out the 
solutions to these problems (Landemore 2012, 1211). Hong and Page mention different 
aspects of cognitive diversity: the diversity of perspectives (ways of representing 
problems), diversity of interpretations (ways of categorising perspectives), diversity of 
heuristics (ways of coming up with solutions to problems) and diversity of predictive 
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models (ways of identifying cause and effect) (Hong and Page 2001; Page 2008). As a result 
when interlocutors come together to deliberate, they represent the same question in 
different ways, interpret and categorise the answers based on their own perspectives, see 
different cause and effect relations in the issues which lead them to different answers.76 Research 
suggests that these diversities lead to better solutions to problems than the solutions of a group of 
“cleverer” interlocutors, because interlocutors with identical or similar cognitive capacities would 
look for answers in the same area of the problem space (Page 2008; Hong and Page 2001).77  
In the context of deliberative decision making processes Hong and Page's findings mean that the 
deliberation of a group of individuals with varying cognitive skills and abilities (like ordinary 
citizens) are preferable for superior outcomes to the deliberation of a group of individuals with 
higher yet similar cognitive skills and abilities (like a select committee of professionals). Two 
illustrative cases from two different deliberative meetings reinforce the point. 
In January 2014 I attended "Better Buses Service Group Meeting", a small deliberative meeting 
that was called to identify and solve some of the problems people with disabilities faced in public 
transport in Gloucestershire. Gloucester's integrated transport manager, one cabinet member 
and a few other council officials were in the same room with representatives of two disability 
NGOs, learning disability partnership board members and people with learning disabilities. The 
meeting was convened to discuss possible improvements to the bus transport system, to make 
bus transport more accessible for people with disabilities. One of the issues that was brought up 
in the meeting was the complexity of the bus transport system for people with mental disabilities. 
People with learning disabilities were generally confused about bus routes, found bus travel 
very challenging, and as a result were further isolated from society. 
                                                     
76 Here we must make a clear distinction between cognitive diversity and diversity of preferences – 
what people want or prefer is always going to be different (and an outcome of various factors) 
regardless of their cognitive skill sets. 
77 For a critique and refusal of the model that Hong and Page used to arrive at their diversity trumps 
ability theorem in recent years see (Thompson 2014). 
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Different solutions to the problem were proposed: putting up large, easy read versions of 
bus route maps at the bus stops, publishing similar booklets for the learning disabled, 
simplifying the transport website and adding an easy read version, adding QR codes on bus 
stops and booklets, training the bus drivers to help people with learning disabilities at bus 
stops and so on. Each solution proposed was either deemed too expensive by officials or too 
impractical as a real solution by people with disabilities. Finally, one disabled participant 
suggested that colour-coding the transport routes, buses and bus stops could possibly 
simplify the transport experience for people with learning disabilities. The idea had a 
precedent – London Tube lines are colour coded – and was relatively cost efficient. While it 
would take a while to lay out the plan completely, the idea was welcome by everyone in the 
room as the most feasible and practical solution to the challenges that people with learning 
disabilities face using the transport system. The most viable solution was proposed by an 
interlocutor with a learning disability, not by an expert or a professional whose job it was to 
create solutions to transport problems. 
Landemore recalls a similar case where a series of deliberative meetings were held in a New 
Haven neighbourhood called Wooster Square. The area had a recurring problem of mugging 
at a particular bridge crossing. Various solutions were suggested in these meetings – the 
police force representative suggested posting of a police car by the bridge, but muggings 
continued when the car was not there. Somebody suggested installing lights on the bridge, 
however a City Hall representative explained that the high voltage system under the bridge 
made it impossible to use electric lights on the bridge. It was an ordinary citizen who then 
suggested the use of solar lights, but the City Hall accountant pointed out that the city could 
not afford solar lights due to their high cost. Finally a participant, an ordinary citizen 
suggested that the city could apply for federal funds to cover the cost. In the end the city 
purchased solar lamps funded by the federal government, and no mugging has been 
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reported since then. Once again the most viable solution came from an ordinary citizen, and 
not from an expert on the topic (Landemore 2012). 
Cognitive diversity is not a weakness in either case to arrive at good solutions that all can 
accept. On the contrary, it is this diversity that brings to the deliberative site a wide and 
creative range of opinions, options and solutions. We also have to accept at the outset that 
the answers agreed on as a result of deliberation are never absolute, incontestable answers 
that had been waiting to be discovered. Rather, they are the result of a process of give and 
take which reflects the preferences of interlocutors which are by definition open to 
transformation and evolving. Therefore we must also acknowledge that there is no way of 
knowing whether a particular decision reached by an inclusive deliberative process will be 
better than a decision reached by using different democratic (or even non-democratic) 
processes. An epistemically superior decision cannot be perceived to be better based on 
perfect outcomes unless we have access to all possible alternative and hypothetical outcomes 
– which in turn is impossible. As Parkinson observes, if the only concern were arriving at the 
absolutely right decisions, we would need to consult the elites or technocrats instead of the 
reflecting public who are affected by those decisions (Parkinson 2012, 27). 
Instead, the epistemic superiority of a decision is an outcome of the intrinsic as well as the 
procedural epistemic elements of deliberation. In this regard deliberation as a democratic 
procedure first has an intrinsic value that is independent of the quality of its outcomes 
(Estlund 2009, 82). This value comes from the concern for the deliberative decision making 
process to be inclusive, other regarding and between equals – described by Marti as “equal 
political autonomy” or “equal consideration” (Marti 2006; Christiano 1997; Cohen 1996; 
James Bohman 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). My insistence on the physical inclusion 
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of the disabled in deliberative sites as a first step converges with this intrinsic value of 
inclusion. 
The idea that inclusion of more voices leads to better outcomes is hardly new or novel. In her 
treatment of the epistemic procedural case for democratic decision making Landemore finds a 
strong case for what she calls “collective intelligence” in Protagoras’ universal political wisdom, 
Aristotle’s wisdom of the more, Machiavelli’s vox populi as vox Dei, Spinoza’s rational majority, 
Dewey’s social intelligence, Hayek’s distributed knowledge of society and so on (Landemore 2013). 
The epistemic procedural justification suggests that the wider the range of opinions in the 
deliberative site, the better the outcomes will be (Bohman 2006, 176). It then follows that the 
inclusion of a wider scale of perspectives is preferable to a narrower scale of expertise, and group 
reasoning is better than individual contemplation or internal reasoning.78 The idea that diversity 
matters much more than individual competence in the context of problem solving is again 
mentioned by many. J.S. Mill advocated the representation of a diversity of interests and opinions 
in a representative assembly, which he called a "Congress of Opinions". This assembly, he said, 
should include "a fair sample of every grade of intellect among the people" rather than "a selection 
of the greatest political minds in the country" (Mill 2010, 74). Similarly for Bohman a diversity of 
opinions, values and perspectives should be maintained throughout in the democratic decision 
making process (Bohman 2006).79 Peter’s approach is especially relevant for our context, in that 
she uses a social epistemological approach which places the emphasis on the knowledge 
producing aspect of deliberation, which I will elaborate in the next section. As a result, the 
                                                     
78 Goodin in turn suggests that when an individual uses reasoning to find arguments for and against 
various opinions, internal deliberation takes place. For this mental exercise to count as deliberation 
the individual needs to find and consider arguments against, as well as for. If she were to consider 
arguments that only supports her views, it would not be deliberation (Goodin 2000). 
79 There is of course, another long tradition against democratic and in favour of elite decision making 
processes, from Plato to Madison. 
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more perspectives are given voice in deliberation, the better the results of deliberation will 
be (Peter 2007; Chappell 2011).80  
In conclusion, the variety of individuals’ deliberative competence – regardless of whether they 
are disabled or not – and the cognitive diversity this variety brings to the deliberative site is not 
only inevitable, but at the same time desirable, because it is valuable in itself, and it leads to 
epistemically superior outcomes. Therefore bringing the voice of people with disabilities in 
deliberative sites does not reduce, but on the contrary improve the quality of deliberative 
outcomes. Now that we have established the relationship between variations in deliberative 
competence, the inevitability of cognitive diversity and epistemic superiority of inclusive 
deliberative processes, we are ready to focus on the significance and effects of the embodied 
presence of the disabled in deliberative sites for opinion formation and transformation. 
 
II. Significance of the Embodied Presence of the Disabled for Deliberative 
Opinion Formation and Transformation 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the embodied presence of people with disabilities in 
deliberative sites is a significant first step for the inclusion of the disabled in deliberative decision 
making processes. The above section made it clear this presence will only add another layer of 
cognitive diversity to an already diverse context, which will in turn contribute to the epistemic 
quality of the outcome of deliberation. It is now time to explore what happens when the rubber 
meets the road: what can we expect to happen when people with disabilities share the same 
deliberative space with non-disabled people, especially in light of the insights from Chapter 2 
about perceptions of and attitudes towards disability? In what specific ways, if at all, does their 
                                                     
80 Peter’s social epistemology converges with Young’s model of deliberative democracy which 
emphasizes the need for all groups in society, especially the disadvantaged, to be given a voice in the 
deliberative decision making process. See Young 2002. 
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presence as well the reactions to their presence have an impact on the opinion formation process 
in the deliberative site? Finally, how do the answers to these questions contribute to the overall 
picture of the inclusion of the disabled in deliberative democracy? I will attempt to answer these 
questions in the framework of two related considerations. First, the transformative and 
moralising effect of the embodied presence on all interlocutors, and second, the importance of 
bringing a disadvantaged perspective to, and maintaining it in the deliberative site. The discussion 
in this section will end with a consideration of secondary benefits of this embodied presence.  
 
Embodied presence has a transformative effect on the interlocutors’ opinion 
formation 
 
In Chapter 2 I talked about the unique position of disability in terms of the emotions and reactions 
it triggers in public. Following Sandahl and Auslander I suggested that people with disabilities 
almost always cause a commotion in public spaces. Disability is noticed, it elicits surprise, attracts 
attention. It is a cause for pause and consideration. It engenders an act of interpretation by 
functioning as a signifying difference. I also stated that in daily life, people with disabilities are 
already performers while the passers-by are their audience (Sandahl and Auslander 2005, 2). 
That is why when people with disabilities enter the deliberative site, their embodied presence 
utters their first line of deliberation without using words: “Here I am, and I have brought my body 
with me. Although I have been excluded I exist, and I have things to say”. 
 
However people with disabilities do not necessarily encounter interlocutors who have a positive 
disposition towards disability. Instead, their attitudes towards disability displays a range of 
dispositions that are prevalent in the public sphere in that particular time and place.81 To remember 
                                                     
81 Habermas calls this “the continual interaction in the public sphere” (öffentlichkeit). See Habermas 
1992, 398. Authors like Gabriel Tarde and the seminal works of James Bryce identify this interaction 
with the public sphere in as early as the late 1800’s. For Tarde, the public emerged as a result of the 
rapid diffusion of newspapers that provoked conversations in coffee houses. Bryce similarly 
summarized the four stages of public opinion formation process based on this interaction: first, the 
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some figures from Chapter 2, this is the public (in the British context) nearly half of whom do not 
know anyone with a disability, and 67% of whom feel uncomfortable talking to disabled people.82 
There will of course be many factors affecting the variety of possible responses to disability in the 
deliberative site: education, personal background (for example whether they have a disabled family 
member), the visibility of the disabled person's impairment, the extent to which this impairment 
affects the disabled person's communication and so on. Most of these pre-deliberative dispositions, 
opinions and prejudices can be traced back to the overarching narratives about disability in the 
media in that particular time and place.83 The discussion on the perceptions of disability provided 
in Chapter 2 summarized three historic perceptions as disability associated with moral condition, 
disability as social suspension and disability as an economic burden. Research commissioned by the 
British Film Institute to understand perceptions of disability in the cinema of our age shows that 
these historic perceptions are alive and well in the popular culture today. The Disabling Imagery 
guide published in 2004 mentions ten stereotypes regarding people with disabilities in cinema: 
disabled person as pitiable or pathetic, an object of curiosity or violence, sinister or evil, super 
cripple, laughable, his or her worst enemy, a burden, non-sexual and unable to participate in daily 
life. 
 
Since the deliberative decision making process is only a moment within a much larger, longer and 
more complex deliberative system – an ongoing opinion formation and transformation process in 
which news media, conversation and public opinion continually interact with each other, these – 
almost always negative – perceptions and the attitudes that they engender will be present in the 
                                                     
person reads news media (newspapers in his original works). Second, he engages with others in 
conversation or debate based on his own personal experience and impressions of the news media 
(political conversation). Third, an opinion starts forming in his mind as a result of the interaction 
between his personal experience, what he has read in the news media and what he has discussed with 
others (opinion formation). And finally he acts upon that opinion by engaging in participatory activities 
that might range from protest to voting (Tarde 2015 [1898]; Bryce 1995 [1888]). 
82 See Chapter 2, also Aiden and McCarthy 2014. 
83 Disabling Imagery guide in 2004 mentions the same disability stereotypes that Paul Hunt found over 
a decade before in his 1992 research (Hunt 1991). 
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deliberative site. By the time an interlocutor has arrived at a deliberative site she will have already 
been informed (or misinformed) by the news media as well as her interactions with others based 
on what each one has heard on the news media. In one sense, deliberation is the means or the 
medium for her to bridge her personal experience, opinions and values which she has acquired 
through participation in the public sphere with the political world, arriving at a certain perspective 
on any given issue (Kim, Wyatt, and Katz 1999, 362).84 This process is significant in our context 
because it means that potential non-disabled interlocutors will come to the deliberative site with 
pre-conceived perspectives – ideas and opinions about disability and the disabled which will be 
tightly linked to the overarching perceptions of and responses to disability in the public sphere as 
we discussed in Chapter 2, and which will be visible in the opinions they hold and solutions that 
they offer. As a result the non-disabled interlocutor may associate the disabled interlocutor's 
disability with a moral condition.85 She might feel that the disabled individual is not competent 
enough to be in the deliberative site, where serious topics are discussed. She might rather 
the disabled individual be kept in a distant, less visible space, in which he can perhaps still be 
consulted by professionals about the decisions that affect his life. She might consider the 
disabled person as unproductive, incapable of contributing to society, an economic burden 
whose opinions, preferences and needs should consequently count less than those who are 
able-bodied and therefore make larger contributions. 
                                                     
84 We must also acknowledge that individuals seldom have complete or coherent opinions. They are 
always tentative, often multiple or even conflicting. Again, many individuals may not realise how 
conflicting their opinions may be until they find an opportunity to discuss, share and in the process 
evaluate them. Only when people speak do they try to organise their opinions in a coherent way (Kim, 
Wyatt, and Katz 1999. 
85 Even today it is not uncommon to see church representatives and prayer groups offering to “cure” 
the “problems” of people with disabilities or mental illnesses through prayer on busy street corners 
or town squares. These prayer sessions usually include a part where the person who is prayed for is 
invited to confess her sins, so that she can be healed. Failure in “healing” can even lead to an implied 
accusation that the person does not have enough faith or has failed to confess her sins. See (Anderson 
2013, 99). 
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The same is inevitably true for people with disabilities. They will also step into the 
deliberative site having already acquired a certain perspective about their own disabled 
experience, the non-disabled as well as society and its institutions. The disabled person’s 
response to being in the deliberative site might range from fear to confidence, from 
confusion to determination. If she had been living in relative isolation due to her disability, 
she might find entering the deliberative site an especially daunting experience and feel 
unsure of what to say or how to talk. If she had accepted and internalised the dominant 
discourse on disability, she might not believe that her opinions have any value in the first 
place. On the other hand if she had been part of a disability network, user of a service offered 
by a disability rights organisation, or even a disability rights activist, her desire to contribute, 
to share her perspective or give her testimony, also reinforced by relevant information based 
on her exposure to disability networks, might help her to be more vocal, even assertive. 
Therefore it will be important to take into account how the ideas prevalent in the public 
sphere and the interlocutors' responses to disability – based on or at least informed by these 
ideas - will impact deliberation and the ensuing opinion formation in a given deliberative site. 
This is a not an issue to take lightly, because bringing the dominant culture’s negative 
attitudes and prejudices into the deliberative site attack the very heart of deliberative 
citizenship which requires interlocutors to have an inclusive, open-minded, other 
regarding mutually accepting, reasonable disposition (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). If, instead 
of displaying this disposition, some interlocutors consider others unfit for deliberation, one of the 
most foundational tenets of deliberative democracy, the equality of its citizens will become 
moot. The discussion so far has indicated that there is a significant potential for people with 
disabilities to be subjected to such attitudes. The existence of these and similar prejudices and 
attitudes is already acknowledged by deliberative democrats. I suggest, with deliberative 
democrats, that the solution to this potential problem is again found in the deliberative process 
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itself. Niemeyer calls these problems pre-deliberation distortions and suggests that deliberation 
itself can provide a “corrective lens by peeling back the layers of manipulation”, and in our case, 
of negative attitudes towards people with disabilities (Niemeyer 2004, 348). The idea is also 
closely related to Miller’s “moralising effect” of public discussion (Miller 1992, 61).86 According 
to Miller, narrowly self-regarding, irrational or morally repugnant preferences will tend to be 
eliminated during public debate. While his focus is on preferences that are defended by 
unacceptable arguments like ‘It’s good for me’, dispositions and attitudes like ‘you are not fit to 
deliberate’ or ‘I do not want to deliberate with you’ are similarly unacceptable. Miller supports 
his point by evidence from psychological experiments which try to simulate the behaviour of 
juries (Miller 1992, 62). We have access to more recent evidence that supports the corrective 
lens effect of deliberation, this time from the field of socio-psychology.87 
 
The encounter between the disabled and non-disabled citizens in the deliberative site may also 
trigger a number socio-psychological effects. Results of a study by MacKuen et al on the effects 
of engagement of certain emotions during deliberation might provide further insights on how 
encountering novel and unfamiliar situations may be instrumental in moving interlocutors from 
pre-deliberative distortions, entrenched positions and partisanship to more attentive, open-
minded and critical – or in other words, deliberative – citizenship (MacKuen et al. 2010). They 
start their empirical study with the assumption that people's emotional states affect how they 
deal with the world, that emotions shape the way people approach politics, and that they have 
                                                     
86 Goodin defines a similar idea as “laundering preferences” (Goodin 1995). 
87 At this point we cannot of course avoid mentioning the question that looms over deliberative 
democrats: Why should the more powerful engage with the less powerful in deliberation, and if they 
do not choose to do so, does deliberative democracy have mechanisms to by-pass this problem? 
Dryzek circumvents the issue by relying on a deliberative system that is made up of discourses that 
compete for influence (Dryzek 2000; 2010). Many others find the answer in institutionalising 
deliberative democracy (Fung et al. 2003; Warren 2007; Elstub 2010). McLaverty questions whether 
the problem can ever be solved (McLaverty 2014). Cohen and Rogers are quite pessimistic (Cohen and 
Rogers 2003). The point I argue here is not whether or how the powerful can be convinced to join 
deliberation. I argue that if the more powerful (in this case the non-disabled) do engage with the less 
powerful (the disabled) in deliberation, their pre-deliberative negative attitudes are likely to change 
for a more deliberative and caring disposition. 
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an impact on their attentiveness as well as engagement in politics (MacKuen et al. 2010, 441; 
Brader 2006; Dumont et al. 2003). They focus on two emotions which are coincidentally 
extremely relevant in the case of a deliberative site co-inhabited by disabled and non-disabled 
interlocutors: anxiety and aversion. In terms of dealing with novel and unfamiliar situations, the 
distinction between anxiety and aversion determines whether people will respond aggressively 
or seek further information (Huddy et al. 2005; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). 
 
MacKuen et al suggest that some experiences in the deliberative site like encountering hostile 
individuals, groups, causes or slogans, and recurring conflict with familiar issues may cause 
discomfort and even pain, which in turn evoke aversion. Aversion may include anger, disgust, 
contempt and hatred - all of them emotions that cause individuals to become more defensive. 
As a result they avoid further discussion, stop looking for ways of accommodation, try and protect 
their views by refusing to compromise and so on. To put it briefly, aversion reinforces prejudice 
and entrenchment, engenders partisanship in interlocutors and consequently decreases the 
chances of good deliberation or superior outcomes in an endogenous opinion formation and 
transformation process. 
Anxiety on the other hand leads to different responses which may help arrive at better epistemic 
outcomes. Anxiety of course has come up in our discussion earlier a few times in the context of 
societies' and individuals’ responses to disability. To remind ourselves very briefly, we have 
discussed that an encounter with disability elicits surprise, attention and anxiety, and that 
disability is a cause for pause and consideration on part of the non-disabled person. The cause of 
this anxiety is the person's inability to deal with the unfamiliar, unexpected and novel 
circumstances that the encounter with the disability brings. However the individual's response to 
finding himself in these circumstances does not lead to aggression as in above in the absence of a 
perception of conflict or hostility. To think of a few examples, the non-disabled person may not 
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know whether to attempt to shake hands with a person with cerebral palsy or not. Sometimes it 
is the more visible, physical aspects of disability that might cause anxiety, other times especially in 
the case of the less visible or cognitive disabilities, the non-disabled person may be extremely 
curious to understand, even quietly attempt to diagnose the disability, so that he can reorient or 
renegotiate his interaction with the disabled person. In any case, the most effective way to 
navigate the unfamiliar terrain in these situations is to seek out information about the novel 
circumstances or characteristics in the environment, and then consider how to proceed. 
 
This anxiety-led need for reconsideration triggers a number of such responses, which, perhaps 
rather surprisingly, may help induce the ideal conditions for the practice of deliberative 
citizenship and improve the epistemic quality of both the opinion formation process and the 
outcomes when disabled and non-disabled citizens share the same deliberative spaces. First, 
anxiety may trigger a desire to learn more about the unfamiliar situation or experience. 
Second, anxiety may signal a problem with prior attitudes, which in turn will lead people to 
search for useful and balanced information. Both responses, of course, relate back to 
Niemeyer’s corrective lens or Miller’s moralising effect. The interlocutor whose preferences, 
disposition or attitudes towards disability are unsettled by the embodied presence of the 
disabled person in the deliberative site starts re-evaluating her preferences or disposition, and 
adopts a disposition that is more open to change, more inclusive, in brief, more deliberative. 
Therefore face to face deliberation in which people with disabilities are physically present in the 
deliberative site may be epistemically superior not only because it acknowledges and includes 
formerly absent perspectives, but because it presents an opportunity for the interlocutors to re-
evaluate or change their disposition, search for more information, leave entrenched interests 
and replace them with a more deliberative disposition. Having discussed the transformative and 
moralising effect of the embodied presence on all interlocutors we can now move on to the 
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second consideration, the significance of this embodiedness in bringing and maintaining 
disadvantaged perspectives in the deliberative site. 
 
Embodied presence brings and maintains the perspectives of the disabled 
The embodied presence of the disabled is desirable not only because of its transformative effects 
on the interlocutors. As I have suggested in the preceding chapter while it constitutes a political act 
and already starts communicating the inaccessibility of the site for the disabled and the exclusion 
of the disabled voices from deliberation, its epistemic value is limited and possibly ambiguous. 
Presence by itself can communicate exclusion, it can lay bare the power relations and inequalities 
that are hidden in the spatial arrangements of a deliberative site, it can affect the dispositions of 
non-disabled interlocutors and transform their attitudes, but in the final analysis, it is not adequate 
to articulate preference or opinion. However, the epistemic value of this presence might be lying 
somewhere else – not in the articulation of preferences or the opinions of the disabled, but in the 
perspectives that it brings the pool of perspectives, which are direct derivatives of their distinct 
experience and social knowledge. 
At this point I take the significance of perspectives theorised Bohman as my point of departure 
(Bohman 2006). Bohman discusses the epistemic value of the diversity of perspectives as distinct 
from opinions and identities at great length. For Bohman, perspectives are rooted in the 
interlocutors’ social positions and primarily emerge from the range and type of their experiences 
(Bohman 2006, 178). They form the basis of a practical point of view common to those who share 
the same social position and experiences. Perspectives are the experiential source of values and 
opinions, which in turn inform the interlocutors’ reasons in a deliberative setting. Therefore if 
deliberative democrats want to arrive at superior decisions and at the same time improve the 
conditions of the least advantaged interlocutors, they should seek to maximise the diversity of 
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perspectives rather than focusing on the sheer number of opinions that attempt to solve a given 
problem or reach a conclusion. 
Inherent in perspectives are different social knowledges and experiences which inform opinions, 
values and interests. Bohman’s perspectives converges with Young’s discussion on the 
representation of the marginalised, where she argues that “being similarly positioned in the 
social field generates a social perspective” (Young 2002, 123). Meanwhile Young’s clearer 
definitions of opinions, values and interests complement and clarify the distinction that Bohman 
(as well as Young) ascribe to perspectives. Interests according to Young are what affects or are 
important to the life prospects of an individual, while opinions are principles, values and priorities 
held by a person as they bear on and condition that person’s judgment about what ends should 
be sought (Young 2002, 135). To reiterate once again going back to Bohman, perspectives come 
from one’s social positioning and experience, and inform the rest. 
Acknowledging the links to the Standpoint Theory formulated by Harding and others, and 
Situated Knowledge formulated by Haraway help deepen our insights into how embodied 
presence improves the epistemic strengths of the deliberative decision making process (Harding 
2003, Haraway 1988). The main claim of feminist standpoint theories is that particular socio-
political positions that women and other marginalised groups occupy can become sites of 
epistemic privilege which inform the lives of not only those who are marginalised but also those 
who occupy privileged positions (Harding 2003).88 Using deliberative terms, the social position of 
an interlocutor (her race, gender, sexuality, disability and abilities) plays a role in the reasons that 
are presented, reviewed and negotiated in the deliberative site. Haraway on the other hand 
problematises the disembodiedness of objectivity because it privileges normal – ‘unmarked’ – 
                                                     
88 Although standpoint is not the same as perspective. While a perspective is related to a person’s 
socio-historical position and in that sense may become the starting point of a standpoint, a standpoint 
is gained through collective political struggle (Harding 1992). 
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bodies by ascribing neutrality to their knowledges while it associates the less than normal – 
‘marked’ – bodies with their own points of view (Haraway 1988). For Haraway situated 
knowledge is always knowledge within a context, and therefore deeper and richer than 
disembodied knowledge that lacks context. In the context of the deliberative site, Haraway’s 
formulation again affirms the unique role the embodied experience of the disabled can play with 
its particular perspective. 
Following Bohman’s formulation and informed by the above feminist theories, while the mere 
physical presence of the disabled in the deliberative site has limited value in terms of what it 
communicates, its epistemic value is much more significant because of the different perspectives 
that the disabled bring to the deliberative site.89 To put it another way, the embodied presence 
of disabled individuals in deliberative sites is not valuable primarily because it allows or 
enables each and every disabled person to communicate her preferences and opinions on 
a given decision or policy issue. It is valuable and desired because the disability experience 
is a particular experience that comes with its very distinct social knowledge that would 
otherwise be absent from the deliberative site. This is knowledge of a different type of 
living the everyday life, a different type of interaction with others, a different type of 
communication. When these reasons and evidence are taken into account in the 
deliberative site, what is acknowledged is not necessarily any individual reason or opinion, 
but a particular reason, a particular opinion that finds its source in the perspective of 
disability - another reason why diversity and inclusion are preferable to expertise in the 
deliberative site. If we are to look for expertise, the experiences and social knowledges of 
                                                     
89 One might ask whether we can talk about a disability perspective in light of the discussion about the 
fluidity of the disability identity, and the uniqueness of each disability. It would probably be wrong to 
pursue a disability perspective if we grounded the perspective on the disability itself, imagining that it is 
the disability that gives the disabled person her perspective. We can, however talk about a disability 
perspective that is grounded in the oppression that is caused by disability. The disability perspective can 
be a result of the oppression, marginalisation and exclusion that people with disabilities face, 
regardless of the exact nature and type of their disability. 
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people with disabilities make them the very experts on life with disabilities. Similarly, in 
light of the discussion about the role of media and the public sphere in opinion formation 
and transformation, if there is undue bias against people with disabilities in the society or 
the media, people with disabilities may challenge or overcome that bias (and any other 
possible barriers to objective and rational deliberation like framing effects) by presenting 
the disability perspective. This need for the diversity of perspectives in the deliberative 
site, labelled by Bohman as the epistemic difference principle, becomes more acute in a 
context where the marginalised are excluded from deliberative decision making processes 
(Bohman 2006). As Mansbridge reminds us, excluding people who have a unique 
experience and therefore knowledge and capacities related to certain issues “not only 
deprives the public deliberation from additional information and new perspectives, but it 
is likely to also widen existing societal power inequities” (Mansbridge 1992). 
We can turn to an illustrative scenario from Gloucestershire – the story of a missed 
opportunity – to help us consider these ideas in context. In Gloucestershire the owners of 
the cafes that line up the high street of a small town decided to extend their seating on to 
the pavement during summer months. This well intended arrangement would contribute to 
a pleasant weekend stroll for the residents of the small town and at the same time help boost 
local businesses. However the arrangement caused the high street to be practically 
inaccessible to people with limited mobility or spatial challenges.90 Although the issue was 
brought up in Learning Disability Partnership Board meetings, there was no deliberative 
venue in which people with disabilities could raise their concerns with city's planning officials 
                                                     
90 It is important to note that it was not only people with physical disabilities and limited mobility who 
found this arrangement challenging. People with cognitive disabilities also felt restricted and 
disorientated as the high street became very difficult to navigate when the pavements were occupied 
by tables and chairs. 
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or the shopkeepers themselves. Ideally, the issue could have been brought up in a 
deliberative setting, perhaps in a public meeting on planning or trading rules. 
Now let us imagine a scenario where the issue is referred to a deliberative meeting. In such 
a deliberative meeting the needs and interests of the disabled – such as mobility rights – 
would have to be given priority over the needs and interests of the shop owners – such as 
profit – and non-disabled members of the community – such as recreation. Taking into 
account the insights from socio-psychological evidence mentioned earlier, it is important to 
remember once again that there is a difference – of impact, if you will – between the 
perspectives of the disabled being shared with the rest or represented by council staff 
members or officials, and being communicated by people with disabilities themselves. For 
most shopkeepers – along with most other non-disabled interlocutors –encountering 
disabled members of their community would be a new, novel, unsettling, anxiety inducing 
experience.91 It would however lead them to a desire to learn more, to seek to understand 
the problem better or in more detail. They would hear first-hand how the tables and chairs 
on the high street pavements make mobility and therefore life harder for a significant section 
of their community. This face to face deliberation would then encourage the shopkeepers 
re-evaluate the cost of their weekend profit on the larger society and especially the 
disadvantaged. Having heard and understood - even witnessed – the challenges and the 
concerns of the disabled, the deliberative party would arrive at a solution that is acceptable 
to everyone. A solution that is acceptable to everyone would of course have to take into 
consideration the interests of not only the disabled but all who are present, the shopkeepers 
and other stakeholders in the larger community. If the same points where conveyed by non-
disabled staff members on behalf of the disabled and in their absence, the triggers that 
induce anxiety would also be absent. Only in the novel and unknown circumstances that the 
                                                     
91 See, once again, the Scope survey on attitudes to disability (Aiden and McCarthy 2014). 
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presence of disability brings to the deliberative site would anxiety be induced, which in turn 
would lead to a desire to learn more. 
We can imagine this desire to learn more encouraging the shopkeepers to try and understand 
how the lives of the disabled are affected negatively by structural barriers. Perhaps in a 
deliberative process this fact finding phase could be done together in the deliberative site, by 
inviting different experts or listening to the testimonies of individuals who are affected directly 
by the problem. Moreover, because anxiety inhibits reliance on habitual routines, individuals 
become more ready and willing to discover alternatives, which in turn sets the stage for 
compromise and cooperation. Therefore in the Gloucester case we could expect the 
interlocutors to consider alternative perspectives together with a view to arrive at a decision 
that serves the community as a whole. None of the above took place however, and instead the 
issue was never referred to a deliberative decision making process. 
A deliberative process as described above would undoubtedly bring the opinions of the disabled 
into the decision making process. However, their inclusion in such a process would achieve 
something much more profound than giving them the opportunity to voice their opinions and raise 
their concerns. Because reasons and evidence come from perspectives which are in turn informed, 
shaped and engendered by social knowledges and lived experiences, the inclusion of the disabled 
would allow for a new and in many cases unacknowledged perspective – the disability perspective 
– to be taken into account along with other, perhaps more commonly acknowledged perspectives 
– of the town planner, the shop keeper or the Sunday shoppers (Bohman 2006, 188). The 
perspective of the shop keeper is informed by their desire to improve their business and perhaps 
their service to community, but it is a perspective limited by its own business or social knowledge. 
The town planner may similarly look at the issue from a perspective that is informed by his technical 
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expertise, the needs of the town, building regulations etc. Their opinions during deliberation, and 
the reasons that they give will inevitably reflect the limits of these knowledges. 
And here lies the epistemic superiority of inclusive deliberation, whereby the decision making 
process acknowledges and takes into account as many perspectives as possible that represent a 
variety of social knowledges, including and perhaps most importantly the social knowledges of 
the disabled, while at the same time challenging or invalidating pre-deliberative prejudices, 
biases or overcoming indefensible arguments, leading to substantively better outcomes both in 
terms of epistemic and of course democratic value, transforming individuals into more 
deliberative citizens at the same time. 
 
Secondary benefits of the embodied presence of people with disabilities 
 
Inclusive deliberation enhances the quality of opinion formation and transformation process in a 
number of other ways. We have already established that the process of deliberation may help 
citizens evaluate their positions and attitudes from different angles and improve their deductive, 
perhaps more objective reasoning. It may help them move from self-interest and resolute 
partisanship to adopting a more reciprocal attitude. These by-products are especially desirable 
for the integration of the otherwise marginalised in society in general, and their inclusion in polity 
in particular. That is why, once again, those who are disproportionately affected by certain 
problems should especially be included in deliberation (Bohman 2007; Fearon 1998). 
Disability inclusive and embodied deliberation's epistemic superiority as a decision making 
process is also related to a process of social bond creation that only face-to-face deliberation can 
engender. In turn it may lead to a type of citizenship and polity that is better prepared and 
149 
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equipped for deliberative democracy. The role of emotions is only one aspect of why inclusive 
deliberation is epistemically superior as a decision making process. An individual with a disability 
who has not had the opportunity to voice his perspective on issues pertaining to the lives of the 
disabled and the policy decisions that affect them may for the first time find himself in the same 
room with a non-disabled person, deliberating on a topic that is relevant for both of them. In this 
context deliberation is expected to enlarge the minds of everyone in the room and increase 
impartiality by providing the opportunity to consider a given issue from different, even opposite 
view points (Kim, Wyatt, and Katz 1999, 367). In practice this might mean that the non-disabled 
person learns to look at a policy decision from the perspective of the disabled, and finds that a 
decision that he found trivial or second-order before the encounter with the disabled individual 
might have totally different, sometimes existential implications for that individual. 
As the above scenario from Gloucester makes clear, face to face deliberation is probably one of 
the best means of increasing the quality as well as impartiality of the decision making process by 
putting people in a situation in which they can start considering issues with less self-interest and 
imagining how they would feel and act if they were in others' shoes.92 If opinions are formed 
through the day to day exchange of comments and observations which goes on among people, it 
is vitally important, let us say for the shopkeepers in that example to be available for deliberation 
with all sections of their local community; and for the disabled to have the opportunity to 
communicate how their daily life may be affected by well-intended and seemingly harmless 
                                                     
92 92 In contrast, Goodin's account of internal deliberation would work if deliberation were strictly a 
mental exercise and deliberative sites were void of emotional, social, psychological or spatial 
dimensions of human interaction and communication which have an impact on reasoning. However 
deliberating together is not merely the sum of all individuals' reasoning. Encountering another 
individual in the deliberative site initiates a number of significant socio-psychological processes that 
directly or indirectly affect the opinion formation process as I discuss here. Seeing deliberation as a 
strictly internal exercise and the outcomes as simply derived from the sum total of reasons would 
leave us unable and unequipped to identify and take into consideration the socio-psychological 
processes that influence and make up a decision. 
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decisions. When citizens are given the opportunity to deliberate with each other, and especially 
with those they would not otherwise interact with, the decisions that come out of the deliberative 
process may take on an unmatched quality. 
As a result, the deliberative process contributes to the creation of a social bond between citizens. 
In a survey of over three thousand jurors who served in local courthouses in the US, Hickerson and 
Gastil found that individuals from marginalised backgrounds found deliberation a positive and 
satisfying experience (Hickerson and Gastil 2008). Rosenberg recounts witnessing the formation of 
positive social bonds between former strangers as a result of deliberating together (Rosenberg 
2014). Similarly, Goodin reports deliberative meetings that end with the interlocutors hugging each 
other, exchanging contact information and promising to meet again in the future (Goodin 2005) . I 
have observed similar and even stronger bonds between the members of the Learning Disability 
Partnership Board. Deliberating together and regularly over an extended period of time have 
created a deliberating community that consists of the disabled, their carers, professionals who 
provide services for the disabled, as well as council officials. These individuals addressed each 
other by first name, spent time together in social settings and engaged in personal conversations. 
As a result, a challenge that a disabled member faced using the city's transport system or paying 
his bills was not mere information for the Council's transport manager. He could empathise more 
readily with the difficulty experienced regularly by an individual he knows personally. The 
empathy that is needed in deliberation can best be realised in contexts where interlocutors can 
encounter one another and are able to imagine – if not witness – how the decision that is in 
question impacts the life and experiences of the other interlocutor. This is also the point where 
deliberation may require a degree of personal sacrifice as opposed to clinging to self-interest 
(Rosenberg 2014). A personal connection that engenders empathy may be instrumental in 
leaving self-interest outside the deliberative site and replacing it with a caring disposition. 
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Therefore, once again, being physically present in the deliberative site does not only perform 
deliberation, but is extremely instrumental for helping change the dispositions of the 
interlocutors and making them better deliberative citizens. However physical presence needs 
to be accompanied by perspectival presence to make inclusion meaningful, and to make a 
meaningful contribution to the quality of the endogenous opinion formation process. Only with 
this double presence can the voices, concerns, preferences but ultimately perspectives of all 
interlocutors count. Having spent the first two sections on the epistemic strengths of the 
presence and perspectives of disability in the deliberative site, it is now time to explore the 
implications of these ideas and suggest ways in which they can be put into practice. 
III. Translating Presence to Preferences: Practical Implications 
Having established in the above sections the epistemic significance and superiority of disability 
inclusive deliberative sites in this section I try to visualise different scenarios that explore how the 
disabled can join in the deliberative decision making process. For the scenarios I will follow the 
hypothetical cases Martha Nussbaum builds in her discussion regarding the capabilities of people 
with disabilities (Nussbaum 2010). However the discussion here will also be informed by a number 
of insights from previous sections and chapters. It will take into account the diversity of the disability 
experience (Chapter 2) and the need for a caring orientation in the exercise of citizenship, as well 
the practical implications this orientation brings to the deliberative site (Chapter 1). 
When talking about the practical applications of the ideas explored above, one of the first 
challenges that needs to be acknowledged and addressed is the diversity of the disability 
experience. As mentioned more than once in the preceding chapters, the diversity of the disability 
experience means that every disabled individual's disability is unique and impacts his cognitive and 
communicative competence in a unique way. Therefore we have to first acknowledge that each 
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disabled individuals' deliberative competence as well as accommodation needs in the deliberative 
site will be different. In practice, this means some individuals with physical or cognitive disabilities 
may not be able to reason or communicate at all, while others' abilities might nearly match those 
interlocutors who are not diagnosed with a disability. In the meantime many disabled individuals 
will be positioned somewhere between no deliberative ability at all and full deliberative 
competence.93 Consequently, any attempt to bring the perspectives of the disabled to the 
deliberative site will have to take into account and work with these differences. 
What, then, happens when individuals cannot deliberate like 'the rest', but their perspectives and 
preferences are as valuable as the rest? I suggest that the basis for an answer to this question 
can be found in the distinction we made earlier in Chapter 1, between the two opposing 
constructions of citizenship – the liberal vs caring citizen. To be reminded of this distinction once 
again, while the citizen in liberal theories is self-sufficient, independent, fundamentally 
egocentric and primarily engaged in pursuing his self-interests, the caring citizen is one already 
situated in networks of interdependent relationships. In times of conflict of interests, the liberal 
citizen's need for compromise arises out of competition or fear, resulting in a social contract. On 
the other hand the caring citizen's relationships arise not only from the need for survival, 
development and social functioning, but also from the human need to relate and care. Caring 
citizenship is situated against the liberal construction of the detached, independent individual 
and challenges the liberal glorification of autonomy and the stigma that this stigma creates 
around dependency. 
 
I have also suggested in the same chapter that deliberative democratic norms and practices are 
very relevant and instrumental to include the traditionally marginalized, and in our case people 
                                                     
93 In Chapter 1 following Kemp I defined communicative competence as “being able to use speech acts 
to produce an interpersonal relationship between the listener and themselves” (Kemp 1987). 
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with disabilities in the polity, because deliberative democracy harbours the spaces and processes 
where particular needs of care recipients could be responded to if a caring disposition instead of 
moral indifference and calculated self-interest were embraced by the interlocutors. The lives of 
people with disabilities is probably one of the most distinctive settings where this sort of caring 
disposition becomes most visible. Disabled persons experience human interdependence much 
more visibly and widely in their lives, in that they usually rely on the support of parents, siblings, 
spouses, carers and so on. Moreover immediate family members as well as people who provide 
social services to the disabled are often subjected to courtesy stigma because of their relationship 
with the disabled.94 The association however goes beyond stigma, many times resulting in their 
being disabled together. To give one very simple example – hypothetical but extremely likely – 
imagine an able-bodied mother who cannot even go out shopping because she cannot take her 
disabled son with her due to accessibility issues. Neither can she leave him alone at home. As a 
result, she experiences the results of her son’s disability first hand – his disability restricts her 
mobility much as it restricts his. 
 
I propose that these relationships can be potential bases for representational claims or mutual 
enactments of citizenship, whereby the disabled may be physically present in deliberative sites with 
the persons who care for them as communicative-others who share and represent their 
perspectives, and who act as translators of their preferences. This notion of representation is 
informed by Saward’s representation as a claim and Young’s conceptualisation of representation as 
a differentiated relationship (Saward 2006; Young 2002). For Saward, representation is not 
something that is formally present or absent, it is a dynamic process. “It is made or constructed by 
someone, for someone, and for a purpose. (Saward 2006, 13). It is a claim to know what represents 
the best interests of someone. Young on the other hand argues that representation is a relationship 
                                                     
94 For two recent treatments on courtesy stigma or stigma by association see van der Sanden et al. 
2015; Phillips et al. 2012. 
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which does not involve an identity requirement, but instead describes “a relationship between the 
representative and the represented” (Young 2002, 127). The representative does not stand for the 
identity of the other person or a collective identity. Instead she looks after the interests of the 
person(s) she represents, voices their principles, values and priorities, and experiences the kind of 
social experience of the person she represents, which is in turn informed by their social group 
position.  
 
In this regard, Clifford’s “collaborative speech” and Lanoix’s formulation of more able citizens can 
all be mentioned as the variations of the same theme (Clifford 2011; Lanoix 2007). In Clifford’s 
collaborative speech, participants [in deliberative spaces] “make political claims collaboratively as 
a way to ensure the inclusion of people with profound cognitive impairment”. Here “speech and 
actions are coordinated among differently situated yet still conjoined selves” (Clifford 2011: 220 – 
221).  Similarly, Lanoix suggests “broadening the foundational concept of the citizen from that of 
a self-governing and perpetually active participant to one that can include passive citizens”. 
Passive citizens include those with cognitive or physical disabilities that impede communication. 
For her, the non-disabled, active and self-governing citizens can regulate social institutions and 
arrive at decisions “with the explicit recognition that these principles and institutions will serve all 
inhabitants, not only those who are like themselves” (Lanoix 2007, 126). Again, Goodin and Lau 
invoke the concept of suretyship in electoral law to enfranchise incompetents [sic] (Goodin and 
Lau, 2011). 
How, then, can this representation or translation of preferences look in the deliberative site and 
how does it affect opinion formation? Since there is no single disability identity and every 
individual’s disability as well as her relationship with her communicative-other will be unique, it is 
not possible to formulate a one-size-fits-all solution. However we can still imagine various 
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scenarios whereby presence is channelled into the preference formation process through 
relationships of care. For this task, I use the three cases or scenarios that Nussbaum introduces in 
her discussion on the capabilities of people with cognitive disabilities (Nussbaum 2010). For 
practical reasons I will use the term ‘carer’ to describe the communicative-other who is in a care 
relationship with the disabled. In my formulation of representation below, the able-bodied carers 
who experience the disabling effects of caring for or living with the people with disabilities have a 
stronger claim or reason than anybody else to represent and translate the preferences of the 
persons they are associated with. 
In the first scenario, let us assume that the individual has a mild mental or physical disability. She is 
capable of understanding, presenting or formulating responses to arguments, however it takes her 
more time and effort to do so. She might be deaf, blind or a wheelchair user. She might have limited 
reading abilities, anxiety disorders or agoraphobia. In this case, facilitating her inclusion may require 
relatively simple accommodations: making the site physically accessible, providing easy-read 
versions of documents or giving her more time to formulate or give her responses during 
deliberation. The carer’s role is relatively simple: helping with physical arrangements, intervening 
when the person has difficulty understanding or expressing an idea, or giving her assurance 
when she feels anxious. Here the person with a mild disability is a full interlocutor in 
deliberation, albeit with some help. 
In the second scenario, the person’s disability prevents her from exercising most 
communicative functions, even with special arrangements. However she can communicate her 
preferences to her carer, perhaps by means of some personal code language. In this case, 
because she is comprehensible only to her carer, the rest of the interlocutors rely on the carer’s 
active involvement or translation in the deliberation process. The carer may translate the 
discussion both ways, and make sure that the preferences of the disabled interlocutor are 
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understood. In her intervention she may have to elaborate the disabled person’s account to 
make it more comprehensible or compelling, or perhaps add her own insights that come as a 
result of the experience of being disabled with the person she cares. Meanwhile others can try 
to be sensitive to body movements, facial expressions and gestures where these may be 
expressions of preferences (Jenkinson 1993, 369). Here the person with a communication 
disability is an interlocutor through the co-presence of her communicative-other. 
In the third scenario we must admit that some people’s disabilities are so severe that they 
are unable to form or respond to reasons and they are altogether unaware of their own 
interests to give consent. In this case we might expect a formally designated legal guardian 
or a person with a strong representative claim to represent the interests of the severely 
disabled person in the deliberative site. Again, what is important to remember in this 
extreme case is that although the disabled person herself may not be able to participate 
directly in deliberation, the perspectives that are represented by her legal guardian or carer 
– what we called the disability perspective above - will originate mostly from the same well 
of distinct experiences and social knowledge. While we cannot claim the experience to be 
identical to the disabled individual's, we can safely assume that it will be the closest, due to 
the relationship between the disabled individual and her guardian or carer. 
While in all three cases people with disabilities, as well as their perspectives are brought into the 
deliberative site, a potential objection still remains: Given the nature of cognitive disabilities, how 
can we be sure that the perspectives that are communicated correspond to real interests and that 
their discussion will contribute to the quality of decisions? In answer to this question we need to 
remember once again the caveat already mention about deliberative competence above. The 
dichotomy that sets complete rationality and complete lack of it against each other is false and an 
illusion. Complete rationality is improbable for any interlocutor. Whether or not we have a 
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disability, none of us is a perfect decision-maker. Our decisions are always affected by subtle, 
multifaceted and sometimes conflicting values, beliefs or biases (Jenkinson 1993, 364). Therefore 
by applying rational models too rigidly, we might in effect end up expecting the disabled to become 
better decision makers than the other interlocutors who do not identify or are not diagnosed as 
disabled.95 By the same token, setting the deliberative competence bar too high might not only bar 
the disabled from deliberative sites, but also disqualify many who identify or are seen as non-
disabled. 
Moreover, the largest subcategory of people with mental disabilities is that of mildly disabled, who 
make up about 89 percent of the population with mental disabilities (Shomaker 2010). They would 
roughly fit in the second scenario above, meaning that given the opportunity, they could 
participate in deliberation. Their exclusion and the barriers set up against them are often more to 
do with the perceptions and the prejudices of the society than their communicative or cognitive 
abilities. The unstable relationship between shifting definitions of disability, the nature of 
diagnosis, and the label and stigma that the diagnosis instigates must also be mentioned. 
Definitions and diagnoses of cognitive disabilities are changed regularly.96 Some disabilities are 
visible while others are invisible. Therefore in a deliberative site the only difference between one 
deliberator diagnosed with a cognitive disability, and the other with the same disability yet 
unaware or undiagnosed might be the diagnosis itself. In this case diagnosis becomes the 
performative utterance that sets aside and labels the person, and changes the society’s 
relationship with her.97 This only reinforces the fact that in the case of cognitive disabilities we are 
not dealing with clear boundaries about who should be included and who should be left out of the 
                                                     
95 As a matter of fact, evidence from research points to the possibility of some status characteristics 
becoming a basis for stricter standards for the lower status person. See Foschi 2000. 
96 There are two guides used by mental health professionals. The first is the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, which was first published in 1952 and was revised for the fifth time in 
2013. World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases includes a psychiatric 
illnesses section and the current document is the 10th edition. Therefore new diagnoses are added or 
existing diagnoses are revised or changed in at least every 10 years. 
97 For diagnosis as performative see Sadegh-Zadeh 2011. 
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deliberative site. Therefore when in doubt we should err on the side of inclusion, because 
deliberative democracy has the necessary procedures and mechanisms to handle the challenge of 
cognitive disability, as I shall explain below. 
I suggested above that the perspectives that originate from the distinct knowledges and 
experiences of persons with disabilities will be best evoked in deliberative settings by those who 
experience disability first-hand, making people with disabilities, rather than anybody else, the best 
candidates to voice their own interests. Similarly, research in decision making suggests that people 
are most likely to have clear preferences in issues that are familiar, simple and directly experienced 
(Jenkinson 1993, 364). Their experience – often of exclusion, segregation or additional hardship – 
makes them the best experts of their interests so far as disability policies and related issues are 
concerned. And it is this very experience of marginalisation that makes deliberative sites potential 
emancipatory venues for them, venues where their perspectives and consequently interests – 
otherwise unheard – can be brought to public discussion. In this sense topics that seem to 
be trivial to the rest of society may be extremely significant for the marginalised. Remember 
once again the scenario about the shops in Gloucester and how a well-intended arrangement 
that would have contributed to a pleasant weekend stroll for the rest of the community 
members would make the high street practically inaccessible to people with limited mobility. 
Therefore while perspectives may be vastly different and interests are much more complex 
than they seem, deliberative democracy can respond to this complexity because it doesn’t 
regard interests as “brute facts that uncritically serve as input to legitimate decision-making”, 
but instead problematizes their status (Rostbøll 2005). Preferences are shaped and 
transformed through the mutual learning and insight gaining that takes place in the 
deliberative site. This transformation is enforced by the need to publicly justify preferences 
with regard to universal aspects of validity: pragmatic appropriateness, moral rightness and 
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common good (Habermas 1987). Therefore I am not suggesting that any preference brought 
up by a disabled person be elevated to overwrite all other preferences because they have been 
marginalised for too long. I am however suggesting that the need to publicly justify preferences 
by the procedure of the force of the better argument already equips deliberative democracy 
to find the better arguments that serve moral rightness or common good.98  
During deliberation we may expect to find that the preferences of those who are subjected to 
injustice or exclusion might have the force of the better argument behind them due to their 
appeal to moral rightness or common good. For the shopkeepers in Gloucester, the choice was 
between defending to keep their weekend profit and keeping a significant section of society 
from accessing the city centre. And this appeal to moral rightness or common good is directly 
linked to deliberative sites' becoming sites of emancipation – in this case for those who 
are marginalised due to their disabilities. However this is not a deliberative carte blanche 
for the marginalised because they are still subject to the same validity checks as every 
other interlocutor. For example, following the same high street scenario, if people with 
limited mobility requested that the town’s pavements are set aside for their exclusive use 
on weekends, their preference would be appealing to neither moral rightness nor 
common good, and therefore would have to be rejected after deliberation. These 
examples on preference formation where the disabled are present with the non-disabled 
in the deliberative site make it clear that deliberative theory’s democratic deficiency in 
the case of disability does not necessarily reflect a procedural inadequacy. On the 
contrary, once people with disabilities are allowed into the deliberative site, the more 
procedural elements such as adherence to validity checks or the force of the better 
argument may become the very means that guarantee an equal voice to the disabled in 
particular, and to the marginalised in general. 
 
                                                     
98 Once again, the problem of agenda exclusion looms over the discussion. See footnote 86 above. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter's aim was to defend disability-inclusive deliberation from an epistemic point of 
view. The discussion was built on the claims of the preceding chapter about the significance 
of disabled individual's presence in deliberative sites. I have discussed how this presence not 
only makes deliberative sites more inclusive and therefore more democratic, but at the same 
time epistemically superior, and therefore preferable as a decision making process. 
Attempting to include individuals with communicative disabilities in deliberative sites is a 
major undertaking, not least because disability is a fluid and multi layered category. As a 
result any attempt to provide a strict inclusion template or formula is irrelevant. With this 
caveat in mind, I first showed that any deliberative site is already cognitively diverse even 
before the arrival of a person who is medically diagnosed with a disability. Therefore we 
cannot ascribe perfect deliberative competence or procedures to any deliberative site. I then 
discussed how the presence of the disabled in deliberative sites interacts with and influences 
the opinion formation process. In the same section I argued from a perspectival followed by 
a socio-psychological view that we can count on the presence of the disabled in deliberative 
sites to transform the interlocutors, to enrich the opinion formation process and lead to 
epistemically superior outcomes. Finally, I explored what the discussion here might look like 
in practice, in the context of a deliberative setting, making use of the few possible scenarios 
already developed by Nussbaum. 
In terms of the general aims of this work, the claim I made in the very first pages still rings 
true: in order to maintain the emancipatory potential of deliberative democracy, the 
perspectives of the communicatively disabled must be included in deliberation. This chapter, 
then, was an attempt to show that it is indeed possible to bring these perspectives to 
deliberative sites and decision making processes, making deliberative democracy more 
inclusive, more emancipatory and more democratic as a result. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Deliberative Spaces 
 
Introduction 
 
In search of a disability inclusive deliberative democracy, I have discussed so far the significance 
of the embodiedness of the disability experience and how it relates to the embodiedness of 
deliberation. I have explored the same theme in the context of disability inclusive opinion 
formation, transformation and deliberative decision making processes. There is yet another 
theme we need to take into consideration in order to give a full account of the disability 
experience, how it relates to deliberation and deliberative decision making processes, as well as 
the inclusion of people with disabilities in deliberative democracy. That theme is the spatiality of 
the deliberative site, which has been at the centre of the discussion throughout this work. From 
its very beginnings disability studies has concerned itself with the spatial dimensions of exclusion: 
accessibility of the built environment, social, economic, political and democratic life etc. The 
words that define the main concern of this work, inclusion and exclusion, are spatial terms that 
denote being in or out of a democratic decision making process. However the role and 
significance of space have not yet been fully acknowledged in deliberative democracy literature, 
much like the absent-present body of the earlier chapter.99  
 
This chapter then has two goals. First, it intends to highlight the role of spatiality in the deliberative 
democracy agenda. One of the most important contributions of deliberative democracy to 
democratic public life is the equalising power of its deliberative sites. This chapter argues that the 
spatial organisation of deliberative sites can have a negative influence on this fundamental 
element of deliberative democracy. Therefore, spatiality should be taken into consideration as a 
significant factor that impacts deliberation as well as deliberative processes both at the micro and 
                                                     
99 For one exception see Parkinson 2012. 
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macro levels (thus the plural "spatialities" of the next section). By the micro level, I mean the 
spatiality of each single deliberative site. By the macro level, I mean the spatiality of different 
deliberative sites in relation to each other in a deliberative system. Second, because of this 
significance of spatiality, the chapter argues that the issue of the inclusion of people with 
disabilities cannot be discussed without first acknowledging and then looking for ways to 
overcome the spatial dimension of exclusion. 
At the outset, I introduce and define my terminology and provide a very brief discussion on space 
and spatiality especially as it relates to the context of this work. I then turn to the micro level, the 
single deliberative event. Here I explore the significance of the physical space in which 
deliberation takes place. In order to fully understand the spatiality of the deliberative site we 
must analyse how the site is organised, who is allocated where and for what reason, who has 
access to various objects or privileges (e.g. speaking platform, microphone, projector etc.) and 
under what conditions they have this access. Answering these questions provides insights about 
much more than a simple arrangement of chairs and tables in the deliberative site – it lays bare 
the role and significance of the site's spatial organisation in the implicit power inequalities that 
deliberative democracy fervently intends to leave outside the deliberative site. 
 
The second section takes the spatial analysis a step wider and broader to the systemic level.100 
Here I suggest that the spatiality of the different sites of the same deliberative system in relation 
to one another has an impact on the decision making processes that take place in that system, 
namely the decisiveness of deliberation and the transmission between different sites. In other 
words, one deliberative site's spatial positioning against another site is not neutral, but again 
indicative of the power relationships which have a direct impact on the consequentiality of the 
decisions that are taken in that site. This discussion brings back the distinction made in the 
                                                     
100 For deliberative systems see Chapter 1. 
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deliberative democracy literature between public and empowered sites, and suggests that 
the spatial dimension of this distinction has to be taken into consideration to fully 
understand the relationship between public and empowered sites. 
Throughout the chapter I use insights from the disability community101 in Gloucestershire as an 
illustrative and diagnostic tool. My analysis of the monthly Learning Disability Partnership Board 
meetings that take place in Gloucester illustrates the points I make regarding the spatiality of the 
micro level of deliberation. Similarly, the analysis of the interaction between different 
deliberative sites that are set up and led by various organisations that share the same single issue 
of improving the lives of people with disabilities serve to illustrate the significance of spatiality in 
the macro level. For this analysis I turn to a deliberative system made up of various deliberative 
sites, all within Gloucestershire: a Learning Disability Partnership Board meeting, two disability 
NGOs’ meetings, and the meeting of a group of people with disabilities organised independently 
to challenge the status quo regarding disability issues at the local level. 
 
I. Space, Spatiality and People with Disabilities 
 
Social theorists have increasingly come to recognise that society and life are not constituted only 
in time, but they are also situated and reproduced in space (Soja 1989; Harvey 1991; Giddens 
1991). Space is no more seen as a natural, static and rigid background or container to life and 
politics, but conceptualised as a politicised, culturally relative and historically specific sphere of 
multiplicity, interconnection and power (Pugh 2009, 580; Rodman 1992, 641). Everything that 
we study – including deliberative democracy and deliberative sites – happens somewhere and 
involves a material dimension. Spatiality on the other hand denotes the organisation of space 
                                                     
101 I use the phrase “disability community” as a shorthand for people with disabilities, their allies (both 
as family members, carers and staff of various organisations) and council staff who work in 
departments relevant to disability work, and are therefore involved in the lives of people with 
disabilities in Gloucestershire in a professional capacity. 
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as a social product (Soja 1989, 79; Massey 1994, 2).102 This organisation is not neutral or 
insignificant either – it reproduces, stabilizes and maintains social structural differences and 
hierarchies, arranges patterns of interaction that constitute collective action, and embodies 
and secures otherwise intangible cultural norms, identities, memories etc. (Gieryn 2000, 473). 
In this sense space is fundamental in any exercise of power and is seen as an active 
constitutive component of hegemonic power (Rabinow 1984). In Keith and Pile's words, it 
“tells you where you are, and it puts you there” (Keith and Pile 1993, 37). Space sustains this 
difference and hierarchy by routinizing daily rounds in ways that exclude and segregate 
categories of people, and by embodying in visible and tangible ways the cultural meanings 
variously ascribed to them. 
Constructions of behaviour, appearances, or even people as welcome or unwelcome, 
accepted or deviant are linked to the space in which they happen – space tells people if they 
are 'out of place', and the symbolic meanings of landscape indicates how to act or what to 
avoid. A temple symbolises reverence while a library demands silence. While a same-sex 
couple holding hands on the streets of the Castro neighbourhood of San Francisco or in 
London's Soho are welcome or at least invisible, the same couple would feel 'out of place' or 
unwelcome in many other spaces. Therefore space can play a role that imposes a 
territorialised normative order to its inhabitants (Gieryn 2000, 480). Space can extend or deny 
life chances to individuals or groups located in some spots. This is why we often see that 
certain spaces are socialised by certain homogeneous groups, whose existence in that space 
regulates and excludes unwelcome visitors (Kitchin 1998, 350).103  
                                                     
102 The formulation of spatiality that I employ here follows Soja and Massey’s formulations. I use 
“spatiality” interchangeably with “socially organised space”. A “spatial site” is a site that is socially 
organised. 
103 These symbolic meanings are in turn a “function of the values and meanings of a specific time and 
place” and therefore not unchangeable (J. R. Parkinson 2012, 98). 
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The organisation of space then is not only a social product, but this organisation always 
simultaneously rebounds back to shape inhabitants and their social relations (Soja 1989, 57). 
These inhabitants then ascribe meanings and qualities to the material and social stuff gathered 
in space that reflect difference and hierarchy – ours or theirs, safe or dangerous, public or 
private, unfamiliar or known, rich or poor, black or white, new or old, accessible or not (Gieryn 
2000, 472; Parkinson 2012, 74). They create meaning - physical, emotional or experiental 
realities – in space (Rodman 1992, 641). However space does not solely feature in narratives. It 
is instrumental, a narrative in its own right, one which produces and reproduces meaning in the 
rhetoric that it promotes (Berdoulay 2015, 135). The arrangement of spaces and the place of 
both inhabitants and objects in those spaces play a role in the constitution and the 
transformation of the inhabitants, because place and psychology are deeply connected 
(Goodley 2014, 10; Imrie 2000, 9). 
The forms of exclusion and oppression that people with disabilities face are also played out within 
space and given context by space (Kitchin 1998, 346). Space is organised and written to perpetuate 
disabling attitudes and practices, as well as the dominance of able-bodied people. According to 
Kitchin, space excludes people in two ways. First, space is organised to keep disabled people in 
their place. People with disabilities are often kept separate from the non-disabled. They exist on 
the margins of society not only socially, but also spatially. Since the institutions that hid away the 
disabled or completely separated them from the rest of the society have been closed down, 
people with disabilities have been relegated to the peripheries of cities and communities. Houses 
that are set aside for people with disabilities are almost always in less desirable areas of cities 
where schools are unpopular, crime rates are higher. 
The recent proposal to build supported living apartments for vulnerable adults with physical 
and learning disabilities in Leamington Spa and the ongoing discussions regarding the 
suitability of the site provides a good example. In 2015 a property development company 
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applied to the local council to build sixteen apartments in the place of a fire damaged school 
building in central Leamington Spa. While the Town Council were in favour of the 
construction, the proposal received a negative response from the disability community and 
their allies, a number of local councillors and initially from Warwickshire Police. Bath Place is 
located between a public car park, two night clubs and a railway line. During the Planning 
Committee meeting in February 2016, the Council’s Safe Communities manager objected to 
the proposal on the grounds that it was a poor location to house vulnerable people 
(Leamington Spa Town Council 2016). In light of the higher than average recorded number of 
incidents of crime and antisocial behaviour in the site, Warwickshire Police suggested that the 
location of the site increases the likelihood of people with disabilities becoming vulnerable as 
targets for crime and antisocial behaviour. Besides incidents of prostitution, Bath Place is 
known by police as an area where street drinkers and drug users gather. Three councillors 
objected to the proposal on the same grounds. The plans, however, were approved by the 
majority of the councillors, and after separate talks with the company, the police have 
eventually advised that they are satisfied that the development will include a high standard 
of overall security. The high standard in question included connecting the area to the town 
centre CCTV system and building a fence around the building. Bath Place provides a very good 
example of how the organisation of urban space can disadvantage people with disabilities 
even when the intention is to provide suitable housing. The town’s response to concerns of 
safety was to surround the building with a fence which would not only keep potential 
intruders and antisocial behaviour out, but people with disabilities in – as a community of 
people who will potentially end up living in, but not as part of the wider community. 
Second, spaces are social texts that convey to disabled people that they are out of place. I 
have already reflected on how public spaces shared by the disabled and the non-disabled 
tend to push the disabled and their needs to the peripheries. Toilets for the disabled are 
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usually at the back of buildings and locked. Public services for the disabled – public transport, 
library services etc. - are almost always provided through specialised and segregated 
arrangements, which perpetuate disablism by labelling the disabled as different, needing 
specialised and segregated treatment or facilities. The sign on the wall of the coffee chain 
shop I visit every day, titled “Facilities for Guests with a Disability” reads: 
“Details of the facilities to assist guests with a disability are available from our 
manager. Please don’t hesitate to ask for any assistance that might help during your 
visit. If you are unable to queue for assistance please find a table and attract the 
attention of one of our team. For more information regarding facilities please visit our 
website.”104  
Even special arrangements that are well intended on the surface can thus reproduce and 
maintain disadvantage and dependence. They can perpetuate the assumption that the 
normative order which implies able-bodiedness is normal and ideal, while disability is 
abnormal and a deviation from the ideal. As a result, when people with disabilities attempt 
to participate in public life at any level – whether it be going shopping or going to participate 
in a deliberative meeting - they are reminded that they are the exception rather than the 
norm, the unexpected rather than the expected, and often, the tolerated rather than the 
welcome.  
 
II. The Micro-Spatial Arrangement of the Deliberative Site 
 
Once the vocabulary of spatiality is added to the toolkit of deliberative democracy's scholars and 
practitioners, the role of space in relation to power inequalities and the significance of spatiality 
during deliberative events bring up a number of questions that need answers: Do deliberative sites 
reproduce and maintain social structural differences and hierarchies by their spatial organisation? 
                                                     
104 Costa Coffee, Warwick University Campus. The sign is neither written in easy-read version, nor 
placed on an immediately visible wall. The expectation that a disabled person should talk to the 
manager if she wants to use the facilities can be criticised from many different angles. My intention 
here to show the prevalence, and in this case the added absurdity of this attitude. 
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Do they embody cultural norms that privilege some at the expense of others? To be more specific, 
are there physical or mental barriers to the participation of people with disabilities in deliberative 
sites? Do deliberative sites perpetuate disabling attitudes and practices, as well as the dominance 
of able-bodied people as a result of spatial arrangements? Exploring these and similar questions can 
tell us whether deliberative democratic practices indeed impose a normative spatial order on 
interlocutors. While there is virtually no published research or discussion on the spatiality of 
deliberative sites and how this relates to the inclusion of disabled interlocutors, a spatial analysis of 
Gloucestershire’s Learning Disability Partnership Board meetings can provide us with some clues as 
to whether deliberative democracy’s problem of inclusion of the disabled has a spatial element. 
 
LDPB meetings are regularly held at the "Shire Hall", the city's Council House.105 Shire Hall was built 
over 200 years ago, well before the rules and regulations of accessibility. The main entrance to the 
building is reached through a monumental set of stairs. Necessary accommodations have been 
made over the years and a ramp has been built to make the ground floor physically accessible for 
people with disabilities. Regular LDPB meetings always take place in a room on this ground floor, 
therefore there is no physical barrier to the participation of people with disabilities in LDPB 
meetings. The organisation of the rooms themselves for LDPB meetings also reflect a sensitivity 
towards people who need different physical and cognitive requirements in order to deliberate 
during the meetings. For example there is always enough space to accommodate wheelchairs, 
and tables are arranged in a way that enables their parking. Non-disabled and disabled 
interlocutors sit together – especially when the tables are arranged in a banquet style for small 
group discussions. Similarly, if there is more than one table, the facilitators make sure that 
there is a balance in the number of non-disabled and disabled interlocutors at each table. 
Interlocutors come with an open mind and display a patient attitude to deliberation, for 
example when they are required to listen to a slow or long speech, or talk that is difficult to 
                                                     
105 See Introduction for a more detailed account on Learning Disability Partnership Boards. 
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follow or understand due to speech impediments or similar cognitive differences. These and 
other spatial arrangements, reinforced by a desire and civic attitude to engage with the 
disabled as equals, make each interlocutor feel valued and welcomed to deliberate. 
Extraordinary meetings – usually those which prove to be more popular and therefore 
require more seats – take place in the larger first floor rooms. Physical accessibility of these 
rooms vary. The spatial organisation of the rooms do not show the same sensitivity towards 
physical and cognitive requirements of the disabled, some of which are mentioned above. 
On this first floor is also the main auditorium, which functions as the ceremonial space where 
the more formal meetings in the city takes place. This room is probably the least accessible 
for people with disabilities, as it is reached only by a very long and spiralling set of stairs. 
Once in the room, navigation is still challenging for people with reduced mobility due to the 
auditorium layout and absence of ramps. As a result when a meeting takes place in the large 
auditorium, people with physical disabilities are relegated to the very top level of the room 
where the entrance to the auditorium is located and where they can easily park their 
wheelchairs if they are wheelchair users. 
This brief overview gives us a number of insights about the power relations hidden in the 
spatial arrangements of LDPB meetings and answers some of the questions brought up above 
regarding deliberative sites’ spatiality as they become apparent in this deliberative context. 
First, the interaction of organised space and power becomes visible in the allocation of meetings 
and inhabitants. LDPB meetings take place in ground floor rooms, which, while being more 
accessible, are also the rooms that host more mundane and less important meetings in terms 
of their decisiveness.106 While LDPB meetings cover a significant number of issues that affect 
the lives of people with disabilities, their power can be defines more as agenda making power, 
                                                     
106 For decisiveness see Chapter 1, Deliberative Systems. 
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and the decisions that are reached in these meetings are referential rather than binding. The 
discussions, perspectives and ultimately decisions reached in this site are then transmitted to 
the Council's joint commissioning partnership executive meetings. 
Meanwhile more significant meetings take place in the less accessible upper rooms. The upper 
room auditorium, while being the largest, is probably also one of the least accessible and 
awkward rooms in the whole building for people with disabilities. This is the room where the 
most decisive, sometimes ceremonial meetings take place. For people with disabilities, this 
implies an inverted relationship between the importance and popularity of a meeting and its 
physical accessibility. In this example, then, physical barriers people with disabilities face to 
participate in deliberation increase as the importance and popularity of the meeting increase. 
The more significant the agenda is and the more participants there are in a county hall meeting, 
the less present are the voices and perspectives of people with disabilities in that meeting, due 
to barriers. 
Barriers do not disappear, however, after the initial hurdle of getting into this deliberative site. 
When a meeting takes place in the large auditorium, people with disabilities are relegated to the 
very top level of the room where the entrance to the auditorium is located. These top levels also 
happen to be the least visible and audible parts of the room, furthest away from the workstations 
and the microphones below, and simply not conducive to participation in the discussions that 
take place in the room. In a "culture change" event where I attended as a speaker in this 
auditorium, people with disabilities had to make an extra effort to see or hear the speaker, 
as well as be seen or heard if they wanted to participate in the discussion. Non-disabled 
interlocutors could be seen or heard in any part of the room by standing up and making 
themselves more visible, raising or adjusting their voice, or even walking down to the central 
stage so that the rest of the interlocutors see and hear them. Most of these options however 
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were not available for people with disabilities, further frustrating their attempts to follow or 
participate in the deliberations. 
Another incident I witnessed in one of the more accessible ground floor rooms illustrates that 
the challenge of spatiality is a challenge not only in terms of the physical organisation of a 
deliberative site, but also in terms of how the exclusionary or oppressive character of that 
organisation is taken as natural, reproduced or reinforced by the inhabitants of that space. 
Before a deliberative meeting in a council room in January 2014, the council staff were still 
setting up the computers and screens. The room was relatively small for the expected fifteen 
participants, and the tables were arranged in a u-shape, facing the large projector screen on 
the wall. When the participants, about half of whom were cognitively or physically disabled 
started arriving, the staff member who was busy setting up the computers warned each 
disabled participant not to walk towards the area where the computers and the cables were, 
in case they step on the cables, touch the computers and accidentally knock things down. The 
warning was extended personally and strictly to the disabled participants as they walked in. 
Non-disabled participants were not warned, could move freely in the room and sit wherever 
they chose. The disabled participants however were led by the staff member to one corner of 
the room, which also happened to be furthest away from the electronic devices.107 The 
perception of the able-bodied staff member about what people with disabilities could and 
could not do – and how much risk they posed to council property – interacted with the spatial 
arrangements of the room and resulted in an arbitrary as well as segregated seating plan 
whereby people with disabilities were banned from a certain area of the room and 
designated to another area. 
                                                     
107 “Better Transport” meeting in Shire Hall, Gloucester, January 2014. It is ironic that only ten minutes 
into the meeting the same staff members had difficulty opening a programme in the computer, and it 
was a participant with a mild learning disability who helped her open and use the programme. 
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The two examples above – one from a less, and the other from a more accessible 
deliberative site illustrate how deliberative sites can spatially exclude people with 
disabilities from participation in deliberation on equal terms. In the first example, we have 
seen the organisation of space exclude and keep the disabled in their place, as well as make 
them feel out of place at the micro level of the single deliberative event. Physical barriers 
both added a greater cost to their participation by making access harder for people with 
disabilities, and at the same time demanded additional conditions and cognitive 
competencies. Seating arrangements were not conducive to equal participation of all 
interlocutors, but instead privileged the able-bodied. Able-bodied interlocutors were more 
visible and audible than the disabled. Access to visual and audio help was more readily 
available for the more mobile. In the second example, a disabling normative order was 
employed very openly and visibly, dividing the room between the able-bodied and the 
disabled, and telling the interlocutors who belongs where. 
Using the language of spatiality scholars, the spatial set up in the Shire Hall perpetuated 
disabling attitudes and practices and the dominance of the able-bodied. This arrangement 
also sustained the hierarchy in which able-bodied citizens are welcome and accepted 
while people with disabilities are unwelcome and unaccepted. As a result, the spatiality 
of the deliberative site mirrored, reproduced and even multiplied the exclusion that 
disabled people face in society this time in the deliberative context. The attitudes of the council 
staff maintained and reinforced the hierarchy in which able-bodied citizens were seen as natural 
deliberators, therefore welcome and accepted, while people with disabilities were deemed to be 
out of place, whose presence needed to be regulated or policed. The negative impact of the 
spatiality of deliberative events in both examples is additionally remarkable, as both events were 
organised as part of the Council's attempt to reach out to people with disabilities and to include 
them in decision making processes. We see therefore at this micro level that even a deliberative 
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site with the end purpose of improving the lives of people with disabilities can disadvantage or 
exclude them as a result of inconsiderate spatial arrangements. 
 
III. The Macro-Spatial Arrangement of the Deliberative System 
 
While the two cases above illustrate the spatial dimensions of single deliberative events and how 
spatiality excludes people with disabilities, there is more to spatiality than the social organisation 
of a single space. Geographers and historians of the suburbanization process have been 
suggesting for a while that the disabled, poor, and racial minorities are excluded through a failure 
to make provision for social and medical services, public transportation and affordable housing 
(Jackson 1987; Hirsch 2009). If space reflects power hierarchies by designating some locations 
more powerful than others, we can expect to see a correlation between the social distance of a 
deliberative site to centres of power and that site's position in the deliberative system (Gieryn 
2000, 475). 
A number of non-profit disability organisations operate in Gloucestershire. They work in the 
same geography, partner in various degrees with the same County Council, and share a 
commitment to the same single-issue (i.e. improving the lives of people with disabilities, as well 
as their rights and involvement in public life). In this sense they make up a deliberative system 
that is defined by the same geographic location and institution, focus on the same single issue 
and an ongoing relationship with each other and the County Council. Among them, 
Gloucestershire Voices is a non-profit organisation founded with the help of the County 
Council, whose stated aim is "to improve the lives of people with learning disabilities and to 
make sure that the voice of people with learning disabilities is heard clearly" 
(‘Gloucestershire Voices’ 2016). Gloucestershire Voices holds "Area Action Group" meetings 
in six locations across the county every two months (Cheltenham, Gloucester, Cirencester, 
Stroud, Coleford and Tewkesbury). These local meetings, which are open to residents with 
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learning disabilities, their carers and other stakeholders (NGO representatives, NHS staff, 
etc.) have a deliberative nature, where the participants "listen to what is happening at the 
Partnership Board, give their opinions as well as share what things they think the 
Partnership Board need to hear about and do something about" (Gloucestershire County 
Council 2011). Carers Gloucestershire is another independent charity, whose mission is "to 
enhance the lives of carers and empower them to make informed choices that have a 
positive influence on their lives” (Carers Gloucestershire 2016a). The carers in question are 
close family members of people with disabilities who provide unpaid care. Carers 
Gloucestershire hold regular deliberative meetings called "Carer Forums", which aim to 
create "a strong carer-led ‘voice’ to influence policy and services to improve outcomes for 
all carers" (Carers Gloucestershire 2016b) Finally, D.R.O.P. (Disabled Responsible Organised 
People) is an independent organisation set up by people with disabilities, whose aim is to 
"educate and empower ourselves to challenge the disabling society in order to achieve an 
equal society". DROP also hold regular deliberative meetings that are open to people with 
disabilities in Gloucester. Moreover, members of all three organisations participate in the 
monthly LDPB meetings that take place in the Shire Hall. They deliberate both in a personal 
capacity as disabled members of the public, as well as the representatives of their respective 
organisations, bringing to the table the decisions reached at their organisations' own 
deliberative meetings, therefore reflecting the preferences of their member or participant 
base. 
Each of these organisations have their own deliberative discussion and decision making 
processes, and their representatives participate in the monthly Learning Disability 
Partnership Board meetings that take place in the Shire Hall. The monthly LDPB meetings are 
the most comprehensive and widely attended deliberative events in the county so far as 
disability issues, advocacy and policymaking are concerned. While the Board itself does not 
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have executive power and therefore the decisions reached here are not binding, this is the 
one meeting in the county where all stakeholders and officials regularly attend, where every 
participant is given the platform to bring to the table their own voice and concerns, and as a 
result where the disability agenda for the whole County is discussed and shaped. At the 
organisational level, decisions reached at the LDPB meetings are transmitted to the Executive 
Board and the City Council Cabinet as a reference point for their executive decisions on 
disability issues. In this sense, LDPB meetings are the power centre in relation to other 
deliberative sites mentioned above. 
While the LDPB meetings take place in the Shire Hall (in the city centre), Gloucestershire 
Voices and Carers Gloucestershire hold their meetings in various locations across the county 
– community centres, libraries, cafes that are central and accessible to prospective 
participants. Both these organisations have their own offices and employ a number of full 
time staff for their activities. DROP on the other hand does have the use of an owned or 
rented office, and its meetings take place in a community centre in the outskirts of the city. 
DROP is also the only grassroots organisation among the three - it is founded and led by 
people with physical and cognitive disabilities. While the other organisations enjoy the use 
of raised and donated funds, DROP does not have regular access to funds, whether it be 
donated funds or funds raised by the members.  
DROP is distinct from the other organisations also in terms of its spatial positioning within the 
deliberative system. I have mentioned above that its meetings take place in a community hall in 
the outskirts of the city. Among all the other meetings I have attended in Gloucestershire, it was 
probably the DROP meeting which took place in a most underprivileged part of the city. This 
deliberative site was not only geographically, but also socio-economically distant from the Shire 
Hall as well as the other deliberative sites. The meetings took place in a run-down building in the 
middle of a council estate, with no sight of audio or visual equipment that I had come to expect 
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in other deliberative sites. To sum up, this was the most spatially distant and disadvantaged site 
among the others.108  
The disadvantaged feel of the site was only matched by the narrative dominant among DROP 
members. These were disabled grassroots activists who wanted to empower the disabled, and to 
that end engage with powerful organisations in a meaningful way, however felt that they were 
usually met with closed doors. They felt that their lobbying efforts were not met with sympathy, 
because they were seen as an angry, political group. They believed that the oppressive and 
disabling policies of the social services or other local authorities could be overcome, and that is why 
they carried on attending meetings organised by other non-profit organisations, as well as the LDPB 
meetings. However they wanted to also bring their critique to these meetings, but felt that while 
there is room for talking freely in many of these meetings, this freedom only existed in certain 
niches (including the LDPB meetings), and "across the hall in the same council building such 
freedom and safety of expression was not possible for an impaired person".109 DROP members' 
attendance in LDPB meetings was less regular compared to the attendance of other 
organisations' members. Among the reasons they cited were suspicions regarding the 
usefulness and decisiveness of LDPB meetings ("LDPB meetings' decisions don't lead to any 
real change for people with disabilities"), belief that the meetings were simply tokenistic, 
that their real concerns and critique were not appreciated or heard, and finally, the time and 
effort it took to travel to the city centre to attend the meetings. Depending on the type of 
meeting, they could also face access issues once inside the Shire Hall, as already explained 
above. 
                                                     
108 Office for National Statistics figures confirms my observation during my visit to the area. In terms 
of employment, 40% of the local population consisted of semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers, 
those on state benefits, and those who are unemployed or lowest grade workers. In terms of 
education, only 12% of the local population had a degree education or professional qualifications, 
whereas 35% has no GCSEs. Source and further details: Office for National Statistics, Neighbourhood 
Statistics for GL4 6JG, in Gloucester 011B (Super Output Area Lower Layer) 
http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk. 
109 Minutes of an informal meeting with DROP members, 28 October 2014. 
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DROP was clearly set apart from the rest of the organisations in a number of ways. First, it 
was the only organisation set up and run by people with disabilities. Second, it was the only 
organisation whose members believed and stated very clearly that they were not listened to 
or heard by the county council. Their suspicion towards LDPB meetings was rooted in this 
sense of being excluded. They did not feel part of the discussion and decision making 
processes in the Shire Hall. Third, DROP was the only organisation that was geographically 
located in an underprivileged area, distant from the town centre both socially and 
geographically. Geographical distance alone from the town centre or the Shire Hall does not 
of course indicate a lower place in a system of multiple deliberative sites. The Bath Place 
story above is a recent reminder that a site that is geographically located in the town centre 
can be socially undesirable and distant from centres of power. 
While there is insufficient evidence to establish a causal relationship between the social 
distance of the DROP site to Shire Hall and its members’ perception of voicelesness, the 
correlation between DROP’s geographical location, its social distance to Shire Hall and its 
members’ sense of powerlessness may not be simply coincidental. Smith and Easterlow, for 
example, not only suggest that health conditions and disability might be mapped onto places, 
but also that people whose health is already compromised might actively be placed into 
deprivation, which has geographical as well as socio-economic implications (Smith and 
Easterlow 2005, 177). Curtis and Reed in turn argue that groups in society which are most socially 
separate are quite often spatially distant as well, especially in their residential distribution (Curtis 
and Rees Jones 1998, 646). Their suggestion that one’s sense of moral responsibility for others 
tends to decay the more one is separated from them by distance might indeed affirm the 
perceptions of DROP members regarding their voicelesness in the Shire Hall. 
I have suggested in the introduction to this section that if space reflects power hierarchies by 
designating some locations more powerful than others, we can expect to see a correlation between 
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the social distance of a deliberative site to centres of power and that site's position in the 
deliberative system. The case of DROP seems to illustrate one such correlation. 
In conclusion, if we are to understand the barriers to the inclusion of people with disabilities in 
deliberative sites, we need to acknowledge and take into consideration the macro-spatial 
dimension – this requires an awareness of issues that run much deeper than physical access. In 
the above example of DROP, spatial positioning of deliberative sites in relation to one another 
further contribute to the perceived and real exclusion of the perspectives of a group of people 
with disabilities from the deliberative system. While I do not claim that the relationship between 
spatiality and exclusion from deliberation is one of causation in the macro sense, there are enough 
reasons in the spatiality literature and clues in the examples above for a correlation between 
spatiality, deliberation and transmission between different deliberative sites. Therefore 
organisation of space and the location of a deliberative site in a given system is a factor that needs 
to be accounted for in order for our analysis to be complete. 
Putting Insights into Practice 
I have mentioned in the introduction to this work that deliberative democracy has always 
harboured an emancipatory potential, a vision of giving otherwise disadvantaged groups voice 
and recognition. If the social organisation of space is as significant as its scholars and the above 
examples suggest in reproducing or mirroring the structures of exclusion and oppression in 
society, we need to start exploring the consequences of this new, spatial way of thinking about 
the deliberative site for how the site is organised, and how people with disabilities can be included 
in this spatial organisation. We need to also demystify spatiality and its veiled instrumentality of 
power to make theoretical and practical sense of deliberative democracy and its sites in order to 
realise further this emancipatory potential so far as people with disabilities are concerned. We 
must therefore take deliberative practices and institutions to task, criticise their workings which 
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appear to be neutral and independent, and unmask the obscure forms of exclusion, alienation and 
oppression that are exercised through the spatialities of these practices and institutions (Rabinow 
1984, 63). The above pages made it clear that spatiality can further disable or enable people with 
disabilities at two levels - either by setting up barriers to their deliberation within the deliberative 
site, or by spatially rendering some deliberative sites voiceless and their decisions inconsequential 
within a deliberative system. Therefore our task should be finding ways in which the organisation 
of deliberative spaces can enable and empower people with disabilities for inclusion and 
participation in deliberation at both levels. 
We can formulate at least two strategies through which participation can be spatially enabled or 
eased. Maintaining the dualities which have come up in the discussion above as a framework, we 
can first consider the bottom-up approach, where those who are excluded from empowered 
spaces and pushed to the margins present themselves to these spaces. I have already suggested 
this in Chapter 3, in the context of the practical implications of the embodiedness of deliberation. 
In practice, this would require an intentional and persistent appearance and participation of the 
excluded in sites of deliberative decision making. We can also consider a top-down approach, 
where those in the power centres can reach out to those who are excluded from empowered 
deliberation and join them in the margins. In practice, this would require a spatial awareness 
of where power exists and where it is absent, and whether or how it is transmitted. Based on 
these assessments, decision making power can then be spatially re-distributed by improving 
transmission channels and processes. 
If barriers to the participation of the disabled in deliberation in a single deliberative event 
have a spatial element as we have seen above, the disabled ought to resist and contest those 
barriers first acknowledging and then openly contesting them in their very spatial context - 
because contestation, like exclusion and dominance, has a spatiality. I have reflected in detail 
on the embodiedness of these bottom-down, out of place practices in Chapter 3, and 
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mentioned that they spatialise deliberative sites, or in other words, lay bare the spatiality 
that is in place in those sites. If the deliberative site is implying that the disabled are "out of 
place" when they are in the site, to engage in "out of place" practices intentionally and 
persistently can be a form of resistance and contestation against a deliberative site that 
imposes a disabling normative order (Cresswell 1996). These "out of place" practices not only 
give voice to the disabled in deliberation and provide self-empowerment during single 
deliberative events, but exercised consistently, they can be instrumental in changing the 
normative order that the space imposes. 
A few broad examples of these practices have already been given in Chapter 3 – Rosa Parks' 
insistence on sitting where she chose on in the bus was an "out of place" practice that 
challenged the spatiality of a public space. Disability activists' famous Capitol Crawl was 
similarly an "out of place" practice that challenged physical barriers to access to a power 
centre. In the context of single deliberative events we can think of a number of "out of place" 
practices that aim to challenge or alleviate the types of barriers and exclusions mentioned in 
the above sections.  
These practices, of course, stem from an understanding that space mirrors the fundamental 
power structures, and it tells the disabled where they belong and where they do not. Unlike 
the majority of the population who are generally unaware of the spatial processes of 
exclusion, people with disabilities do not need additional education to see, understand or 
feel how space excludes and marginalises them – this is a reality they experience daily 
(Kitchin 1998, 351). There is still, however, a case to be made for more intentional and 
persistent "out of place" practices to challenge and overcome exclusion, and for deliberative 
democrats in turn to accept these disruptions. 
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At the micro level we can take some cues from the examples from Gloucester above. People 
with disabilities as well as their allies should insist on demanding access when the space puts 
barriers to that access. If a deliberative event is arranged in such a way that the disabled are 
relegated to the back, to the least audible or visible corners of the room (e.g. the auditorium 
in the Shire Hall), especially in a deliberative event on disability issues, the disabled should 
attract the facilitator's attention to the problem of spatial exclusion and ask to be given access 
to more visible, audible parts of the room. When they are not heard because they cannot speak 
loudly enough they should request audio-visual enablers like microphones, access to 
workstations etc. Only by intentionally and persistently pointing out to the exclusion that 
spatiality engenders can people with disabilities and their allies both empower themselves and 
convince the decision makers of the significance of spatial arrangements. 
Attempting to challenge and overcome the excluding impact of spatiality at the macro level 
and the consequent problem of transmission between the public and empowered sites with 
a bottom-up approach might admittedly be less feasible because in many cases the 
conditions that create or contribute to the macro-spatial exclusion, which then lead to 
problems in transmission, will be systemic and structural. In this case, we should expect the 
onus for change and inclusive design to be on the shoulders of the institutional decision 
makers. Change should be initiated by institutional decision makers, happen at the systemic 
level and aim to improve the transmission gap between different sites of the deliberative 
system. 
In this instance systemic change need not mean that each and every deliberative site is 
equally empowered and that their deliberations are equally decisive. It should, however, 
mean that perspectives represented, and more importantly, decisions that are reached in 
each deliberative site are transmitted without any barriers from the more public to the 
more empowered deliberative sites. Turning once again to the illustrative case of 
  
182 
 
Gloucestershire's deliberative sites, the council ought to guarantee that the spatial 
elements which have been mentioned above do not interfere with the deliberative 
decision making process whereby each deliberative site's perspectives and decisions are 
ultimately transmitted to the next empowered site. 
Alleviating the macro-spatial barriers within a system can take different forms. The 
Gloucestershire Council, for example, can compensate for the distance between the public 
and empowered sites which DROP members believe contributes to the exclusion of their 
perspectives in the LDPB meetings. The council can provide free shuttles to the Shire Hall, 
which would close the physical distance. On the other hand, holding the monthly LDPB 
meetings in different locations, perhaps even rotating between the deliberative sites in the 
same area would help close the socio-economic distance. Rotation of LDPB meetings' 
locations would admittedly add a logistical burden to the council, however it would also 
ensure that no one physical site is associated with a privilege of decisiveness, and that 
decisions reached are backed by the force of the argument rather than of spatial 
arrangements. 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I had two goals. First, to highlight the much neglected significance of space 
and spatiality in deliberative democracy, and their impact on deliberation as well as 
transmission. Second, to show how the exclusion of people with disabilities from deliberative 
democratic processes and sites has a spatial element that should not go unnoticed – because 
these sites and processes cannot be made disability inclusive if the spatial dimensions of 
exclusion are not acknowledged and alleviated. I also suggested that if exclusion has a spatial 
dimension, challenging and alleviating that exclusion also ought to have a spatial element. 
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The illustrative cases from Gloucestershire disability community's deliberative meetings 
provided insights on how the spatiality of deliberative sites impact deliberation and 
transmission on the micro as well as the macro level. The organisation of deliberative space 
excludes, creates barriers, silences, leaves out and segregates, makes the disabled feel "out 
of place". Deliberative systems on the other hand can leave some deliberative sites outside 
the decision making processes by concentrating power and decisiveness in some sites and 
denying it to others. Spatiality can also give rise to problems in transmission, whereby 
decisions reached in one site are not transmitted to another due to the physical as well as 
socio-economic distance between two sites. 
 
Finally, the discussion in this chapter brings to the agenda of deliberative democracy scholars 
a new, perhaps limited, but nevertheless significant research question that needs to be 
explored further: What can deliberative democratic theory learn from theories of spatiality? 
The question is important because if spatiality does indeed affect deliberative processes as 
this chapter suggests, every deliberative site and system needs to take into account its 
effects in order to maintain deliberative democracy's so called superiority. Beyond the 
theoretical question however, practitioners of deliberative democracy - policy makers, 
designers and facilitators of deliberative institutions and events will gain much insight and 
improve the quality of their designs as well as deliberative events taking the necessary steps 
to offset the impact of spatiality. 
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CONCLUSION 
In March 2015, scholars and practitioners of deliberative democracy came together in a 
workshop hosted by The Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance at the 
University of Canberra to share their experiences and insights from research and practice. 
After a brief overview of deliberative democracy’s achievements in the last three decades, 
Carolyn Hendriks from the Australian National University presented future topics and 
challenges for research. The role of non-verbal communication in deliberation, boundaries 
of deliberation in relation to power and self-interest, and the question of who is excluded 
(e.g. children, ethnic groups, the disabled, animals) were mentioned as “cutting edge” issues 
that deliberative democrats would have to engage with (Institute for Governance and Policy 
Analysis 2015). 
The issue of disability in deliberative democracy was indeed waiting to be discovered in light 
of the proliferation of deliberative events and the prevalence of disabilities in any given society. 
I have stated in the introduction that the normative concern of this work is to recover and 
indeed to advance the emancipatory credentials and vision of deliberative democracy by 
bringing up this issue. With this goal in mind I have attempted to identify the roots of the issue 
and provide a solution that will on one hand improve deliberative democracy’s emancipatory 
credentials and on the other hand give its practitioners a model for inclusion. 
The Issue Identified and Explored 
Deliberative democrats were aware of the theory’s cognitive burden and demands almost 
from the beginning, as the discussion on the “turns” of deliberative democracy makes clear. 
Indeed, the development of deliberative democracy has always relied on a pattern of an 
ongoing dialogue between its theory and practice. However, I argued that throughout these 
dialogues and the development of deliberative democracy over the last three decades, people 
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with disabilities were consistently left outside the scope of discussions that aimed to make 
deliberative democracy more democratic, relevant and applicable. 
 
I identified three root causes for this exclusion. First, deliberative democracy’s convergence 
with liberalism – as it flourished in liberal contexts – led to the construction of the deliberative 
citizen as a liberal citizen. As a result, those who do not have the competencies expected from 
liberal citizenship have been left out of the scope of discussions about, as well as critique of 
deliberative democracy. Second, deliberative democracy’s neglect of the embodiedness of 
deliberation, again linked to its convergence with liberalism, conceptualised a deliberative site 
which normalised able-bodiedness and left out deviant bodies. This neglect also prevents 
deliberative democrats from a complete understanding of deliberative communication, since 
they leave the bodily aspects of communication outside of their analysis. Finally, deliberative 
democracy’s neglect of the spatiality of deliberative sites at both micro and macro levels lead 
to the under theorisation of the role of social and physical arrangements and distance in 
questions regarding inclusion and exclusion. I summarise each of these points in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
The Liberal Deliberative Citizen 
Deliberative democratic theory’s marriage with liberalism lies at the heart of these 
assumptions about the deliberative citizen. As a result, deliberative democrats follow liberal 
constructions of citizenship. This citizen is self-sufficient and independent, egocentric and 
primarily interested in pursuing her own self-interests. The liberal citizen is also able-bodied: 
her physical and psychological needs and capacities are within the “normal” range. 
Deliberative citizens have roughly similar physical and cognitive powers, and as I have 
explained quoting from Rawls, those who are below the line of this “normal” are not an 
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immediate concern of liberal theories. Their needs can be met once the society has agreed on 
principles of justice and through legislative means. This need meeting is seen as a purely 
medical, bureaucratic and distributive process, aiming to “restore” people with disabilities 
into fully functioning citizens. 
These assumptions lead to a number of specific problems, which I grouped under the four 
headings of participation, rationality, language and equality. The assumptions pose a 
problem in terms of participation, because the demands of the deliberative site might  
prevent the presence, voice or representation of all relevant parties in a deliberative site. 
When these demands privilege the able-bodied, it may prove to be impossible for people 
with disabilities to be part of deliberative decision making processes. Demands about 
rationality further disadvantage those who deviate from the norms that define citizens’ 
competencies. Deliberative rationality is usually linked to basic cognitive capacities to 
formulate and defend arguments in an understandable and persuasive way, which 
marginalise those who speak less well, or who speak in ways that are devalued by the 
dominant culture. People with disabilities are further disadvantaged in terms of the use 
of language, as in many instances they may not have the best grasp of language to speak 
eloquently. As a result, although deliberative theory is built on the principles of equal 
access and equal opportunity to articulate persuasive arguments, in its practice people 
with disabilities are given neither access to the site nor opportunity to voice their 
preferences. 
 
The four deliberative events from different countries show the extent of this exclusion 
at work. All four cases illustrate that while deliberative democrats are aware of the need 
for an inclusive and representative deliberative site, the citizenry that they imagine does 
not include people with disabilities. Their attempts to create a microcosm of the society 
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often do not go further than recruiting to the deliberative site through random or 
stratified samples of the population. Giving each citizen an equal chance of being 
selected to participate in deliberation might be adequate for a demographically diverse 
deliberative site in relatively equal societies, however it does not stop the systematic 
exclusion of the disabled from participation. 
 
The Embodiedness of Disability and Deliberation 
One of the issues we encountered while discussing the conceptualisation of the 
deliberative citizen and the insights gained from disability models was that deliberative 
democratic theory and its deliberative sites take for granted the mind / body dualism 
and privilege the mind over the body. Indeed, no account of deliberative democracy 
acknowledges the embodiedness of interlocutors in the deliberative site. Deliberation is 
equated with linguistic communication in a narrow cognitivist sense and the significance 
of human embodiment, emotion or imagination is completely ignored although our 
experience of both communication and being with others is simply and always an 
embodied experience. However it is important to remember that disembodiedness 
assumes bodily normality (i.e. able-bodiedness). As a result, the body only becomes 
noticeable when it displays difference, in particular in the case of those whose 
differences render them visible in a matrix of asymmetrical power relationships. In the 
context of able-bodiedness versus disability, this means the conceptualisation of the 
deliberation and the deliberative site as disembodied renders the disabled abnormal and 
out of place. 
Failing to recognise the embodiedness of deliberation also causes deliberative democrats 
to ignore or miss a significant dimension of communication in their analysis. As the DQI 
example shows, awareness of and attention to the bodily aspects of deliberation can 
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enable deliberative democrats to analyse and understand at a much deeper and arguably 
more accurate level what really happens during deliberation. Therefore any attempt to 
understand deliberation must find a way to take into account bodily cues, some of which 
were mentioned in the DQI example as shouting, laughing, crying, standing up, raising hands 
(for example in disbelief) and so on. 
 
The Spatiality of Deliberative Sites 
While disability studies scholarship has always been interested in the spatial dimensions of 
exclusion, deliberative democrats have not yet fully acknowledged the significance and role of 
spatial arrangements in deliberation. At the micro level, awareness of spatial arrangements and 
how the site is organised can help us identify who is allocated where and for what reason, who 
has access to various objects or privileges (e.g. speaking platform, microphone, projector etc.) 
and under what conditions they have this access. The answers to these questions then can inform 
us about the power relations that are not immediately visible during deliberation. 
Spatiality of deliberative sites is also significant in a systemic analysis, because the spatial 
positioning of the different sites of the same deliberative system in relation to one another has 
an impact on the decision making processes that take place in that system, namely the 
decisiveness of deliberation and the transmission between different sites. In other words, the 
social distance between deliberative sites can be indicative of the power relationships which have 
a direct impact on the consequentiality of the decisions that are taken in that site. Moreover, in 
some instances – as in the DROP example – physical distance might also be indicative of social 
distance. This discussion brings back the distinction made in the deliberative democracy 
literature between public and empowered sites, and suggests that the spatial dimension of this 
distinction has to be taken into consideration to fully understand questions regarding inclusion 
and exclusion. 
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Solutions: An Inclusive Model for Deliberative Democracy 
Having identified the issues that prevent people with disabilities from participation in 
deliberative democratic decision making processes, I proposed an inclusive model of 
deliberative democracy that constructs the deliberative citizen as a citizen with a caring 
orientation, acknowledges the embodiedness of disability as well as deliberation, and employs 
the embodied presence of disability as a claim for recognition and inclusion. The inclusion of the 
disability perspective in deliberative sites makes decisions epistemically superior both because 
of the intrinsic and procedural value of inclusion. Finally, this inclusive model also acknowledges 
the role of the spatiality of deliberative sites at both micro and macro levels, leading to a theory 
and practice that is spatially inclusive as well. 
From a liberal to a caring orientation 
Deliberative democrats’ construction of the deliberative citizen following liberal assumptions 
leave us with two main problems to solve. The first problem is to do with the pre-deliberation 
recruitment process. As we have seen, the disabled are absent from deliberative sites, and 
their absence is for the most part not noticed or problematized. The second problem is to do 
with what happens during deliberation – as long as the disabled and able-bodied citizens share 
the same deliberative space as liberal citizens, the demands of the deliberative site will always 
render the disabled disadvantaged and less powerful compared to the able bodied. 
To alleviate the first problem, I have argued that the recruitment methods that are used most 
often by deliberative democrats, namely random sampling and stratified sampling, must be 
modified to guarantee the presence of the disabled in deliberative sites. While we can expect 
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random and especially stratified random sampling to bring an adequate cross-section of society 
to the deliberative site, the systematic exclusion of people with disabilities, especially in light of 
the stigma and prejudice that they face in public, requires additional measures to be taken for 
their inclusion. These additional measures may include over sampling of people with disabilities 
during recruitment, or establishing a quota in the deliberative site to make sure that their 
perspectives are recognised and heard in deliberative sites. 
The second problem is less likely to be solved by short-term measures. I contend that in the face 
of the engrained marginalisation, disadvantage and stigma that people with disabilities face 
every day, a fundamental orientation change is required for the disabled to take their place in 
deliberation as equals. Beyond attitudes, the communication needs of a disabled person may 
require more costly adjustments, more time, more attention, even more patience from the 
interlocutors in a deliberative site. A caring orientation, with its emphasis on interdependence 
as opposed to independence provides deliberative democratic theory with the theoretical 
resources to justify the additional cost inclusion may require.  
Embodied Presence and Perspectives  
While deliberative democratic theory and its deliberative sites take for granted the mind over 
body dualism and privilege the mind over the body, rejecting the mind over body dualism and 
acknowledging the embodiedness of deliberation helps open up a discussion about the practical 
inclusion of people with disabilities in deliberative sites. The embodiedness of disability can be 
employed as a political claim that makes visible the exclusion, and the unexpected presence of 
the embodied citizen in the deliberative site can be a demand for recognition and voice. The 
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embodied presence of the person with a disability in the deliberative site can make the 
interlocutors accessible and subject to each other and thereby mitigate the stigma and social 
distance that people with disabilities find themselves subject to. Moreover, encountering one 
another in the presence of vulnerability may also engender a re-humanising and caring response 
whereas distance and segregation dehumanize. The embodied presence of the disabled in 
deliberative sites also lays bare its workings that might appear to be neutral, independent or 
idealised. Consequently, it politicises the deliberative site because hidden in these distances and 
exclusion are power relations that dictate who is in and out, who belongs and who does not 
belong and so on. Finally, the embodied presence of the disabled person in the deliberative site 
performs deliberation by making exclusion visible. The significance of the embodiedness of 
disability and deliberation, require deliberative democrats to take into account the bodily 
dimensions of deliberation. In practice, this means including the bodily and non-verbal aspects 
of communication in their measurement toolkits. The additional, social bond creating benefits 
of participation also make deliberation in physical spaces especially relevant in this context. 
Therefore, once again, practitioners of deliberative democracy will have to proactively recruit 
people to participate in deliberative sites. 
However, this presence goes beyond the above claims and brings an epistemic superiority to 
the deliberative decision making process, which means that decisions that are reached in more 
inclusive sites lead to epistemically better outcomes. I explained this epistemic superiority on 
the grounds that inclusivity has an intrinsic as well procedural benefits. The intrinsic value of 
inclusivity is based on deliberative democracy’s emphasis on equal political autonomy or equal 
consideration of citizens. It is a benefit on its own independent of the quality of the outcomes 
of deliberation. Epistemic procedural value on the other hand suggests that the wider the range 
of opinions in the deliberative site, the better the outcomes will be. 
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This is especially true considering that the perspectives of people with disabilities are products 
of a particular experience that originates from a very distinct social knowledge. People with 
disabilities bring to the deliberative site the knowledge of a different type of living the everyday 
life, a different type of communication and interaction with others. When their reasons or 
opinions are taken into consideration during deliberation, what is acknowledged is more than 
an individual’s opinion – that particular reason or opinion finds its source in the shared 
perspective of disability. 
Due to the nature of a given disability, there may be times and circumstances that make it hard 
or impossible for this perspective to be communicated by the disabled themselves. While the 
presence of the disabled person is still significant for the reasons above and therefore still 
required, this presence also needs to be translated into preference by a representative of the 
disabled person who has a good claim to represent her. In this case, I proposed that the care 
relationships between people with disabilities and their carers can be potential bases for 
representational claims or mutual enactments of citizenship, whereby the disabled may be 
physically present in deliberative sites with the persons who care for them as communicative-
others who share and represent their perspectives, and who act as translators of their 
preferences. I have given examples of how these representative relationships could look, using 
a number of different scenarios. In terms of practical applications for deliberative democrats 
and especially facilitators of deliberative sites, I suggest with this model that invitations (or 
quotas) are extended to people with disabilities with an awareness of a potential need for a 
communicative-other to be present with them, and possible necessary accommodations.  
Spatial Arrangements of the Deliberative Site 
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Finally, spatial arrangements of deliberative sites, both at the micro level of the single 
deliberative site and the macro level of multiple sites within a deliberative system, should reflect 
an awareness of how space has an impact on the power relations and therefore both the quality 
and consequentiality of deliberation. When people with disabilities are present in a deliberative 
site, their needs regarding access and voice should be taken into account: physical access to the 
site, seating arrangements, access to audio-visual help, visibility and audibility of interlocutors 
and so on. Similarly, deliberative democrats in their analysis and   practitioners in their 
organisation and facilitation of deliberation should continually ask themselves whether and how 
their choice of location for a deliberative event has any negative (or positive) implications 
regarding the space-power relationship that has been explored earlier. As I have indicated, 
physical distance and social distance may be mutually constitutive, however social distance is 
not always implied in physical distance. 
Further Reflections 
While my immediate concern in this work is the inclusion of the disabled, the ideas that I 
introduce and the solutions I propose point to a twofold or two-dimensional contribution to the 
literature. The first dimension deals with the immediate concern – the inclusion of the disabled 
– in the narrow sense. However it becomes clear very quickly that concepts, insights gained and 
literatures engaged with in the process of looking for a solution point to wider implications that 
move beyond the immediate concerns of this work. These concepts and corresponding insights, 
which deliberative democrats have either completely ignored or engaged with only 
inadequately, for example the construction of the deliberative citizen as a liberal citizen, the 
embodiedness of deliberation, the spatiality of the deliberative site, can have wider implications 
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in a number of contexts that  go beyond the scope of this work. We can think of a number of 
marginalised communities or identities for whom these ideas may be relevant. Immigrants, 
especially those who do not speak the local language, the long term unemployed, or those who 
are incarcerated immediately come to mind. If their exclusion from decision making processes, 
and especially deliberative sites display similarities with the exclusion and marginalisation that 
the disabled face, there are probably convergences waiting to be explored. 
In many ways this work is only a preface to many of the issues raised. While the ideas I have 
presented here have had their roots in my observations of practice and the interaction of that 
practice with the theory in turn, it will still be necessary to ask what sense people make in 
practice of this model. Therefore the theory, as well as practitioners of deliberative democracy 
will benefit from future trials of the model I propose, especially through empirical search for 
evidence.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
List of Conversations and Meetings Used as “Aids to Insight” 
 
Conversation with Barnwood Trust Staff, 4 December 2013 
Location: Barnwood Trust, Ullenhall. 
Present: Clare Fletcher (Research Manager), Philip Booth, Hettie Peplow and Maureen 
Rowcliffe-quarry (Community Inclusion Workers). 
 
Discussion: 
In this introductory meeting in Gloucestershire, my goal was to understand the makeup of 
the disability community in the county, along with the actors and structures that are 
involved. I introduced myself and my work, and asked them what their roles as “community 
inclusion workers” involved. I did not use structured questions, but instead started a 
conversation with the individuals.  It was in this meeting that the LDPB meetings in 
Gloucestershire were first mentioned by Philip Booth. And it was through his introduction to 
the LDPB chairs that I made first contact with the LDPB chairs.  It was also at this meeting 
that Maureen told me the story about the cafes in a Gloucestershire town, which I reflect on 
as an illustrative scenario, “the story of a missed opportunity” (see p. 148 ff).  
Clare summarised her experience and view on participatory politics as follows: Participatory 
events are tokenistic almost all the time. Legitimate decision making processes are not open 
to the influence of people with disabilities. Sites of influence are usually different than the 
sites where people with disabilities give their views. Representation is also problematic, as 
one person with a disability cannot represent another person with a disability just because 
they are both disabled. Therefore it is vital to support each and every person to find their 
own voice. 
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Better Buses Meeting, 29 January 2014 
Location: Shire Hall (Gloucester) 
 
Better Buses campaign started in January 2012 in partnership between Gloucester LDPB and 
Gloucestershire Voices, to address local transport issues that people with disabilities face.  
During workshops facilitated by Gloucestershire Voices, 43 different issues came up. The 
group meets every two months to deliberate and act on these issues. 
 
Present:  
Kathy Williams (Cabinet Member, Mental Disability and Long Term Care), Alan Bentley 
(Gloucestershire Integrated Transport Manager), Philip Booth (Barnwood Trust), Janet 
(Gloucestershire Voices, Self-advocacy development worker), Zara H. (LDPB co-chair, 
Learning Disabilities Service User), Nick (Gloucestershire Voices co-director, LD Service User), 
Nick (LD Service User), Nathan (LD Service User), Thomas (LD Service User), Natasha (Council 
Staff), Vikki (Council Staff). 
 
Agenda: 
Stagecoach presentation practice by Janet, Nick, Nick, Thomas, Sara, in preparation for the 
Stagecoach meeting the following week.  
Travel Buddy Presentation by Nathan 
Discussion regarding the future of the group (funding cuts coming in place, some will lose 
jobs/positions). 
Traveline Website discussion (process report by Natasha). 
Bus Passes discussion (process report by Nicki). 
Hate Crimes discussion. 
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LDPB Meeting, 17 February 2014. 
Location: Shire Hall (Gloucester) 
 
Present: LDPB Co-chairs (Jan M. and Zara H.), Sam C., Andy M. (Community Protection 
Inspector), Jonathan J., Margin A. (Gloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group), Nicky S., 
Julie P. (GCC Staff) Gloucestershire Voices Staff, Carers, Service users (individuals with 
disabilities). 
 
Agenda 
Gloucestershire Voices Update (Information) 
Gloucestershire Concordat, “Free to be me Spaces” (Information and Discussion) 
Hate Crime Reporting (Information and Discussion) 
Benefits and Universal Credit (Information and Discussion) 
Joining up your Care (Information and Discussion) 
 
In this first LDPB meeting that I attended I introduced myself and joined in the discussions 
like every other board participant. I was introduced to Zara, the LDPB co-chair who is also a 
service user, and had a conversation with her about how much she likes being part of the 
board. Discovering that I come from a university – and am therefore an expert – Zara asked 
me a number of questions about how well I think they are doing as the LDPB board chair and 
members. 
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LDPB Annual General Meeting, 31 March 2014 
Location: Main Hall, Guildhall, Gloucester. 
Present: LDPB Co-chairs (Jan M. and Zara H.), Suzie P., Sam C., Andy M. (Community 
Protection Inspector), Liana M., Fiona W., Nathan W., Jonathan J., Mark A. (Gloucestershire 
Clinical Commissioning Group), Nicky S., Julie P. (GCC Staff) Gloucestershire Voices Staff, 
Carers, Service users (individuals with disabilities). 
 
Agenda 
Employment Group Presentation 
Housing Group Presentation 
Community Inclusion Presentation 
Health Presentation 
Gloucestershire Voices Presentation 
Disability Partnership Award Ceremony  
 
LDPB Meeting, 24 April 2014 
Location: Shire Hall (Gloucester) 
Present: Agy P. (GCC), Ailsa L., Alex P., Becky C., Janet H., Jan. G., Jordan R.W., Nathan W. 
(Service users), Jan M., Zara H. (LDPB Co-chairs), Ann A., Brenda B. (Parent carers), Richard 
C. (Care Services), Sam C. (Support Officer), Simon S. (2gether), Sue W. (Family carer), 
Gloucestershire Voices Staff, Vikki W., Karen R. H. (GCC). 
 
Agenda 
Gloucestershire Voices – Area Action Groups Update (Information) 
Building Better Lives Consultation (Discussion) 
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(Deliberation on what needs to happen in each of the 7 policy areas: Independence, Early 
Help, Inclusion, Contribution, Personalisation, Shared Responsibility, Whole Life Approach) 
New Communication Strategy (Information and Discussion) 
 
Conversation with Jan Marriott, 2 June 2014 
Location: Gloucester 
In this first face to face meeting, I introduced my work to Jan and asked for her feedback. At 
this point my ideas on the significance of embodiedness and caring citizenship had already 
been formed. Therefore I had the opportunity to ask her feedback on these ideas. It was also 
at this meeting where we had a discussion about Jan’s serving tea to a service user who 
arrived at the LDPB meeting late (see p. 120).  
 
Conversation with Steve Strong, 2 August 2014 
Location: Stroud 
Steve Strong was the Manager for Gloucestershire Voices, a user-led organization which took 
active part in LDPB meetings in Gloucestershire. In this first meeting I introduced my work 
and asked Steve to comment on my ideas on embodiedness and caring citizenship. We also 
had a conversation about the role of carers and non-disabled others in the lives of people 
with disabilities. This discussion informed and shaped my thoughts on carers being disabled 
together with those who they care for. 
 
LDPB Meeting, 18 August 2014 
Location: Shire Hall (Gloucester) 
Present: Agy P. (GCC), Ailsa L., Alex P., Becky C., Janet H., Jan. G., Jordan R.W., Nathan W. 
(Service users), Jan M., Zara H. (LDPB Co-chairs), Ann A., Brenda B. (Parent carers), Richard 
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C. (Care Services), Sam C. (Support Officer), Simon S. (2gether), Sue W. (Family carer), 
Gloucestershire Voices Staff, Vikki W., Karen R. H. (GCC). 
 
Agenda: 
Gloucestershire Voices AAG Update (Information) 
Carers Update (Information and Discussion) 
Healthy Weight Workshop (Discussion – What steps should be taken for a balanced diet, 
Being Active, Services) 
Keeping Safe Discussion 
 
Conversation with Jan Marriott, 21 August 2014 
Location: Gloucester  
In this meeting we discussed the challenges people with disabilities face in their participation 
in meetings and events that take place in the Town Hall (Shire Hall), and how the institutional 
set up of the County Council prevents the participation of people with disabilities from being 
part of decision making processes.  
 
LDPB Meeting, 27 October 2014 
Location: Shire Hall (Gloucester) 
Present: Agy P. (GCC), Andy M. (Community Protection Inspector), Ailsa L., Alex P., Becky C., 
Janet H., Jan. G., Jordan R.W., Nathan W. (Service users), Jan M., Zara H. (LDPB Co-chairs), 
Ann A., Brenda B. (Parent carers), Richard C. (Care Services), Sam C. (Support Officer), Simon 
S. (2gether), Sue W. (Family carer), Gloucestershire Voices Staff, Vikki W., Karen R. H. (GCC). 
 
Agenda: 
Gloucestershire Voices AAG Update (Information) 
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Carers Update (Information) 
Building Better Lives Update (Information) 
Challenging Behaviour Strategy Update (Information) 
Dysphagia Discussion (Information and Discussion) 
 
Conversation with DROP members, 28 October 2014 
Location: Redwell Centre, Matson, Gloucester. 
Present: Liam S.W., Siobhan S.W., Rob S., Rich A.  
D.R.O.P. (Disabled Responsible Organised People) is an independent organisation set up by 
people with disabilities, whose aim is to "educate and empower ourselves to challenge the 
disabling society in order to achieve an equal society". DROP also hold regular deliberative 
meetings that are open to people with disabilities in Gloucester (see p. 178). 
I attended one of DROP’s regular Tuesday afternoon meetings as an observant, however 
after the structured part of the meeting I was given the opportunity to introduce myself and 
present my work. We had a rich and wide-ranging discussion especially on the intersection 
of disability, power and decision making processes, which informed my thoughts on the 
relationship between spatiality and power (see Chapter 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
